







to Assessment and Control
Mania PAVELLA
University of Liège, Belgium
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The market liberalization is expected to affect drastically the operation of
power systems, which under economical pressure and increasing amount of
transactions are being operated much closer to their limits than previously.
These changes put the system operators faced with rather different and much
more problematic scenarios than in the past. They have now to calculate
available transfer capabilities and manage congestion problems in a near on-
line environment, while operating the transmission system under extremely
stressed conditions. This requires highly reliable and efficient software aids,
which today are non-existent, or not yet in use.
One of the most problematic issues, very much needed but not yet en-
countered today, is on-line dynamic security assessment and control, enabling
the power system to withstand unexpected contingencies without experienc-
ing voltage or transient instabilities. This monograph is devoted to a unified
approach to transient stability assessment and control, called SIngle Machine
Equivalent (SIME).
SIME is a hybrid direct-temporal method which processes information about
the system behavior in order to get one-shot stability assessment in the same way
as direct methods. It crystalizes a long research effort developed by the group at
University of Liège in the field of direct approaches to transient stability. Two
distinct methodologies have thus emerged over the years, depending upon the
type of temporal information used. The one, called “preventive SIME”, relies
on time-domain (T-D) programs to get information about simulated stability
scenarios of anticipated contingencies. The second, called “emergency SIME”,
uses real-time measurements which take into account the actual occurrence of
a contingency.
The preventive SIME combines advantages of T-D and of direct methods,
evades their difficulties and broadens their capabilities. In particular, it pre-
serves the assets of T-D methods: accuracy, and ability to handle any power
system modeling, to process any contingency scenario and to analyze any type
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of instability (first- or multi-swing; plant or inter-area mode oscillations). Be-
sides, it speeds up the assessment of T-D methods, and opens new possibilities
so far considered beyond reach. Such an important achievement is control, i.e.,
design of near optimal preventive countermeasures.
The emergency SIME, on the other hand, processes real-time measurements
in order to design, in real time, corrective actions able to contain the system’s
loss of synchronism, just after a contingency has actually occurred. The
emergency control is performed in a closed-loop fashion, comprising predictive
stability assessment, predictive control design, and predictive assessment of the
effectiveness of the triggered control action.
Despite their conceptual differences, both approaches rely on the same prin-
ciples.
The content of the book is divided in seven chapters and two appendices.
The first chapter deals with the transient stability problem, its formulation,
modeling, conventional analysis and a historical overview of the two non-
conventional classes of methods available today: direct and automatic learning
ones. Reviewing direct methods contributes to understanding the incentives
having led to the development of hybrid direct ones, like SIME. On the other
hand, the overview of automatic learning methods intends to inform about the
essentials of this important class of emerging transient stability methods. The
chapter ends up with a restatement of the scope of the book.
Chapters 2 and 3 are the core of the general SIME methodology, whatever
the subsequent developments and uses.
Chapter 4 deals with the foundations of the preventive SIME and covers all
aspects of transient stability assessment and control. In particular, contingency
filtering and ranking, contingency assessment, and (simultaneous) stabilization
of harmful contingencies, i.e. control.
The various functions developed in Chapter 4 are organized in Chapter 5 in
an integrated transient stability assessment and control package. Its interface
with an OPF algorithm is also advocated and illustrated on a case-study using a
real-world problem. Further, the integration of this package in an energy man-
agement system or dispatcher training simulator environment is also considered
for real-time operation.
Chapter 6 lays the foundations of the emergency SIME method, designed
for real-time closed-loop emergency control. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes
essential features of preventive and emergency SIMEs, discusses various types
of control (preventive, open-loop and closed-loop emergency controls) and fi-
nally proposes a comparison of SIME with time-domain and automatic learning
methods.
Throughout the monograph, several simulations illustrate and emphasize
various facets of the method, using two different types of power systems: a
xv
simple 3-machine system, to help the reader understand the basic ideas and to
allow easy simulations, using for example MATLAB. The second type concerns
real-world or realistic large-scale power systems. They contribute to a better
understanding of complex transient stability phenomena and illustrate how the
method handles them.
The monograph gives a detailed account of the method and provides the
material necessary for all those who, one way or another, want to learn and
use it. More generally, the monograph is intended for researchers or utility
engineers who want to develop various types of transient stability software
packages (e.g., contingency filtering and ranking; real-time preventive control;
integrated schemes for transient stability-constrained available transfer capa-
bility calculations; real-time closed-loop emergency control; etc.). In short, for
all those who are involved in software development and implementation of dy-
namic security tools in planning studies, in control center energy management
systems, or in dedicated emergency controls of important power system sites.
Throughout the preparation of the monograph, we have greatly benefited
from the help and advice of many collaborators and PhD students. The SIME
method itself is based on the PhD thesis of Dr Yiwei Zhang who elaborated
a hybrid version of the EEAC method, previously developed by Dr Y. Xue in
his PhD thesis. The method has evolved over the years, and has been tested
thanks to various collaborations with industries, in particular with Electricité
de France, Hydro-Québec, Electrabel and more recently with Electric Power
Research Institute. We also acknowledge the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia
y Tecnologia, Mexico for supporting the PhD studies of Daniel Ruiz-Vega.
Finally we are most grateful to Mrs Marie-Berthe Lecomte, who patiently and
skillfully typed the text.
Notation
All abbreviations, acronyms and symbols are fully defined at the place they
are first introduced. As a convenience to the reader, we have collected below
some of the more frequently used ones in several places.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ATC : available transfer capability
CCT : critical clearing time (of a contingency); denoted also
 
CT : clearing time (of a contingency); denoted also
 
CM : critical machine
EAC : equal-area criterion
EMS : energy management system
FACTS : flexible alternating current transmission system
MIP : maximum integration period
NM : non-critical machine
OMIB : one-machine infinite bus
SIME : single machine equivalent
sTDI : seconds of T-D integration
SVC : static VAR compensator
TSA : transient stability assessment
TSA&C : transient stability assessment and control
T-D : time-domain
TSL : transient stability-limited
VAR : volt-ampere-reactive
3  SC : three-phase short circuit  
clearing time (of a contingency); denoted also CT
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BASIC SYMBOLS
Unless otherwise specified, the following symbols refer to OMIB parame-
ters:
 
: OMIB mechanical (active) power  
: OMIB electrical power 
: OMIB accelerating power
: OMIB inertia coefficient
: OMIB rotor angle
: OMIB “return” angle, i.e., maximum angular derivation of a stable simulation	
: OMIB unstable angle
 : OMIB rotor speed  	
: time to (reach) instability conditions, i.e. to reach
 	
  





stand respectively for “during-fault” and “post-fault” (configuration)
stands for “critical”; e.g.,

: inertia coefficient of the group of CMs
stands for “non-critical”; e.g.

: inertia coefficient of the group of NMs stands for “elimination”; e.g.,    : (contingency) clearing time stands for “return”; e.g.,   : “return angle”;    :“return time”   stands for “stable” stands for “unstable”
MISCELLANY
  
(active) power generation of the group of CMs  
(active) power generation of the  -th CM 
(active) power generation of the group of NMs 
(active) power generation of the  -th NM 
electrical “distance”, i.e. angular deviation, between the  -th CM
and the most advanced NM
Chapter 1
BACKGROUND
The objectives of this Chapter are:
to define the transient stability problem in the realm of power system se-
curity, its operating modes, application contexts and corresponding needs
(Section 2);
to elaborate on transient stability phenomena and modeling (Section 3)
and discuss about main strengths and weaknesses of the conventional time-
domain approach (Section 4);
to review the “conventional” direct approaches, examine whether and to
which extent they are able to cover (some of) the needs in transient stability
studies, and introduce the spirit of the method developed in this monograph
(Section 5);
to give a summary of the class of automatic learning methods, so as to
subsequently enable comparisons between them and the method developed
in this monograph (Section 6);
to describe the scope and overall organization of this monograph (Sec-
tion 7).
1. INTRODUCTION
Power systems transient stability phenomena are associated with the oper-
ation of synchronous machines in parallel, and become important with long-
distance heavy power transmissions.
From a physical viewpoint, transient stability may be defined as the ability of
a power system to maintain machines’ synchronous operation when subjected
to large disturbances.
From the system theory viewpoint, power system transient stability is a
strongly nonlinear, high-dimensional problem. To assess it accurately, one
1
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therefore has to resort to numerical integration methods, referred to as “time-
domain” (T-D) methods. Historically, T-D methods started being used before
the advent of numerical computers: calculations of very simplified (and hence
of reduced dimensionality) versions of the system dynamic equations were car-
ried out manually to compute the machines’ “swing curves”, i.e. the machines’
rotor angle evolution with time [Park and Bancker, 1929].
Another way of tackling transient stability is a graphical method, popularized
in the thirties, and called “equal-area criterion” (EAC). This method deals with
a one-machine system connected to an “infinite” bus and studies its stability
by using the concept of energy, which removes the necessity of plotting swing
curves. EAC has been - and still is - considered to be an extraordinarily powerful
tool for assessing stability margins and limits, for evaluating the influence of
various system parameters, and more generally for providing insight into the
very physical transient stability phenomena. Note that the origin of EAC is not
well known; rather, reference is often made to books, like [Dahl, 1938, Skilling
and Yamakawa, 1940, Kimbark, 1948], which are among the first to use this
criterion.
Actually, the EAC energy concept is a particular case of the Lyapunov’s
general theory yielding the Lyapunov energy-type function applied to a one-
machine infinite bus system.
The Western technical literature recognizes Magnusson [Magnusson, 1947]
as being the first to use the concept of energy for studying multimachine power
systems transient stability. About 10 years later, he was followed by Aylett
[Aylett, 1958]. Magnusson and Aylett may therefore be considered as the
forerunners of the application of Lyapunov’s method to power system stability.
The actual application of the Lyapunov’s method to power systems appears for
the first time in publications of the “Russian school” (e.g., see Gorev [Gorev,
1960], Putilova and Tagirov [Putilova and Tagirov, 1970] and the references
therein); they were followed by two American publications: Gless [Gless,
1966] and El-Abiad and Nagappan [El-Abiad and Nagappan, 1966]. These
publications mark the beginning of a tremendous research effort - maybe one
of the most intensive in technical matters.
Such a fascination for the Lyapunov approach to power system stability may
stem from the appeal of both, the theory as such, and the expected promising
capabilities of this approach to cover practical stringent needs that T-D ap-
proaches cannot meet satisfactorily. Such needs started being felt round the
seventies; and the emerging liberalization of the energy sector renders them
even more acute and urgent.
Almost at the same time, other types of approaches started emerging. They
were initiated in the context of pattern recognition [Dy-Liacco, 1968, Koizumi
et al., 1975]; see also a review of methods in [Prabhakara and Heydt, 1987].
Quite soon, however, it became clear that such methods could not be developed
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satisfactorily because the computer facilities available in those years were
insufficient to meet their demanding needs. Thus, despite thoughtful attempts,
these methods started becoming effective only two decades later. Actually, they
led to the broader and more elaborate class of “automatic learning” methods.
Today, the tremendous progress in computer technology together with the
availability of bulky data bases for transient stability purposes yield impressive
achievements in this field.
This introductory chapter aims at giving a synoptical but complete picture
of recent breakthroughs in transient stability assessment and control before
focusing on the very subject matter of this monograph, which is the SIngle
Machine Equivalent (SIME) method.
2. SECURITY: DEFINITIONS AND STUDY
CONTEXTS
2.1 Definitions and classification
Power system security in general may be defined as the system robustness to
operate in an equilibrium state under normal and perturbed conditions. Power
system security covers a wide range of aspects, usually subdivided into “static”
and “dynamic” phenomena. Power system stability currently refers to the
“dynamic” part of security.
Power system stability may be defined broadly as that property of a power
system that enables it to remain in a stable equilibrium state under normal
operating conditions and to regain an acceptable equilibrium state after being
subjected to a disturbance [Kundur, 1994].
Power system stability is a multifaceted problem depending upon a vari-
ety of factors, such as: the time span that must be taken into consideration
in order to assess stability/instability; the size of the disturbance considered;
the physical nature of the resulting instability. Hence, although a rigorous
classification among distinct types of stabilities is difficult, a practical classi-
fication often accepted relies on the above factors. Thus, with reference to
the time span of the phenomena, one distinguishes short-term from long-term
stability. With reference to the size of the disturbance considered, one dis-
tinguishes small-disturbance from large-disturbance stability: the former may
be handled via linearization of the dynamic equations of motion, while the
latter requires nonlinear approaches. Further, both the small-disturbance and
large-disturbance stability phenomena may be subdivided into “voltage” and
“angle” ones. Figure 1.1 illustrates this classification. One can see that the
angle large-disturbance stability is the so-called transient stability; this is one
of the two aspects making up what is called dynamic security; the other aspect
is large disturbance voltage stability.
4 TRANSIENT STABILITY OF POWER SYSTEMS














- ability to maintain steady acceptable
voltages
- load restoration dynamics 
- torque balance of synchronous machines
- ability to maintain synchronism - ability to maintain frequency within 
nominal range
- system generation/load imbalance
- ability to remain in operating equilibrium
- equilibrium between opposing forces
Small
Figure 1.1. Types of power system stability phenomena.
Adapted from [Kundur and Morisson, 1997a]
This monograph is devoted to transient stability assessment and control
(TSA&C).
Transient stability of a power system is its ability to maintain synchronous
operation of the machines when subjected to a large disturbance. The occur-
rence of such a disturbance may result in large excursions of the system ma-
chine rotor angles and, whenever corrective actions fail, loss of synchronism
results among machines. Generally, the loss of synchronism develops in very
few seconds after the disturbance inception; actually, among the phenomena
considered in Figure 1.1 transient stability is the fastest to develop.1
The nonlinear character of transient stability, its fast evolution and its disas-
trous practical implications make it one of the most important and at the same
time most problematic issues to assess and even more to control, especially
today, with the emerging deregulation practices of the electric sector in many
countries.
Indeed, the deregulated electric energy sector in the United States, in Europe,
and in many other parts of the world will call for independent system operators
to be responsible for the transmission network. The electric utility industry
is thus moving into a new regulatory regime, where the new control centers
will have to monitor and control networks significantly larger than the existing
1Large-disturbance voltage stability is another challenging issue of great practical importance, though
generally slower to develop than transient (in)stability (typically some (tens of) minutes). In some cases
transient voltage instabilities caused mainly by induction motor loads develop as fast as transient (angle)
instabilities and the distinction between them is difficult.
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Figure 1.2. Dy Liacco’s diagram. Adapted from [Fink and Carlsen, 1978]
ones and to track in much shorter time horizons many more energy transactions
than today: larger network size, more important amounts of power flows, and
shorter time horizons are likely to impact on TSA&C and to make it even more




Most authors credit Dy Liacco for laying down the conceptual foundations
of power system security and for defining the different operating modes [Dy-
Liacco, 1968]. Figure 1.2 shows a more detailed description of the “Dy-Liacco
diagram”.
Preventive security assessment is concerned with the question whether a
system in its normal state is able to withstand every plausible contingency; if
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not, preventive control would consist of moving this system state into a secure
operating region. However, since predicting future disturbances 2 is difficult,
preventive security assessment will essentially aim at balancing the reduction
of the probability of losing integrity with the economic cost of operation.
Emergency state detection aims at assessing whether the system is in the
process of losing integrity, following an actual disturbance inception. In this
rather deterministic evolution, response time is critical while economic consid-
erations become temporarily secondary. Emergency control aims at taking fast
last resort actions, to avoid partial or complete service interruption.
Restorative mode. When both preventive and emergency controls have failed
to bring system parameters back within their constraints, automatic local pro-
tective devices will act so as to preserve power system components operating
under unacceptable conditions from undergoing irrevocable damages. This
leads to further disturbances, which may result in system splitting and partial
or complete blackouts. Consequently, the system enters the restorative mode,
where the task of the operator is to minimize the amount of un-delivered en-
ergy by re-synchronizing lost generation as soon as possible and picking up the
disconnected load, in order of priority.
Restorative mode is beyond the scope of this book; rather, direct focus is
placed on preventive and emergency TSA&C.
Note. The vertically integrated organization of the electric industry is under-
going a major unbundling and subsequent restructuring into generation, trans-
mission and distribution companies. Nevertheless, the distinction between pre-
ventive and emergency operating modes remains unchanged. Further, within
the preventive mode, the conventional distinction between planning, operation
planning and real-time operation still seems to hold valid, although with some
changes. Paragraph 2.3 addresses issues relative to the conventional, integrated
type of organization, while

2.4 discusses the other way of handling TSA&C
viz., the emergency mode. Finally,

2.5 considers changes (anticipated or
already in application) of the electric industry restructuring.
2.3 Preventive TSA&C. Corresponding needs
The diversity in power system morphology and operation strategies induces
various needs. However, despite their specifics, power systems also have
2The terms “contingency”, “disturbance” and “fault” are used here interchangeably. They refer to a large
change in the system state, able to drive the system to insecurity. In the context of transient stability, a
contingency may for example be a (three-phase or phase-to-ground) short-circuit at the bus of an important
generation plant, the loss of an important tie-line, or the loss of an important load.
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common needs, relative to the particular field of application. Traditionally,
one distinguishes three such fields, each with its own requirements. They are
summarized in Table 1.1 and briefly commented below.
Table 1.1. Application contexts and corresponding needs.
Adapted from [Pavella and Murthy, 1993]
Application Key requirements Key Needs































) Lack of appropriate techniques may lead to operation stability
margins which are needlessly large and anti-economic
2.3.1 Power system planning
In this context, a large number of cases must be performed, months to years
before the planned system is finally designed.
Despite the long time allotted to these simulations, speed is yet an important
factor. Indeed, to overcome the “curse of dimensionality”, a rapid, screening
tool is needed to identify the “interesting” situations on which the planner
should concentrate. On the other hand, a sensitivity assessment method is
desired, able to provide information about the relevant system parameters, their
impact on stability, and thence to suggest means to reinforce stability, whenever
needed.
2.3.2 Operation planning
In these studies, where the time horizon reduces to days or hours, the speed
becomes critical. Moreover, as the power system is operated in ways not
necessarily anticipated during the system design3, there is a need, in addition
to the crude stability/instability assessment to appraise stability margins and,
whenever necessary, to suggest means to increase them. Once again, sensitivity
3especially since power systems restructuring, see below,

2.5.
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analysis and means to reinforce stability, in addition to analysis, are essential
characteristics needed.
In the present-day practices operation planning stability studies merely re-
duce to assessment of stability limits or operating guidelines. Techniques able
to suggest corrective actions are very much needed.
2.3.3 Real-time operation
Here, only some (tens of) minutes are left to:
analyze the situation, i.e., screen a large number of contingencies in order
to identify the potentially harmful ones,
scrutinize each one of these latter and design appropriate control actions in
case the contingencies do occur,
decide whether to take actions preventively, or to rely on emergency control,
i.e., to postpone actions until such contingencies actually occur.
Hence, speed becomes a crucial factor; besides, control tools are strongly
desired, together with sensitivity analyses (inasmuch as they provide early
warnings and help determine control actions).
2.4 Emergency mode
As mentioned above, the concern of the preventive mode is to forecast
the projected situation, so as to best assess the system stability limits and/or
determine appropriate control actions. These may be preventive or emergency
control actions (or a combination of both) designed to cope with plausible
contingencies identified as dangerous [Kundur and Morisson, 1997b]. The
balance between the two options stems from the fact that preventive actions
are more versatile and easier to apply than emergency controls, but lead to an
increase in operating cost.
However, even in the context of real-time operation, it is very unlikely that
such control actions can be optimized in the preventive mode, because of the
combinatorial nature of the events which might occur. Ideally, the final control
decision should be taken for the actual system state, after a (large) disturbance
has actually occurred. This should be the task of closed-loop emergency
control.
This type of emergency control is (near)optimum, since it addresses the real
problem, but also more difficult to handle, given the extremely short times left
to make decisions and take actions able to preserve system’s integrity (fractions
of second).
The preventive type of approach, on the other hand, generally faces the
tradeoff between security and economics in a sub-optimal way. But it is easier
to achieve and, so far, it is the only one in use. Yet, today, where new legislations
open electricity markets, the trend is to operate the power systems continuously
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closer to their security limits: the need for emergency control is strongly felt.
The question is how to reach this objective.
As will be seen in Section 4, traditional pure analytical T-D approaches are
unable to tackle stringent needs imposed by real-time preventive and even more
by emergency TSA&C. One thus is led to search for more adequate methods.
They have to be found in the realm of “modern” methods, either of the analytical
or the automatic learning class (Sections 5 and 6).
2.5 Security in a liberalized environment
2.5.1 Restructured power systems: an introduction
In many countries around the world, electric utilities are being restructured
from a traditional vertical model, in which all the activities like generation,
transmission and distribution of the electric energy were owned and operated
by one single private or state entity, to a horizontal model in which all three
activities become independent and, in some cases, are owned by several dif-
ferent companies. This process was performed in order to allow competition
between different private companies and utilities, initially at the generation
level, and with the trend of extending it to all levels. It was justified mainly by
two reasons:
Prices of electricity in some regions were too high compared to the prices
in other regions located in the same country (for example, this happened in
USA). In order to allow consumers to pay lower electricity prices, it was
thought that increasing competition would make the prices go down to an
acceptable level [EIA, 2000].
In the past, the investment required for building new electric facilities
like power plants was so huge that only a very big utility could afford
it (economies of scale). This characteristic, which holds still valid in the
case of transmission lines, changed recently (ten or fifteen years ago) by the
developments achieved in the materials and turbine technology, making the
efficiency of smaller power plants comparable to the one of the big thermal
plants [Hunt and Shuttleworth, 1996].
Other reasons for unbundling generation from transmission that have been
mentioned are: the need of increasing efficiency through better investment de-
cisions and better use of existing plants and the introduction of incentives where
conventional utilities have become inefficient. In order to allow competition,
almost all the restructured companies were organized in the following way.
Generation, transmission and distribution subsystems were separated and
became independent (at least administratively) one from another. In most of
the cases, generation and distribution subsystems were privatized or sold after
being divided in many parts, in order to foster competition at these levels.
Regarding the transmission subsystem, it is universally agreed that it should
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remain as a monopoly, because of the physical characteristics of power system
operation and the advantages of its centralized control. In this case, even if this
activity remained as a regulated monopoly, a new figure, the “system operator”
was created.
There are many interpretations of the system operator (SO). Its main role
is to provide “open, non-discriminatory and comparable” transmission system
access to all supplies and loads of electrical energy in their influence areas
[Shirmohammadi et al., 1998, Ilic et al., 1998, European Parliament, 1996,
FERC, 1996]. In order to achieve this objective, in some market structures it
is considered that the SO should be a regulated, but not state owned, non profit
entity, completely independent from generation and transmission companies
(ex., the California ISO [Alaywan and Allen, 1998]). In other markets, the SO
is also the transmission system owner and can be either a for-profit investor
owned company, or a state owned one [Dy-Liacco, 1999] (e.g., see UK and for
the second France [Russell and Smart, 1997, Merlin et al., 1997]).
Independently of its ownership and although this “system operator” usually
has many additional obligations depending on the given new market structure,
it is always responsible for power system security assessment and control.
2.5.2 Congestion management and ATC
After deregulation, and additionally to other obligations, the system operator
is responsible for managing two main security problems necessary for the new
horizontal electricity market structures: congestion management and Available
Transfer Capability (ATC) calculations. These two important problems are
briefly described below.
Congestion Management. Congestion is a new term (in power systems) that
comes from economics. It is being used, after restructuring, for designing
situations in which producers and consumers desire to generate and consume
electric power in amounts that would cause the transmission system to operate
at or beyond one or more of its transfer limits. Congestion management consists
of controlling the transmission system so that the transfer limits are observed.
Congestion was present in power systems before de-regulation and was
discussed in terms of steady state security. Its basic objective was to control
generator output so that the system remain secure (no limits violated), at the
lowest cost. Most of the energy sales were between adjacent utilities and a
transaction would not go forward unless each utility agreed that it was in their
best interest for both economy and security. Problems like the one we call
congestion would only arise when the transaction had an impact in the security
of a utility not involved in the transaction (third party wheeling) [Christie et al.,
2000].
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SO creates a set of rules for ensuring sufficient control over producers and
consumers in order to maintain acceptable security and reliability levels in both
short and long term, while maximizing market efficiency. The rules must be
robust because some market participants could exploit congestion to increase
profits for themselves at the expense of market efficiency. The rules also should
be transparent, fair and clear to all market participants. The form of congestion
management is dependent on the structure of the energy market and cannot be
separated from market considerations.
Available Transfer Capability. The US Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) requires, among other things, that the SO (in the US Inde-
pendent System Operator or ISO) responsible for each regional transmission
system monitors and computes the Available Transfer Capability (ATC) for po-
tentially congested transmission paths entering, leaving and inside its network.
ATC would be a measure of how much additional electric power (in MW) could
be transferred from the starting point to the end point path.
In order to give the same opportunity to all companies owning generation
facilities for locating and obtaining transmission services between their gener-
ation sites and their customers, while maintaining reliability and security, ATC
values for the next hour and for each hour into the futures (next day) is placed
in a web site known as the open access same time information system (OASIS),
operated also by the ISO. In this way, anyone wishing to send a power transac-
tion on the ISO transmission system would access OASIS web pages and use
the ATC information available there to determine if the transmission system
could accommodate that transaction, and to reserve the necessary transmission
service. [Christie et al., 2000]
New challenges. It is important to mention that only static limits are currently
used for both, congestion management and ATC calculations. However, it
is generally agreed that all power system security limits (static, voltage and
transient) should be taken into account since the limiting condition in some
portions of the transmission networks can shift among them over time.
Power system dynamic security assessment and control is now a more de-
manding task since, in addition to the conventional requirements of operating
power systems, it has more constraints, and new obligations and problems like
the following ones.
The new facility for making energy contracts between customers and com-
panies for the long distance power transmission possibly causes third party
wheeling. In order to identify and control this congestion problem, it is
sometimes necessary that the system operator analyzes larger systems.
After unbundling the transmission services, many of the services that were
naturally provided by the different electric generation plants for controlling
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the power system in order to allow system operation (ancillary services) now
have to be accounted and paid separately, sometimes in a real-time market
that is run and coordinated by the SO [Shirmohammadi et al., 1998, Alaywan
and Allen, 1998].
The efficient utilization of power systems with an acceptable security level
is becoming more and more dependent on system controls. Successful
energy trading can overwhelm the existing system control structure and the
new business structure will have an impact on what controls are used as
well as how they are designed and deployed. Since power system physical
functioning remains the same, the specification and design of these controls
should be part of an overall study carried out by an independent entity
(usually the one in charge of security and planning, the SO). Otherwise,
system security and economy could be sacrificed, defeating the very purpose
of restructuring the industry [Kundur and Morisson, 1998].
Depending on the structure of the electricity market the old unit commitment
process is now replaced by an auction market that sets up the generation
profile for the following day or the next hour. The way this auction market
works is dependent on the congestion management and/or the ATC calcula-
tion; therefore, the market should closely interact with the system operator
in order to ensure security assessment and control [Sheblé, 1999].
These demanding needs of the restructured electric markets operation made
necessary to use in new ways some tools already available as EMS functions in
the control center and to coordinate its execution with some new applications
that still need to be developed.
2.5.3 OPF: a comeback
This is the case, for example, of the Optimal Power Flow (OPF). The advent
of open access and the competitive market has given OPF a new lease on life
and respectability as the indispensable tool for nodal pricing and its variants,
zonal and locational pricing [Dy-Liacco, 1999]. Its optimization function also
switches from the economical optimization of the system state in order to
achieve the minimum operating cost, using the individual cost of the different
units, to the optimization for maximizing the profits of the several different
players using bids. Its capacity to solve steady state security problems is also
used for static security constrained dispatch in congestion management.
Today, there are many situations where stability limits are reached before
static constraints like thermal limits. In this kind of stability-limited power
systems, it is thus necessary to assess the dynamic security limits of the system
in order to provide useful values for ATC and for the congestion management
process. These new tools, required for assessing dynamic limits in all the con-
texts of power system planning and operation, should act in a coordinated way
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with the existing EMS functions and design applications (like the OPF) already
available. This new problem is addressed in Chapter 5 of this monograph,
where the combination of a transient stability assessment and control scheme
and an OPF is performed in order to provide solutions to power system security
problems that satisfy at the same time static and transient stability constraints.
3. MODELS
3.1 General modeling
Dynamic time constants in power systems range from fractions of microsec-
onds (electromagnetic phenomena) to hours (thermal phenomena). As was
noted earlier, the time constants of interest in dynamic security assessment
correspond to a much smaller window (say, above 1 millisecond and a few
minutes). Within this context, power system dynamic behavior is governed by
two sets of non-linear equations:
   	

 (1.1)  	

 (1.2)
Set (1.1) consists of the differential equations (generators, motors, including
their controls, and other devices whose dynamics are modeled); set (1.2) com-
prises the algebraic equations of network and “static” loads. The dimension
of vector  depends on the modeling detail; it is lower bounded by twice
the number of system machines (e.g., typically  ), but may be orders of
magnitude larger. The dimension of vector  is lower bounded by twice the
number of nodes of the power system model (e.g., typically  ). Vector explicitly represents parameters whose influence on dynamic security may
be studied (e.g., generator output, load level, interface flows  ) as well as
disturbances (represented as a sequence of “instantaneous” changes in  ).
Imposing
   in (1.1) yields the overall equilibrium equations which
allow computing the steady state conditions of the system in its pre-fault state
or in its post-fault state.
3.2 Static and dynamic models
Assuming that the system is in an acceptable steady-state pre-fault operating
regime, the overall TSA problem consists of evaluating the quality of the system
response when subjected to various disturbances.4
The static (part of) security assessment thus consists in evaluating the prop-
erties of the post-fault equilibrium state, by checking that it leads to viable
and acceptable operating conditions. This implies in particular that the post-
4Since the system is non-linear, its properties are disturbance dependent.
14 TRANSIENT STABILITY OF POWER SYSTEMS
fault equilibrium is locally stable, and that steady-state voltage magnitudes and
currents satisfy a certain number of constraints.
The dynamic (part of) security assessment, then considers whether the system
would indeed be able to reach its post-fault operating conditions. The dynamics
in (1.1) may usually be decomposed into two subsets: one faster, generally only
related to the electro-mechanical angle dynamics of the synchronous machines;
and one slower, normally only related to the stability of voltage (and load)
restoration process due to the action of the slow subset of automatic voltage
control devices5 . They yield tools for respectively transient and voltage stability
assessment.
3.3 Transient stability models
In the particular context of transient stability, one may distinguish the fol-
lowing types of state variables (SVs):
machine state variables
– the machine per se has a minimum of 2 (mechanical) SVs (rotor angle
and speed); in addition, generally 6 (although there could be more) SVs
can be considered for a complete electrical model
– the excitation system of a machine has usually in between 1 and 5 SVs;
note, however that consideration of PSSs can increase this number (the
output signal of the PSS is sent to the excitation system)
– turbine and governor of a machine have generally up to 5 SVs (a PSS
can be added to the system)
– all in all, 18 SVs is a standard number of accurate machine modeling;
load state variables
– static load: no additional SVs are involved, the characteristic of such a
load being a function of bus voltage magnitudes and frequency
– dynamic load; systems with large number of motors require a dynamic
representation involving 1 to 2 SVs per load;
special devices (SVCs, HVDC links, FACTS, etc): the number of SVs is
not standard; it varies with the degree of modeling detail; besides, modeling
of such devices generally requires a good number of macroblocks.
More or less detailed description of the above various components of a power
system is used in T-D programs to analyze transient stability phenomena.
These phenomena are generally strongly non-linear. They are caused by
important disturbances, and characterized by the type of resulting instabilities:
5Transformer taps, shunt-capacitor switching, secondary voltage control, and overexcitation limiters.
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first-swing vs multiswing, upswing vs backswing, plant vs inter-area mode of
instabilities, and their combinations.6
Conventionally, these phenomena are assessed using T-D programs, as de-
scribed below. Let us simply mention here that today a rather large number
of T-D programs exist, based on more or less detailed models of the power
system. They range from general purpose power system dynamic simulation
packages, down to simplified models and approaches for the study of a partic-
ular subproblem. Below we mention only those which, one way or another,
will be used in this monograph: ETMSP [EPRI, 1994]; MATLAB [MATLAB,
1999]; SIMPOW [ABB, 2000]; ST-600 [Valette et al., 1987].
4. TRANSIENT STABILITY: TIME-DOMAIN
APPROACH
The conventional time-domain (T-D) approaches assess the system robust-
ness vis-à-vis a given disturbance by solving, step-by-step, eqs (1.1), (1.2)
modeled for the transient stability problem, and computing the machine “swing
curves” (rotor angle evolution with time), along with other important system
parameters.
A disturbance in general is defined as a sequence of events, starting at
 
 
and finishing up at
  
(the time of its elimination or clearance), when the power
system enters its post-fault configuration. Note that this latter configuration
depends on the scheme of the disturbance clearance.
Thus, to assess the system robustness vis-à-vis a given disturbance, the T-
D approach simulates the system dynamics in the during-fault and post-fault
configurations. Generally, the during-fault period is quite short (e.g., 100 ms
or so). On the other hand, the post-fault period may be much longer: typically,
a system which does not lose synchronism after, say, some seconds, is consid-
ered to be stable, i.e., able to withstand the disturbance under consideration.
The maximum simulation period depends upon the characteristics of the very
power system and the degree of its modeling sophistication. It generally does
not exceed 15 s for full detailed modeling, while 3 s are deemed enough for
simplified modeling, provided that this latter is valid for assessing first order
effects of transient stability phenomena (which may not be the case).
Observe that the definition of criteria detecting the loss of synchronism is
also a matter of operational practices; they may differ from one power system
to another and from one T-D program to another. They generally depend on
maximum deviation of machine rotor angles and rotor speeds. In any case,
6The various types of instabilities are illustrated on real-world examples throughout the monograph. (For
example, Fig. 2.9 illustrates multiswing instabilities, Fig. 4.10 inter-area mode oscillations.) Their various
characterizations are summarized in

1.2 of Chapter 7.
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these are subjective rather than objective criteria, inspired from the system
operator experience.
Typically, T-D methods assess the system robustness vis-à-vis a given dis-
turbance
either upon fixing a clearing time,
  
, and assessing whether the system loses
synchronism or on the contrary remains stable throughout the maximum
integration period
or by assessing stability limits: power limit for a given clearing time, or
critical clearing time (CCT) for given pre-fault operating condition; CCT
is defined as the maximum duration that a disturbance may remain without
the system losing its capability to recover a normal operating condition.
The search of stability limits may, for example, be conducted by dichotomy.
In any case, it requires many trials (say, 3 stable and 4 unstable); of them,
the stable ones are much more time consuming, since they are pursued for
the maximum simulation period. In contrast, the unstable ones are faster
(their simulation is generally stopped after some hundred ms, where the system
is declared to go out of step); note, however, that this holds true for first-
swing instability phenomena: detecting multi-swing instability is more time
consuming, since the loss of synchronism may arise after some seconds.
Power limits are more popular in the United States, CCTs in Europe. Actu-
ally, computing CCTs is easier than computing power limits, and the usefulness
of CCTs goes beyond the mere stability limit computation. For example, they
may be used to screen a set of contingencies and rank those found to be “po-
tentially interesting”, i.e., those whose CCT is close enough to the operating
time of the system protections to clear the considered contingency. CCTs may
also be used as the reference for assessing the accuracy of non-conventional
methods (direct or automatic learning ones, see below in Sections 5 and 6).
Further, for automatic learning methods, CCTs may be used to classify stability
scenarios as stable or unstable when constructing the required data base (see
also below in Section 6).
The question of concern that now arises is: which are the strengths and
weaknesses of T-D methods ? A list is proposed below which yields a twofold,
apparently contradictory observation: T-D methods are definitely insufficient,
yet indispensable for in-depth transient stability investigations.
Pros. T-D methods are able to:
provide essential information about relevant parameters of the system dy-
namic evolution with time (machine swing curves, i.e. rotor angles; speeds;
accelerations; powers; etc.);
consider any power system modeling and stability scenario;
reach the required accuracy, provided that the modeling of a power system
is correctly designed and its parameters accurately known.
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Cons. T-D methods are unable to provide:
straightforward screening tools in order to discard “uninterestingly harm-
less” disturbances;
sound stability margins which would inform one about “how far” from
(in)stability the system is, and which would yield suitable sensitivity anal-
ysis tools;
guidelines for control.
In short, T-D methods cannot meet major needs identified in Table 1.1, and,
in particular, those relating to control, be it of the preventive or the emergency
type.
Nevertheless, T-D methods are the reference for transient stability analysis.
Besides, they are essential to the design of modern methods as will be seen
below: for hybrid direct methods (

5.3.2); for automatic learning methods as
a tool for assessing stability, i.e., for preanalyzing the cases of the learning set
(Section 6).
A final note: the T-D approach has long been considered as very CPU time
consuming; it is interesting to observe that within the last years the time required
for a single simulation with high order models of a typical power system has
shrunk from half an hour to some seconds, essentially thanks to increased CPU
speeds of high performance workstations. Today, T-D methods become even
“faster than real-time”. Yet, the weaknesses identified earlier still hold true.
5. DIRECT APPROACHES - AN OVERVIEW
5.1 Brief introductory notice
The above deficiencies of T-D methods gave an impetus to the development
of non-conventional approaches: direct (Lyapunov-like) and automatic learning
ones.
Direct methods started being developed in the sixties [Gorev, 1960, El-
Abiad and Nagappan, 1966, Gless, 1966, Putilova and Tagirov, 1970]. One
main attraction was their capability of restricting the T-D simulations solely
to the during-fault period while avoiding all repetitive runs, i.e. of reducing
simulations to a very small percentage of the overall computing effort of T-
D methods. The other attraction was that direct methods may provide sound
stability margins, which in turn open up possibilities towards suitable sensitivity
analysis.
The above features of paramount practical importance, together with the
fascination of the application of direct methods to power system transient
stability, explain the researchers’ intensive efforts over almost four decades.
Quite soon, however, the first enthusiastic expectations of these methods were
overshadowed by two main difficulties. The first is linked to the difficulty
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of constructing good Lyapunov functions for multimachine power systems,
unless (over)simplified modeling is used. The other difficulty is related to the
assessment of a practical stability domain, that is suitable from both viewpoints:
computational efficiency and accuracy of the transient stability assessment in
the large. As often happens in applications, these difficulties have eventually
been circumvented by combining theoretically pure approaches with pragmatic
engineering solutions. And, as usual, many combinations have been proposed,
corresponding to various tradeoffs. They are briefly described below.
5.2 Application of direct methods to transient stability
5.2.1 Introduction
Broadly, the Lyapunov direct method [Lyapunov, 1907] relies on the con-
struction of a Lyapunov
 
function, which is a scalar function of the sys-
tem state vector 
 obeying a number of conditions, in particular: positive-
definiteness of
 
and (semi-)negative-definiteness of its time derivative
  
along the solutions of eqs. (1.1),(1.2). The concept of Lyapunov function is il-
lustrated in Fig. 1.3 for a simple hypothetical “one-machine-infinite-bus” power
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Figure 1.3. Phase plane of “one-machine-infinite-bus” system and exact  function
The aim of the direct method’s application to transient stability was to
alleviate some of the deficiencies of the T-D approach.
The following paragraphs deal in a sequence with elements of the application
of the Lyapunov direct method to power system transient stability, the two main
difficulties met and the ways proposed to circumvent them.
This brief overview will not attempt to make a critical survey nor an exhaus-
tive description of all existing streams. Hence, by no means could it do justice
to the impressive number of contributions to the field, which is still being fed
by new publications. Rather, it attempts to suggest that, as is often the case
in engineering, the combination of good theoretical approaches with physical
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know-how is able to furnish innovative approaches much more powerful than
its components.
5.2.2 Principle
The principle of the application of the Lyapunov criterion to power system
transient stability may be stated as follows: under pre-assigned stability condi-
tions (i.e., a pre-assigned disturbance and its clearing scenario) assess whether
the system entering its post-fault configuration is stable, using the Lyapunov
criterion. In turn, this yields the following practical procedure: upon construct-
ing a Lyapunov function for the post-fault system, compute its value
        ,
where   is computed for the during-fault trajectory, and decide that the system
is stable if this is smaller than
       ; it is unstable otherwise. Here,      denotes the values taken by the components of the system state vector
at
  
, the disturbance clearing time; these values are computed via T-D simu-
lations carried out in the during-fault period for successive values of
  
. On
the other hand,  denotes the value that the components of the system state
vector take at a point located on the boundary of the stability domain, or of its
estimate.     provides the stability limit condition, i.e. the CCT for a given
power level, or the power limit for a given
  





represents a sound stability margin, measuring “how far from
instability” the system is under preassigned conditions. Figure 1.4 portrays
schematically the search of a CCT.







Figure 1.4. Principle of critical clearing time computation by the Lyapunov direct criterion
From a computational point of view, the above procedure requires:
computation of
         which is almost negligible, provided that    
has already been constructed for a given power system model and that     
is known;
a single T-D simulation for the during-fault period to compute       for
successive
  
’s; it is upper bounded by the CCT, i.e., it represents a very
small percentage of the overall amount of simulation required by the T-D
method with equivalent modeling;
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computation of
         , which is almost negligible for a given   ;
the problem is how to compute that   which provides a limit value   
of practical interest.
5.2.3 Discussion
1. According to the Lyapunov direct method, the study of a power system
stability consists of constructing a Lyapunov function for the dynamic equations
of motion, and determining the value it takes on the boundary of the stability
domain.
Unfortunately, there is no effective method for constructing closed form
Lyapunov functions for general dynamical systems. However, for a class of
nonlinear systems there are systematic procedures for constructing Lur’s type
Lyapunov functions with the required sign definite properties. (For details, see
[Rozenvasser, 1960, Kalman, 1963, Moore and Anderson, 1968, Willems, 1969,
Pai, 1981, Pai, 1989, Pavella and Murthy, 1993]; for a survey see [Ribbens-
Pavella and Evans, 1981]).
2. In general, nonlinear systems may have many stable equilibrium points
(SEPs); therefore the character of motions close to a SEP does not hold globally
for all motions.
3. The Lyapunov stability theorems do not provide conditions for obtaining
the largest stability domain estimate (SDE). Rather, they provide sufficient
conditions for testing stability via a particular choice of a
 
function . But
since these conditions are not necessary but sufficient 7, from a practical point
of view the concern is to search for a convenient Lyapunov function that ensures
a SDE which is as large as possible.
4. To summarize, the choice of a
  
function and of its limit value is
of paramount importance for making the Lyapunov criterion interesting in
transient stability studies, where the concern is to assess accurately stability
limits or margins: (over)conservative results that the pure Lyapunov criterion
tends to provide (since it guarantees stability but not instability) are of no
practical interest.
5.3 Past and present status of direct approaches
5.3.1 Anticipated advantages and difficulties met
The above short description suggests that two main advantages can be ex-
pected from the direct approach, namely: (i) straightforward computation
of transient stability limits, since direct methods reduce the T-D simulations
7This is however different from the theorem: “the necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of a
dynamic system is that it has a Lyapunov function”. This admittedly interesting theorem from a theoretical
viewpoint hardly helps construct Lyapunov functions.
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solely to the during-fault period while avoiding all repetitive runs; (ii) suit-
able definition and computation of margins, which in turn allows sensitivity
analysis.
At the same time, it appears that to make the method applicable in practice,
one should be able to: (i) construct “good”
  
functions; (ii) assess “good”
limit values or, equivalently, good practical stability domain estimates.
Both of the above conditions have been found to be extremely difficult to
meet properly. With reference to condition (i), it appeared quite early that the
construction of
  
functions was only possible with over-simplified (actu-
ally unacceptably simplified) system modeling. Among the many interesting
attempts to circumvent this difficulty is the “structure preserving modeling”
proposed by [Bergen and Hill, 1981]. Another one, which has finally pre-
vailed, led to the use of “pseudo-Lyapunov functions” consisting of hybridizing 
functions with T-D methods (see below); credit for this may be given to
[Athay et al., 1979].
As for condition (ii), among the large variety of solutions proposed are the
methods of [Athay et al., 1979], of [Kakimoto et al., 1980], the acceleration
approach [Ribbens-Pavella et al., 1981], the BCU or exit point [Chiang et al.,
1991], the PEBS [Pai, 1989], and the IPEBS methods [Fonseca and Decker,
1985].
All these methods aim at identifying the value taken by the Lyapunov func-
tion at the boundary of the practical stability domain estimate; but they differ in
the way of doing so. Broadly, two different approaches may be distinguished;
the one consists of computing  , the “unstable equilibrium point of concern”,
and hence
     ; the other relies on criteria able to suggest when the sys-
tem trajectory comes “close enough” to the boundary of the practical stability
domain estimate.
Nevertheless, although inventive, the various solutions were not able to
properly overcome the difficulties met. Indeed, the proposed stability domain
estimates were found to provide overly conservative stability assessments, with
an unpredictably varying degree of conservativeness; besides, from a computa-
tional point of view, the involved computations were often quite cumbersome,
counterbalancing the computer gains expected of direct methods, and even
making them much slower than T-D methods.
5.3.2 The two families of hybrid solutions
An impressive research effort and number of publications have been devoted
to the derivation of (pseudo)-Lyapunov approaches, able to handle the transient
stability problem in a way which is flexible (with respect to power system mod-
eling), accurate (as compared to the corresponding T-D assessment using the
same degree of modeling detail) and computationally efficient. They eventually
came up (explicitly or implicitly) with the following two observations:
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the stability-domain estimation problem may be tackled by considering
a two-machine or a one-machine equivalent of the multimachine power
system
the modeling problem may be solved by hybridizing the direct method with
T-D calculations.
The first observation stems from the fact that for the particular case of a
two-machine or a one-machine equivalent system described with simplified
modeling, the stability condition of the Lyapunov criterion becomes sufficient
and necessary instead of being solely sufficient. This gave rise on the one
hand to the Bellman decomposition-aggregation approach and vector Lyapunov
functions, where the multimachine power system is decomposed into 2-machine
subsystems [Pai and Narayana, 1975, Grujic et al., 1987]8; on the other hand,
to the single-machine equivalent approaches [Rahimi and Schaffer, 1987, Xue
et al., 1988].
The idea underlying the second observation is to construct a Lyapunov
function for the simplified power system modeling,
  
 , while however
computing step-by-step the components of vector  via a T-D program run
with the desired detailed modeling. The resulting
    becomes path-
dependent and is not anymore a true Lyapunov function; nevertheless, from
a practical point of view this works nicely with functions of the energy type,
like the popular transient energy function (TEF) (e.g., [Athay et al., 1979, Pai,
1989, Fouad and Vittal, 1992, Fonseca and Decker, 1985]). This has led to
hybrid approaches, either of the multimachine type (e.g.,[Maria et al., 1990], or
of the single-machine equivalent type (e.g., [Zhang et al., 1997a]). The SIME
method (for SIngle Machine Equivalent) belongs to this latter family.
The resulting practical approaches are hybrid direct

T-D methods of two
types. The one considers a Lyapunov function constructed for the multimachine
power system and computed along the multimachine trajectory. The other
considers a one-machine equivalent of the multimachine system, and studies
its stability using the equal-area criterion (EAC). The SIME method belongs to
this latter type.
Careful examination of these two hybrid types suggests that, after all, both
of them are capable of providing good practical results. Indeed, they both
rely on energy considerations; and the Lyapunov direct method is “just” a
generalization of the energy concept.
However, in order for a hybrid function to be interesting in practice, one
should be able to assess easily its limit value. The use of EAC simplifies
8But their subsequent aggregation imposes extremely conservative stability conditions, unacceptable for
practical purposes.
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greatly this task for the one-machine equivalent, and this factor is shown to be
of paramount importance.
5.3.3 Concluding remarks
Power system transient stability phenomena are almost as old as the Lya-
punov theory itself [Lyapunov, 1907, Park and Bancker, 1929]. But its applica-
tion to transient stability started being developed round the middle of the 20th
century. The initial incentive was to replace (major part of the) T-D simulations,
and thus to alleviate massive numerical computations involved by the intricacy
of the very physical problem and by the trend to interconnect power systems
thus increasing their size.
Surely, the tremendous fascination for the Lyapunov approach to power
system stability may be attributed to its theoretical appeal, and its practical
promising outcomes; but curiously enough, to a large extent it is also attributable
to the accompanying difficulties at stake. And although the approaches have
matured significantly, they still inspire research work.
The dramatic progress in computer technology allowed significant reduction
of the computational burden of T-D methods and resulting significant speed
up. But at the same time, the difficulties caused by operating the power
systems increasingly closer to their security limits bred new needs for ultra-fast
analysis, sensitivity analysis and control. Thus, along the years, the incentive
for alternative solutions more efficient and powerful than T-D programs has
gradually shifted from mere CPU considerations to basic requirements.
The SIME method attempts to meet such requirements.
6. AUTOMATIC LEARNING APPROACHES
  A DIGEST
The subject matter of this section is beyond the scope of the monograph.
Nevertheless, we thought it interesting to give a brief overview in order to
provide a picture of this class of emerging “modern”, “non-conventional”
methods. This will also allow us to make a comparison of all existing methods
at the end of the monograph. The reader interested exclusively in SIME may
skip this section.
The review of methods given below is based on work developed by Wehenkel
and his group, and is mainly transcribed from [Wehenkel and Pavella, 1996,
Pavella and Wehenkel, 1998]. It is not a critical survey, and by no means could
it do justice to the many contributions in the field which is continuously being
fed by a flourishing technical literature. The interested reader may kindly refer
to [Wehenkel, 1998].
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Figure 1.5. AL framework for TSA. Adapted from [Wehenkel and Pavella, 1996]
6.1 Problem statement
Automatic Learning (AL) in general is concerned with the design of auto-
matic procedures able to learn a task on the basis of a learning set of solved
cases of this task. Three main families of AL methods may be distinguished,
namely : (i) machine learning, a subfield of symbolic artificial intelligence
(decision trees are members of this family); (ii) artificial neural network based
learning; (iii) statistical pattern recognition and regression.
In the particular context of power system TSA&C, the AL approach may be
schematically described by Fig. 1.5 : random sampling techniques are used to
screen all relevant situations in a given context (here transient stability), while
existing analytical tools are exploited

if necessary in parallel

to derive
detailed stability information. The heart of the framework is provided by AL
methods used to extract and synthesize relevant information and to reformulate
it in a suitable way for decision making. This consists of transforming the data
base (DB) of case by case numerical simulations into a power system security
knowledge base (KB). As suggested in Fig. 1.5, a large variety of AL methods
may be used in a toolbox fashion, according to the type of information they may
exploit and/or produce. The final step consists of using the extracted synthetic
information (decision trees, rules, neural network or statistical approximators)
either in real-time, for fast decision making, or in the off-line study environment,
so as to gain new physical insight and to derive better system and/or operation
planning strategies.
This section briefly reviews various classes of AL methods applied to
TSA&C.
6.2 Overview of AL methods
Two broad types of AL may be distinguished : supervised and unsupervised.
Supervised learning usually aims at constructing a model for an assumed re-
lationship between input attributes (e.g., real-time measurements) and outputs
(e.g., stability margins), while unsupervised learning (or clustering) essentially
aims at either uncovering similarities among groups of security scenarios or
correlations among groups of variables used to describe such scenarios. In
what follows we restrict ourselves to supervised learning. Within this context,
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Figure 1.6. DT for transient stability assessment. Taken from [Wehenkel and Pavella, 1996].
three classes of methods are distinguished. They provide three complementary
types of information as discussed below.
6.2.1 Decision trees (DTs)
We illustrate this method on the DT portrayed in Fig. 1.6 built for the purpose
of transient stability [Wehenkel and Pavella, 1996]. The tree comprises “test
nodes” and “terminal nodes”; it involves dichotomic tests automatically carried
out by the building procedure outlined below.
The tree building starts at the tree’s top node, with the entire learning set,
which comprises a mixture of learning cases of the various classes. (In Fig. 1.6,
1819 stable and 181 unstable cases).9 The building procedure consists of
identifying that candidate attribute,10 along with that threshold value of it
which allows a decomposition of the mixture of stable-unstable cases into the
two most purified learning subsets; these latter are then directed towards the two
successors of the top node. This dichotomic procedure is repeatedly applied to
each of the successive test nodes, until getting a purified enough subset whose
further splitting is deemed statistically meaningless. This subset composes a
9In addition to these 2000 learning cases, another 1000 cases were used to assess the accuracy of the DT.
10“Candidate attributes” are system parameters a priori deemed likely to drive the phenomena of concern.
They are suggested by past experience and chosen by the human expert (e.g., here, voltages, generated
powers, power flows on important lines). Note that, for reasons appearing below, they are often chosen
among pre-disturbance system parameters.
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terminal node, labeled stable or unstable according to its majority population;
for example, in Fig. 1.6, the leftmost terminal node D9 is an unstable node.
The candidate attributes thus selected at the various test nodes become the
“test attributes”. Note that a same test attribute may appear at many test nodes,
although with different threshold values. For example, in Fig. 1.6 the test
attribute
 
(denoting a generated power) appears at the top node as well as
at other, lower-level test nodes, with different threshold values (4734, 4538,
5066, ... MW).
Besides identifying the test attributes, the tree also appraises their respective
influence on the phenomena, in terms of their “information quantity” (IQ). Note
that this is a “measure of purification ability” which takes into account the size
of the learning (sub)set of concern. Hence, the higher the position of a test
attribute in the tree hierarchy, the larger its IQ

and hence its influence on the
phenomena. Finally, note that the IQ of a test attribute which appears more
than once on the tree is the sum of its partial IQ’s.
The essential outcomes of the above procedure are as follows.
Selection of the test attributes: these are a (generally small) subset of
the candidate attributes proposed to the tree building. They represent the
salient parameters driving the phenomena (here, transient stability). In
Fig. 1.6, only 4 out of the 17 candidate attributes have thus been selected;
they appear at the test nodes of the tree of Fig. 1.6 and are explicitly listed,
along with their total IQs in the upper rightmost part of the figure.11
Synthetic description of the physical phenomena of concern. The descrip-
tion follows the very hierarchical structure of the tree: the more essential
the part of a test on the mechanism, the higher its position in the tree.
Straightforward classification of (so far) unseen cases. This is achieved by
placing the case at the top tree node and letting it progress down the tree by
subjecting it to the successive tests that it thus meets. Eventually, the case
reaches a terminal node and is given its class.
To fix ideas, according to Fig. 1.6, a case whose
  
is larger than 4734 MW
and whose
 
is smaller than 406 kV will be directed to node D9 and classified
as unstable by the tree.
The former two outcomes refer to synthetic information, which yields the
INTERPRETABILITY of the phenomena; the latter concerns detailed information,
and yields the classification.
Actually, the tree’s unique feature and particular strength lies in this inter-
pretability property, which is essential

at least for stability concerns; for
that reason, it will also be the backbone of the hybrid(ised) AL approaches
advocated below.
11In Fig. 1.6 these IQs are given in percentages.
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As far as classification is concerned, the DT classifies a case by merely
relying on the values that the tree test attributes assume for that case. Hence,
by choosing as candidate attributes pre-disturbance (and hence predetermined)
system parameters, the classification computing effort is reduced merely to the
time required by the case to traverse the tree, i.e. to an extremely short time
(see Table 1.2). But, on the other hand, it should also be observed that DTs
provide a discrete (staircase) rather than smooth approximation. This prevents
one from getting back margin values (e.g. CCTs) which could have been used
in the data base. In some sense, this discrete type of approximation is the price
to be paid in order to get good interpretability.
Another piece of information of great practical importance is the possibility
to infer means of control. For example, Fig. 1.6 suggests how to enhance the
stability of a case directed to the lowest unstable terminal node (D3): move it
either to the next, stable terminal node (D4) by acting on the value of attribute  




To summarize the above discussion, in addition to interpretability, DTs
provide means for analysis (classification), sensitivity analysis (influence of
the driving parameters on the phenomena) and control, and that in extremely
short times (fractions of ms, see in Table 1.2). In short, DTs provide all
the necessary ingredients to meet the needs identified in Section 2, and, in
particular, the needs of real-time operation.
There are two generalizations of decision trees of interest in the context
of TSA: regression trees which infer information about a numerical output
variable; fuzzy trees which use fuzzy logic instead of standard logic to represent
output information in a smooth fashion. Both regression and fuzzy approaches
allow inferring information about security margins. Fuzzy trees have not yet
reached the maturity of crisp classification or regression trees, but they seem
particularly well suited to TSA problems. Indeed, they appear to be more
robust than classical decision trees and are able to combine smooth input/output
approximation capabilities of neural networks with interpretability features of
crisp DTs.
6.2.2 Artificial neural networks
In contrast to crisp DTs, ANNs are able to provide continuous margins (e.g.
to recover the CCT information contained in the data base), at least in the
neighborhood of stability boundaries. This ability is owing to the nonlinear
relationships between the ANN inputs and outputs, through the neurons of
their hidden layers. But, on the other hand, these complex relationships make
it hard to get an insight into the phenomena. Thus, for example, it is (almost)
impossible to identify those input attributes which drive the phenomena, and
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to appraise their influence. In some sense, in contrast to DTs, ANNs provide
smooth approximations at the sacrifice of interpretability.
For the stability problems considered here, this “blackbox” type of informa-
tion is a handicap; it makes ANNs uninteresting to use, unless combined with
other, more transparent approaches, like DTs (see below the DT-ANN model).
6.2.3 Statistical pattern recognition
The previous two approaches essentially compress detailed information
about individual simulation results into general, more or less global stabil-
ity characterizations.
Additional information may however be provided in a case by case fashion,
by matching an unseen (e.g., real-time) situation with similar situations found
in the data base. This may be achieved by defining generalized distances so as to
evaluate similarities among power system situations, together with appropriate
fast data base search algorithms.
A well known such technique is the “k Nearest Neighbors” (kNN) method
able to complete DTs and ANNs. It consists of classifying a state into the
majority class among its k nearest neighbors in the learning set. The main
characteristics of this method are high simplicity but sensitivity to the type
of distances used. In particular, to be practical, ad hoc algorithms must be
developed to choose the distances on the basis of the learning set. While in
the past this method was generally exploiting a small number of sophisticated
ad hoc input features manually selected on the basis of engineering judgment
(e.g., in the context of TSA, see the survey by [Prabhakara and Heydt, 1987]),
nowadays the emphasis is more on the research of automatic distance design
methods exploiting the learning states.
6.2.4 Hybrid AL approaches
Each of the above “pure” AL approaches has its own assets and relative
weaknesses; hence the idea of combining them so as to gather their assets while
evading their weaknesses. Of course, the choice among various combinations
depends on the particular application sought.
Below, two such combinations developed for the purpose of transient stability
are outlined. They both use DTs for their interpretability capabilities and for
providing test attributes and their information quantity.
DT-ANNs. The DT provides a synthetic view of the phenomena and identifies
the relevant parameters (its test attributes); these are then used as input variables
to the ANN. The ANN may output either a continuous type of margins or a
discrete classification, more accurate than that of the DT.
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Table 1.2. Typical performances of AL methods applied to TSA.
Adapted from [Wehenkel and Pavella, 1996]
Method Accuracy % CPU time (SUN Sparc 20/50)
Classif. Regr. Off-line (s) On-line (ms)
Crisp DT 3.3 – 60 0.1
Fuzzy DT – 1.3 – 1.6
Pure ANNs – 1.6 33,000 3.6
Hybrid ANNs 2.7 1.4 3,200 1.6
Pure kNN 6.6 6.7 200 100
Hybrid kNN 1.4 1.7 50,000 100
DT-
 
NNs. The DT provides a synthetic view of the phenomena, including the
test attributes, along with their IQ. The
 
NN uses these attributes to define the
attribute space, and their respective IQs to weight them in the distance measure.
The DT-
 
NN model may be further optimized using genetic algorithms, as
proposed in [Houben et al., 1997].
Two main outcomes of the DT-
 
NN combination are: description of the
global mechanism of the phenomena, provided by the DT; description of the de-
tailed mechanism concerning an (unseen) case by comparison with its (known)
nearest neighbours, provided by the
 
NN. This latter detailed information may
be used in various ways. For example, to suggest means of control, to avoid
dangerous errors,12 and to identify outliers, as discussed earlier. This latter
aspect is quite a unique feature of
 
NNs.
6.3 Performances and assets
6.3.1 Overall comparison
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 give a synoptic view of the performance and salient
features of the “pure” and “hybrid” AL approaches considered above. The
accuracy is expressed in terms of test set error rate,
  
(in %). Table 1.3 gathers
general comparative properties. The assessments rely on the transient stability
problem and the data base used to build the DT of Fig. 1.6. Recall that actually
2000 cases of this data base were used to learn the various AL methods, the




12i.e. dangerous misclassifications; such a dangerous error arises when an actually (very) unstable case is
declared stable by the classifier.
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Table 1.3. Salient features of AL methods applied to TSA.
Adapted from [Wehenkel and Pavella, 1996]
Method Functionalities Computational:
Off-line On-line
Pure Crisp DTs Good interpretability (global). Dis-
crete. Good accuracy for simple “lo-
calized” problems. Low accuracy for
complex, diffuse problems.
Very fast Ultra fast
ANNs Good accuracy. Low interpretability.
Possibility for margins and sensitivities.
Very slow Fast
kNN Good interpretability (local). Concep-
tual simplicity.
Very slow Very slow
Hybrid Fuzzy DTs Good interpretability (global). Sym-
bolic and continuous. More accurate
and more robust than crisp trees. Possi-
bility for margins and sensitivities.
Slow Very Fast
DT-ANN Combine features of DTs and ANNs Slow Very Fast
DT-kNN Combine features of DTs and kNNs Slow Slow
Observe that the best accuracy performance for classification is provided
here by the hybrid
 
NN (last row of Table 1.2). Actually, this is a
 
NN-DT-GA
model where the genetic algorithm (GA) allows the accuracy of
 
NN-DT to be
enhanced at the expense of lengthy computations.
6.3.2 Main assets of AL methods
The foregoing discussions identify, and Table 1.3 highlights, three salient as-
sets intrinsic to (some of the) AL methods over the deterministic ones, namely:
interpretability of the phenomena;
extraordinary on-line computational efficiency;
management of uncertainties.
The former two properties are linked to the models used by the AL methods.
Management of uncertainties is obtained thanks to the way of generating a data
base, where the uncertain information is (suitably) randomized. This latter
property is of great importance in real-world problems where uncertainties are
always present. They are inherent to the necessarily limited knowledge of
the power system modeling (e.g., modeling of loads connected to high voltage
buses) and parameters, not to mention the lack of information due to economic-
political factors.
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6.4 Comparison of methods
Paragraph 2.3 has identified the present needs of transient stability assess-
ment, in the context of preventive and emergency modes.
Sections 4 to 6 have described the three classes of existing approaches to
transient stability assessment, highlighted their potentials and identified the
needs that each one of them is able to encounter. It was suggested that some
of the needs may be met by more than one method in a complementary rather
than competitive way.
A comparison will be proposed at the end of the monograph, where the
various techniques will be assessed in terms of various evaluation criteria, such
as: modeling possibilities; type of information required; off-line preparation
tasks; real-time computational requirements; type of information provided.
7. SCOPE OF THE BOOK
This monograph is devoted to a comprehensive and unified approach to
TSA&C: the hybrid temporal-direct method called SIME. The approach is
comprehensive, since it covers both preventive aspects (be it for planning, op-
eration planning or real-time operation) and emergency aspects. The approach
is unified, since it relies on the same basic method suitably adapted to the
various requirements.
The scope of the book is essentially threefold. First, as a textbook, to give a
detailed description of SIME so as to make it accessible to practicing engineers,
researchers, final year undergraduate and PhD students. Second, to illustrate
its outcomes by concrete real-world examples in the various application con-
texts, so as to guide the choice among existing strategies for transient stability
assessment and control; further, to open avenues for new operational strage-
gies. Third, to provide researchers and PhD students with real-world topics for
further investigation.
The monograph benefits from authors’ various collaborations with electric
industry, research institutes, and EMS (energy management system) construc-
tors. These collaborations have guided the development of appropriate software
functions. At the same time, they gave the opportunity to test the developed
functions on a large variety of real power systems; they thus contributed to
make the method robust, reliable, and fully operational.
N.B. The illustrations on the simple three-machine system may easily be
checked by the reader, using for example MATLAB together with the data
provided in Appendix B. Illustrations on real-world power systems aim at
exploring/describing transient stability phenomena specific to large power sys-
tems.
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8. SUMMARY
The transient stability problem has first been introduced in the realm of
power system security, and its specifics along with its study contexts have been
identified. Further, the need for tailor-made techniques in the various study
contexts, and especially in real-time operation, have been specified.
The impact of the restructuring electric industry has next been considered.
It was pointed out that the new market environment creates needs considerably
more stringent than those of the vertically organized electric sector.
The possibilities of the conventional time-domain approach have then been
scrutinized in the light of the resulting requirements; its fundamental role has
thus been highlighted but also its serious deficiencies.
Two major classes of non-conventional approaches have next been reviewed:
the direct or hybrid direct

temporal methods, which are deterministic in
essence, and the probabilistic, automatic learning methods. The review helped
identify their complementary features and strengths.




The objectives of this chapter are:
to trace the origins of SIME and state its principle (Section 1)
to define the rules of OMIB’s automatic identification and set its general
formulation (Section 2)
to scrutinize the derivation of stability margins and related issues (Section 3)
to illustrate the developments on a simple example easily tractable by the
reader (Section 4), with the exception of phenomena specific to large-scale
systems (Section 5)
to give a flavor of the way the techniques developed in this chapter will be
used in the remainder of the monograph (Section 6)
to point out main differences between preventive and emergency SIME
(Section 7).
1. FOUNDATIONS
1.1 OMIB: concept and variants
As mentioned in Chapter 1, SIME belongs to the general class of transient
stability methods which rely on a one-machine infinite bus (OMIB) equivalent.
To get a better insight into its specifics, it is therefore interesting to take a look
at the general class of OMIB methods.
All OMIB-based methods rely on the observation that the loss of synchro-
nism of a multimachine power system originates from the irrevocable sepa-
ration of its machines into two groups, which are replaced by a two-machine
system and then by an OMIB equivalent. Thus, an OMIB may be viewed
as a transformation of the multidimensional multimachine dynamic equations
into a single dynamic equation. This latter takes on various forms, depending
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upon the power system modeling and the assumed behaviour of the machines
within each group. We distinguish three types of OMIBs: “time-invariant”,
“time-varying” and “generalized” ones.
The foundations of all these OMIBs rely on the classical, well-known equal-
area criterion (EAC). EAC along with related notation is recalled in Appendix A.
1.1.1 Time-invariant OMIB
A time-invariant OMIB is obtained under the following assumptions: (i) sim-
plified power system modeling; (ii) coherency of the machines within each one
of the two groups, so as to “freeze” their relative motion in the fault-on and
the post-fault periods. The dynamic equations of a multimachine system may
therefore be transformed into an equivalent OMIB equation of the form
                 	
     (2.1)
where
       	
 and  take on constant values (different in the fault-on and
the post-fault configurations); hence the name “time-invariant” OMIB. Note
that eq. (2.1) is similar to that of the simple one-machine infinite bus system
(see Appendix A). It describes the typical sinusoidal variation on the
   
plane, to which the well-known EAC may apply.
The first publications in the area were the “worst case” approach by Rahimi
and Schaffer [Rahimi and Schaffer, 1987], and the EAC (Extended Equal-Area
Criterion) by Xue et al. [Xue et al., 1986, Xue, 1988, Xue et al., 1988].
1.1.2 Time-varying and generalized OMIBs
If we relax the coherency assumption while keeping the simplified power
system model, we get “time-varying” OMIBs:
    	
   are no longer
constant, and the dynamics in eq. (2.1) become piece-wise sinusoidal. Such
time-varying OMIBs were for instance used in the so-called GEAC (for Gen-
eralized EAC) [Rahimi, 1990] and DEEAC (for Dynamic EEAC) [Xue and
Pavella, 1993, Xue et al., 1993, Pavella and Murthy, 1993].
If, in addition, we consider detailed power system models, we come up with
what we will call the “generalized” OMIB. Its dynamic model is still expressed
by              (2.2)
But, here, the
     variation is no longer sinusoidal; nevertheless, the energy
concept of EAC still holds valid.
Various approaches have been proposed in recent years to build up gen-
eralized OMIBs; for example: “mixed” DEEAC [Zhang, 1993], HEEAC (for
hybrid EEAC) [Zhang et al., 1995], IEEAC (for Integrated EEAC) [Xue, 1996],
FASTEST [Xue et al., 1997], SIME [Zhang et al., 1997a, Zhang et al., 1998].
The various approaches differ in many respects (e.g. in the way of identifying
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the mode of machines’ separation, of updating the OMIB parameters, of com-
puting the stable and unstable margins, of assessing stability limits); but they
all rely on the same concept viz., the generalized OMIB transformation.
1.2 From EEAC to SIME
SIME (for SIngle Machine Equivalent) is a transient stability method based
on a generalized OMIB. More precisely, it is a hybrid, temporal-direct method:
temporal, since it relies on the multimachine system evolution with time; direct,
like the EEAC, from which it originates.
To justify, or at least explain the reasoning leading to EEAC, let us go back
to the discussions of
 
5.2.3, 5.3.2 of Chapter 1. It was said that in the context
of
  
functions constructed for the transient stability problem, the difficulties
linked to the stability domain estimation vanish when considering two-machine
or one-machine systems. Based on this observation, two ways were suggested
to overcome the stability domain estimation problems in the case of multima-
chine power systems. The first was the Bellman decomposition-aggregation
method [Bellman, 1962] for dynamic systems which if applied to power systems
translates as: decompose the system into two-machine (or one-machine) sub-
systems; construct scalar
  
functions for these latter; consider these scalar
functions as the components of a vector Lyapunov function; finally, aggregate
the subsystems to infer stability information about the original, multimachine
system [Grujic et al., 1987]. But, as mentioned in Chapter 1, this approach
fails in practice, essentially because of the overly stringent stability conditions
imposed on the aggregated system. The second way to circumvent the difficulty
was the construction of an OMIB system itself. As mentioned earlier, this is
on the basis of EEAC.
EEAC (for Extended Equal-Area Criterion) is a direct transient stability
method relying on a time-invariant OMIB. The crux of this approach, as in any
OMIB-based approach, is the identification of the right decomposition pattern
of the system machines into two groups.
The first attempts to reduce the multimachine trajectory to that of an OMIB
date back to the eighties. They originated from two distinct research groups
which proposed almost simultaneously the OMIB concept that, however, de-
veloped in different ways [Rahimi and Schaffer, 1987, Xue et al., 1986, Xue,
1988, Xue et al., 1988]. (A short account may be found in [Pavella and Murthy,
1993].)
The fundamental difference between the original version of EEAC and SIME
is that EEAC relies on a time-invariant OMIB that constructs by assuming the
classical simplified machine and network modeling and by “freezing” once and
for all the machine rotor angles at
 
  , the initial time of the disturbance incep-
tion. As a consequence, EEAC is a pure direct method, free from any transient
stability program; it thus yields analytical expressions that are extraordinarily
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fast to compute, but introduces approximations about the machines coherency
and their (over)simplified modeling.
The EEAC started being tested on the French EHV power system in the
early nineties. The first results were very encouraging [Xue et al., 1992].
At the same time, they clearly revealed that the efficient identification of the
correct decomposition pattern of the machines was a difficult but crucial task
for the validity of the method and its practical application to real systems. The
difficulty increases when dealing with highly meshed systems. Solving this
problematic but key issue [Xue and Pavella, 1993] has contributed to make
EEAC robust and able to provide an interesting alternative to the conventional
Time-Domain (T-D) method, by alleviating the bulky simulations involved in
planning studies [Dercle, 1995].
The good performances of the method reinforced engineers’ interest in its
use as a tool for operational planning and real-time operation. At the same time,
engineers started being more demanding as concerning applicability limitations
of the method; in particular, they started considering its modeling limitations
as a serious handicap. Relaxing EEAC from these and some other related
constraints became a strong motivation for further research. This has gradually
led to the development of “dynamic” and of “hybridized” EEAC versions
[Xue et al., 1993, Zhang et al., 1995]; little by little, these successive versions
departed from the original EEAC idea and resulted in the SIME method [Zhang
et al., 1996, Zhang et al., 1997a, Bettiol et al., 1997, Pavella et al., 1997, Zhang
et al., 1998].
The first version of SIME was using temporal information of the multima-
chine power system, furnished step-by-step by a T-D program.
This SIME coupled with T-D programs has subsequently been (re)named
Preventive SIME, to distinguish it from the Emergency SIME, proposed more
recently, which uses real-time measurements collected on the system power
plants. As suggested by these names, the Preventive SIME operates in the
preventive mode, prior to any disturbance inception, while the Emergency
SIME aims at controlling the power system after a disturbance inception, so
as to prevent loss of synchronism. More about Preventive vs Emergency
SIME will be found in Section 7 of this chapter, after a description of SIME’s
essentials.
Indeed, the scope of this chapter is to state SIME’s general principle, set up
its basic formulation and related material, illustrate main features, and finally
describe the overall organization of the book, thus guiding the reader through the
various subject matters which cover the whole field of power system transient
stability assessment and control.
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1.3 Principle
Like all OMIB-based methods, SIME relies on the following two proposi-
tions.
Proposition 1. However complex, the mechanism of loss of synchronism in a
power system originates from the irrevocable separation of its machines into two
groups: one composed of the “critical machines” (CMs), which are responsible
of the loss of synchronism, the other of the “non-critical machines” (NMs).
Hence, the transient stability behaviour of the multimachine system may be
inferred from that of an OMIB properly derived from the above decomposition
pattern into two groups.1
Proposition 2. The stability properties of an OMIB may be inferred from
EAC constructed for this OMIB.
More specifically, SIME uses a generalized OMIB whose parameters are
inferred from the multimachine temporal data and refreshed at the same rate.
These data are obtained either from time-domain transient stability simulations
of anticipated contingencies (Preventive SIME), or from real-time measure-
ments reflecting the actual transient stability behaviour of a power system,
subjected to a contingency (Emergency SIME). In either case, SIME may be
viewed as a means of compressing multimachine data to extract information
about transient stability margins and critical machines. As will be shown
below, these two pieces of information broaden dramatically the possibilities
of SIME with respect to the temporal multimachine information. In par-
ticular, they open avenues to sensitivity analysis and control. At the same
time, by updating this compressed information at the rate of acquisition of the
multimachine parameters, SIME preserves the accuracy of the multimachine
information.
2. GENERAL FORMULATION
Basically, SIME concentrates on the post-fault configuration of a system
subjected to a disturbance which presumably drives it to instability, in order
to: identify the mode of separation of the machines2 into two groups; replace
these latter successively by two machines, then by OMIB; assess the transient
1Note that the machines of each group are by no means assumed to behave coherently. They even may split
subsequently into sub-groups which would themselves cause loss of synchronism if they were considered
separately from the other group. The point is that the system loses synchronism as soon as the first major
machines separation occurs.
2The terms “mode of machines’ separation” and “mode of instability” will be used interchangeably. They
define the “critical OMIB”, i.e., the OMIB of concern, or, simply, the OMIB.
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stability properties of this OMIB via the energy concept of EAC [Zhang et al.,
1997a, Zhang et al., 1998].
The various steps of the method are elaborated below and illustrated in
Figs 2.1 to 2.3 corresponding to the small 3-machine system described in
Section 1 of Appendix B.
Without loss of generality, the formulation and illustrations of this chapter
are developed in the context of the Preventive SIME.
2.1 Critical machines identification
The notion of critical machines is intimately related to unstable scenarios. By
definition, on such an unstable multimachine trajectory the critical machines
(CMs) are those which go out of step i.e., which cause the system loss of
synchronism. To identify them, SIME drives the T-D program first in the
during-fault then in the post-fault configuration; and as soon as the system
enters the post-fault phase, SIME starts considering, at each time step of the
program, candidate decomposition patterns, until one of them reaches the
instability conditions (2.15) defined by EAC (see

2.4).
More precisely, at each time step of the post-fault simulation, SIME sorts
the machines according to their rotor angles, identifies the very first larger rotor
angular deviations (“distances”) between adjacent machines, and considers
as candidate CMs those which are above each one of these larger distances.
The corresponding candidate OMIB parameters are computed according to
expressions (2.3) to (2.12) of

2.2. The procedure is carried out until a
candidate OMIB reaches the unstable conditions defined by (2.15): it is then
declared to be the critical OMIB, or simply the OMIB (of concern).
ILLUSTRATION. Let us illustrate the OMIB identification procedure on the 3-machine
system, supposed to be subjected to contingency Nr 2 .3 The simulations are performed
by SIME-MATLAB (see Appendix B).
Figure 2.1a portrays the machine swing curves from
        (time of fault
inception) to
    	 ms (time of fault clearance) and from   to   	  
 ms
(“time to instability”). Time
  	
is determined according to the developments of  2.4
and corresponds to the time when the critical OMIB loses synchronism.
At
      	 , one reads:    	  ;      ;      
 . Accordingly,
the angular distances are:
      
  ;        !"#  . They
yield two candidate OMIBs: the one is composed of 1 CM and 2 NMs (
 
and %$  
respectively); the other is composed of 2 CMs and 1 NM (
 %$  
and 
respectively). Anticipating, we mention that, according to  2.4, the actual critical
OMIB is composed of 2 CMs and 1 NM. Note that, here, this OMIB corresponds to
the largest “distance” (angular deviation between adjacent machines at
  	
); but this
is not a general rule. Figure 2.1a plots also the OMIB swing curve computed from the
3The 3-machine system as well as the considered contingencies are fully described in Section 1 of Ap-
pendix B.
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3-machine swing curves, according to eqs (2.3) to (2.6) of  2.2. Note that, here, the
OMIB trajectory is more advanced than that of the most advanced machine:
    
;
in particular,
   	   	 #   (vs  %    	 	   ).
Further, using the formulas developed in the following paragraph, Fig. 2.1b sketches the
OMIB





curves of Fig. 2.1b, note that because of the machines modeling,
the
  	
curve is not sinusoidal as in the pure EAC representation; but still looks alike.
On the other hand, the plot of
  
curve still remains a straight line, suggesting that
there is no fast valving nor fast acting governors modeled here.
Finally, Fig. 2.1c provides a general notation, used throughout the monograph.
δ
(deg)















(a) Critical machines and OMIB trajectories
Nr of CMs: 2


























(b) Power-angle OMIB representation.
Resulting EAC parameters:       ;  	   	  




: electrical power ;
  
: mechanical power ;           : accelerating power  
: clearing time ;
  	
: time to instability         : clearing angle ;  	      	 : unstable angle
Subscript

stands for “during-fault” (or fault-on) configuration
Subscript
 
stands for “post-fault” configuration
Figure 2.1. Swing curves and OMIB
    representation of the 3-machine system.
Contingency Nr 2,
     " ms. General notation
2.2 Derivation of OMIB time-varying parameters
As already mentioned, the OMIB transformation results from the decompo-
sition of the system machines into two groups, the aggregation of these latter
into their corresponding center of angle (COA) and finally the replacement of
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the two COAs by an OMIB. These transformations use the parameter values of
the system machines and are refreshed at the rate these values are furnished by
the step-by-step T-D program. The resulting time-varying OMIB parameters
are thus a faithful picture of the multimachine parameters.
The formulas developed below correspond to the pattern which, presumably,
decomposes the machines into critical machines (CMs, subscript
 
) and non-
critical machines (NMs, subscript  ). However, they may also apply to any
other (candidate) decomposition pattern.
The expressions of corresponding OMIB parameters                
are derived as follows.
(i) Denoting by       the COA of the group of CMs, one writes:
      
	             (2.3)
Similarly:
        
	              (2.4)
In the above formulas:
            
       (2.5)
(ii) Define the rotor angle of the corresponding OMIB by the transformation
                 (2.6)
The corresponding OMIB rotor speed is expressed by
                 (2.7)
where
        
	                     
	
            (2.8)
(iii) Define the equivalent OMIB mechanical power by
            
	              
	
           (2.9)
the equivalent OMIB electric power by
             
	              
	
            (2.10)
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and the resulting OMIB accelerating power by
                     (2.11)
In the above expressions,
 
denotes the equivalent OMIB inertia coefficient
  
     
         (2.12)
2.3 Equal-area criterion revisited
As recalled in Appendix A, the well-known EAC proposed round the thirties
[Dahl, 1938, Skilling and Yamakawa, 1940, Kimbark, 1948] was dealing with
a single machine connected to an infinite bus and modeled in the standard
oversimplified way. Its purpose was to determine the stability properties of the
single-machine infinite bus system without solving the swing equation formally
expressed by (2.1). In other words, EAC was able to determine the maximum
excursion of  and hence the stability of the system without computing the
time response through formal solution of the swing equation.
Despite the above extremely restrictive applicability conditions, EAC has
been one of the most powerful tools in transient stability studies, thanks to
the extraordinary insight it provides into the stability phenomena and their
interpretations. Certainly, detailed transient stability analysis relies, one way
or the other, on T-D methods where the non-linear sets of differential and
algebraic equations (1.1), (1.2) are solved step-by-step by using numerical
integration techniques. But despite the extraordinary performances of T-D
methods achieved thanks to the tremendous progress in computers, EAC re-
mains a unique tool for sensitivity analysis and control issues. This is why it
always retains due attention in textbooks and publications dealing with transient
stability.
EAC relies on the concept of energy.4 In short, it states that the stability
properties of a contingency scenario may be assessed in terms of the stability
margin, defined as the excess of the decelerating over the accelerating area of
the OMIB
    plane:
        (2.13)
In the above expression (2.13), the accelerating area represents the kinetic
energy stored essentially during the fault-on period, while the decelerating area
4Although not surprising, it is interesting to note that the EAC coincides with the Lyapunov criterion using
the energy-type Lyapunov function mentioned in Chapter 1, when constructed for the same single-machine
infinite bus system and the same classical model (e.g., see [Pavella and Murthy, 1993]).
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represents the maximum potential energy that the power system can dissipate in
the post-fault configuration. Accordingly, the OMIB system is transient stable
if the accelerating area is smaller than the maximum decelerating area; stated
otherwise, the OMIB system will be unstable if     , stable if   ,
borderline (un)stable if    .
Thus, from a physical point of view, eq. (2.13) states that [Zhang, 1995]: if
the stored kinetic energy can be released as potential energy in the post-fault
system configuration, the system will be stable; otherwise it will be unstable.
Note that since this statement expresses the conservation of energy, it is
fully general and may apply to any OMIB system.5 In particular, it applies
to the generalized OMIB whose dynamics is expressed by (2.2). The main
and essential difference with the “original” EAC is that SIME computes the    and      curves of the generalized OMIB from the multimachine
data provided by a T-D program by solving eqs (1.1), (1.2); the computation is
needed only for the (generally short) duration determined by EAC. Depending
upon the stability case, this duration reduces to the time to reach the OMIB
angle   or  , as appropriate, defined as follows.6
the unstable angle,   , (  for “unstable”) is found at the crossing of the  
and
 
curves for an unstable scenario
the stable (or return) angle,  , ( 	 for “return”) represents the maximum
angular excursion of
  
for a stable scenario7




Figures 2.1b and 2.2b are relative respectively to an unstable and a stable
scenario under same operating conditions and same contingency, apart from its













    (2.14)
Angle             ) denotes the angle where   changes sign (from
positive to negative). Note that this angle does not necessarily coincide with
  , i.e., with the switch from    to    curves as is normally the case of
the original EAC (see Appendix A); hence, the accelerating power
 
may
change sign at     .
5Of course, to make sense, this OMIB representation has to be valid from a physical point of view.
6The analytical definitions of  	 and   are given below in  2.4.
7This applies to first-swing stability only. Multiswing phenomena will be discussed in Section 5.
Chapter 2 - INTRODUCTION TO SIME 43
For example, in Fig. 2.1b,
      :    is thus positive from 55.3  to 86.0  , and
negative from 86.0  to  	   	   .
Formula (2.14) expresses the stability margin in terms of the OMIB
  
 variation in both during- and post-fault configurations. More convenient
expressions will be elaborated in Section 3.
But before, let us state the EAC stability conditions in terms of the OMIB
time-varying parameters. The developments are illustrated on the previous
concrete example, described in Figs 2.1 as well as in Figs 2.2 and 2.3.
ILLUSTRATION. Figures 2.2 report on simulation results obtained under same operating
conditions and same contingency with Figs 2.1. The only difference is that, here, the
contingency clearing time is small enough
         ms vs      	 ms in Figs 2.1)
to avoid system’s loss of synchronism, yet close enough to
   
to allow considering by
continuation the same separation pattern and resulting OMIB. Note that for this stable
case the T-D simulations are conducted on the entire simulation period, in order to make
sure that the system is not only first-swing stable but also multiswing stable.
Finally, Figs 2.3 gather on their upper parts the power-angle representations in the
unstable and stable cases, on their lower parts the corresponding time-evolution of
OMIB rotor angle and speed. Note that the upper part of Fig. 2.3b is a truncated version
of Fig. 2.2b drawn up to a time slightly longer than the “return time”
     ms .
Notation relative to the small area representing the stable margin in the upper part of
Fig. 2.3b is discussed in Section 3.
2.4 Stability conditions
In this paragraph, the stability conditions resulting from the application of
eqs (2.13), (2.14) are restated in terms of the OMIB time-varying parameters
(angle, speed and accelerating power).
2.4.1 Conditions of unstable OMIB trajectory
An unstable case corresponds to     , i.e., to         (see eq. (2.13)).





or, equivalently, the accelerating power
  
passes
by zero and continues increasing. From a physical point of view,
    takes
place at     and marks the OMIB loss of synchronism.
The above reasoning yields the following statement.
An unstable OMIB trajectory reaches the unstable angle   at time    as
soon as:
     

  
      

 
      	
 	   (2.15)
with    for        . Whenever met, conditions (2.15) determine the “early
termination conditions” of the T-D program. Recall that these conditions are
also used to identify the critical OMIB (see

2.1).












































Corresponding power-angle representation of
the OMIB identified under prefault conditions
of Figs 2.1. Resulting EAC parameters:       ;      
#           ms
Figure 2.2. Swing curves and OMIB
    representation of the 3-machine system.
Contingency Nr 2;
      ms .
2.4.2 Conditions of stable OMIB trajectory
A stable case corresponds to   , i.e., to         . Inspection of
Fig. 2.2b and upper part of Fig. 2.3b suggests that in such a case, the acquired
kinetic energy is less than the maximum potential energy:
   
stops its
excursion at    , before crossing   . Stated otherwise, at    ,
   with      ,  stops increasing then decreases.
The above reasoning yields the following statement: a stable OMIB trajec-
tory reaches the return angle   (       at time    as soon as
     
   with            (2.16)
Conditions (2.16) are the “early termination stable conditions”: they imply that
the system is first-swing stable and that the T-D simulations can be stopped,
unless multiswing instability phenomena are sought.
2.4.3 Borderline conditions of OMIB trajectory
By definition, a critically stable OMIB trajectory reaches the return angle
 with       
  ; it coincides with the critically unstable OMIB trajectory
identified by the unstable angle   with         . Stated otherwise, the
borderline (un)stable conditions are met when the return angle   equals   .
Let   denote this particular, “critical angle” :         .
Observe that in this borderline case,   represents the unstable equilibrium
angle, since          .




















































































     	 ms (b)       ms
Figure 2.3. OMIB
    and time-domain representations of the 3-machine system.
Contingency Nr 2
2.4.4 Objectivity of the stability criteria
Conditions (2.15), (2.16) are fully objective stopping criteria, contrary to
the pragmatic criteria used with T-D programs to decide whether a stability
simulation has definitely been shown to be (un)stable and can be stopped.8
3. STABILITY MARGINS
3.1 Unstable margin
Observing that the OMIB becomes unstable as soon as it meets conditions









8This, however, does not imply that the values of the stability limits (critical clearing times or power limits)
computed by the two methods will be different.
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Further, observing that      9, we get by integration




    (2.18)
Comparing this equation with eq. (2.14) yields the unstable margin as


       (2.19)
where subscript  holds for “unstable” and           .
Remarks
1.- The above expression of the unstable margin is extraordinarily simple and
straightforward to compute. It gets rid of the computation of the accelerating
and decelerating areas of eq. (2.13) and of the integral in (2.14). It merely
requires knowledge of the OMIB inertia coefficient and rotor speed.
2.- Under very unstable simulation conditions, it may happen that an OMIB
post-fault trajectory has only positive accelerating power, i.e. no unstable
angle   and therefore no margin. Paragraph 3.4 identifies the conditions
under which such a situation arises and shows how to circumvent this difficulty
by using another type of margin, different from the one defined by EAC.
3.2 Stable margin














and observing that    for      and for    , we get the corresponding
stable margin as
     
 	
 




      (2.21)
where subscript    stands for “stable”.
3.2.1 Remark
Unlike unstable margin which takes on the closed form expression (2.19)
and can be computed precisely, stable margin expressed by (2.21) can only be
9Indeed,        
	    , since it represents the pre-fault stable equilibrium solution.
Chapter 2 - INTRODUCTION TO SIME 47
approximated. Indeed, neither   nor       )         can directly
be computed, since the OMIB
      curve “returns back” at    (see
Fig. 2.3b).
Two types of approximations are proposed below: one relies on the con-
struction of a triangle and computation of its area, the other on the prediction
of the
     curve in the interval       and computation of the integral
(2.21).
3.2.2 Triangle approximation
This approximation consists of using a linearized trajectory in the
 	  
plane, in the interval
      . Denoting by    the value of   at    ,
this yields
                 (2.22)
and corresponds to the small decelerating area portrayed in the upper part of
Fig. 2.3b, denoted “TRI”.
Note that the validity of the above approximation relies on the following two
conditions:
1. the stable angle in eq. (2.22),   , is close enough to   ; otherwise, the
approximate expression (2.22) may introduce large errors
2. to compute the unstable angle,   , accurately enough, two unstable simu-
lations are needed, in order to use the linear extrapolation formula:
                 
    	 	 (2.23)
where the sensitivity coefficient
  	 	 is expressed by
  	 	      


     

     
              
 (2.24)
The above expressions comply with several sensitivity definitions (see below

3.2.5 and Chapter 3).
On the other hand, the reason for searching the angle   corresponding
to    is clearly suggested by the triangle displayed in the upper part
of Fig. 2.3b. Indeed, as can be seen, it would be for that angle   that the
curve
      would reach    then would immediately start “returning back”.
Figures 2.5b and 2.5c of

3.3.2 show that for    ,        .
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3.2.3 Weighted least-squares approximation
The weighted least-squares (WLS) approximation was initially developed in
the context of Emergency SIME.10 It consists of extrapolating the
     ) curve
from   to   :
either by writing
               (2.25)
and solving for       based on    values taken at three successive time
steps
or by using a WLS approximation based on more than three (actually a large
number of) time step values.
Angle   is then found by solving eq. (2.25) and taking the solution     .
Finally,    is computed via eq. (2.21). In the upper part of Fig. 2.3b, the area
thus computed is labeled “WLS”. More about this predicted
     curve will
be found in Chapter 6.
3.2.4 Triangle vs WLS approximation
The triangle approximation relies on two unstable simulations which, in
addition, should be quite close to the stable one. When these conditions are
met, the resulting computation of the triangle-based positive margin is very
accurate.
On the other hand, the WLS approximation needs only one unstable simu-
lation11 , i.e., more relaxed conditions than the triangle.
When two convenient unstable simulations exist, the triangle and WLS
approximations generally furnish numerical results close to each other.
3.2.5 Note on sensitivity analysis by SIME
The sensitivity computation of

3.2.2 is a particular case of linearized
sensitivity analysis.
Sensitivity analysis by SIME relies on stability margins. Sensitivity issues
receive a large number of applications; they are elaborated in Chapter 3. Let
us merely set here the basic formulation of a linearized sensitivity analysis for
the sake of the developments of
 
3.4, 3.5.
10see Section 2 of Chapter 6. This is also the reason for calling it “weighted” least-squares. Actually, in the
context of Preventive SIME developed here this is simply a “least-squares” approximation.
11as close as possible to the critically unstable one; remember, the OMIB of concern can only be identified
on an unstable simulation which identifies the pattern of machines’ separation into two groups
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By definition, the sensitivity coefficient of margin  with respect to param-






          






Accordingly, the value of parameter   which cancels the margin is given by
                    

 (2.27)
In the above expressions, parameter   could be the clearing time, the power
level or any other quantity liable to influence the system stability.
3.3 Existence and range of stability margins
3.3.1 General description
Stability margins in general express “how far” from (in)stability a system is.
The question is: does a stability margin as defined by SIME cover the whole
range of stable and unstable cases ? If not, why and what is the range of existing
margins ?
To explore this key issue, first recall that in the sense of SIME a stability
margin results from the definition of an OMIB and the application of EAC.
Now, according to EAC, a stability margin is defined in the
    plane in
terms of the accelerating and decelerating areas,    and    (eq. (2.13))
or, equivalently, of the integral of
  
over  (eq. (2.14)). In other words,
existence of a stability margin in the sense of EAC implies existence of   
and   , or, equivalently, of   .
Second, observe that, strictly speaking, an OMIB is defined on unstable sim-
ulations only, since its existence is directly related to the machines’ separation
and loss of synchronism.12
The above observations suggest that, in the sense of SIME:
negative margins can be defined only as long as    (or, equivalently,
  ) exists, that is as long as    goes past   for some       ;
positive margins can be defined only for a small range of cases close to the
stability limit.
Taking as reference the limit stability conditions where    , we see that
in the sense of SIME, stability margins range from small positive values of 
12However, by continuation, we accept this OMIB to be valid on a stable simulation too, provided that this
simulation is close to the borderline (un)stable case.
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up to negative values bounded by
  	
  which corresponds to        
where
                                            (2.28)
Figure 2.4a illustrates this definition (see also Fig. A.5). In turn,
 	   
depends on the contingency clearing time,
 
, under fixed operating conditions
or, on
 
under fixed contingency clearing time. Below we explore on an
example the range of existence of  .
3.3.2 Illustrations












. Let us consider the two stability cases described in Figs 2.1
and 2.2. They were carried out for respectively,
    
	 ms (for which
       (unstable simulation)), and       ms (for which     	
(stable simulation)). Obviously, the borderline clearing time, i.e., the critical
clearing time, CCT, lies in between 117 and 92 ms. It was also mentioned that
for
      
 CCT ,         .13 Angle   is thus likely to be a little
larger than  and also larger than   ; indeed, decreasing    from 117 to
CCT implies increasing    , i.e., increasing   .
Let us search
      , i.e., the clearing time for which    starts being positive.
Figs 2.4a, are drawn for various
  
’s . They show that
     	 ms yields
an unstable case where a stability margin still exists, and that
     ms is
the borderline case, where the system stops having a post-fault equilibrium and
hence unstable angle   . Hence,         ms . Finally,        ms and,
a fortiori
       ms correspond to extremely severe stability conditions for
which
 
has only positive values. For example, Fig. 2.4a shows that
    
corresponding to
       ms is 38.2 MW.
Extremum of
 
. Fig. 2.4b portrays a behaviour similar to that of Fig. 2.4a
but for fixed clearing time,
  
, and variable OMIB mechanical power. One
can see that the system stops having a post-fault equilibrium and corresponding
unstable angle   when   exceeds 149 MW.
3.3.3 Variation of salient parameters with 
Figures 2.5 illustrate the ranges of variation with
 
of
       and
     , for the 3-machine system and operating conditions of Table 2.1,  4.2.
These figures are further commented below.
13Recall that subscript

stands for “critical” or limit stability conditions.

























      for     "  MW (b) Search of      for      " ms
Figure 2.4.
    representations for overly unstable cases. 3-machine system.
Contingency Nr 2
Variation of
     with    . The “distance”      defined by (2.28) is
expressed in MW. Its variation is portrayed in Fig. 2.5a: it is lowerbounded
by
      , the minimum value of    for which    becomes positive
(
        ms) then starts increasing: its range goes from      (     )







































     (b) Range of stability margin (c) Range of   $  	
Figure 2.5. Range of existence of
      $  $   $  	 . Contingency Nr 2
Variation of  with    . The curve  vs    is lowerbounded by a value
of
  
smaller than but close to
  
and upperbounded by
          .
Figure 2.5b portrays this variation. Note that the curve is almost linear for
negative values, and also linear for
   	 ms . For smaller values, the validity
of the stability margin becomes doubtful. The margin becomes zero at 95.7 ms;
hence, CCT 
       	 ms .
Variation of  and   with    . As already discussed, the curve   vs   
reaches a maximum at





. The curve   vs    is defined in the interval             .
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Figure 2.5c portrays these curves. We can also check that for the limit condition
       CCT, the three angles coincide:        .
3.4 A convenient substitute for unstable margins
It was just observed that under very stringent stability conditions the EAC
margin defined by eqs (2.13), (2.14) does not exist anymore. This may arise
for the following two reasons:







(ii) the clearing angle,   , is beyond the unstable angle   .
Hence, since all SIME-based computations rely essentially on stability mar-
gins, it is important to decrease the severity of the stability conditions so as to
“effectively” reach the range of margins’ existence.
Such a systematic procedure is derived below. It relies on a sensitivity
computation similar to that of

3.2.5, where
the margin  is replaced by       expressed by (2.28)
the parameter   stands either for
 
, the OMIB mechanical power, or for
  
, the contingency clearing time.
(i) To appraise the amount of OMIB’s mechanical power necessary to reach
  (where     , see Fig. 2.6a), the sensitivity computation consists of
writing:
                           (2.29)
with                 
                    
              
 (2.30)
(ii) Similarly, to appraise the clearing time for which the OMIB meets  
(see Fig. 2.6b), the sensitivity calculation consists of writing:
                           (2.31)
with                  
                    
                
 (2.32)
14This case corresponds to the absence of solutions of the dynamic eq. (2.2), i.e., of equilibria in the system
post-fault configuration.
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(b) By adjusting the clearing time
Figure 2.6. Procedures for reaching the range of margins’ existence.
Adapted from [Zhang et al., 1997a]
In both cases, this yields an iterative procedure which usually requires 2 to 4
iterations. Note that the sensitivity computation per se is virtually inexpensive.
Hence, the computing time virtually reduces to the time spent for the T-D
simulations; and since the cases of concern are generally very unstable, this
time is generally short.
Figures 2.6a illustrate the procedure corresponding to above case (i), and
Figs 2.6b to that of case (ii).
3.5 Next candidate CMs and margins
15 So far, we have focused on the critical OMIB and resulting margin.
In many applications, however, it is interesting to explore candidate OMIBs
next to the actual critical OMIB. Their usefulness will appear in the following
chapters. Let us only mention here that in various sensitivity-like applications
one is led to consider two successive simulations (say,       and   ) and
compare their corresponding margins. Now such a comparison is possible only
if the simulations refer to the same set of CMs and resulting OMIB. If not, one
should continue running simulations until getting two successive simulations
with identical OMIBs.
15This paragraph deals with matters aiming at speeding up SIME’s algorithm. It might be skipped at first
reading.
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A convenient solution may be found in the use of candidate modes of sep-
aration (and corresponding candidate OMIBs) close to (though not identical
with) the actual mode of separation. Such situations often arise on large power
systems having hundreds of machines for which the mode of separation can be
rather versatile, leading to two successive simulations16 which, even close, do
not have exactly the same CMs. The solution then consists of comparing the
margins of simulations
 
and       computed for the OMIB of simulation
 
.
To state this more clearly, let us denote COMIB a candidate OMIB and
 (COMIB) the corresponding margin. Then, if OMIB     is identical to
COMIB       , we may, for example, extrapolate the margins  (OMIB     )
and  (COMIB       ) . Obviously, the result won’t be “optimal”; nevertheless,
it is likely to be good enough to allow saving one T-D simulation.
ILLUSTRATION. The 3-machine system considered so far has limited possibilities.
This is why the example used below and illustrated on Figs 2.7 does not conform
to the above scheme. Rather, it consists of computing the margins      $       
corresponding to the clearing times
     	 and 137 ms respectively, for the candidate
OMIB composed of one machine
    . The reason for using the candidate instead
of the actual critical OMIB is that this latter does not have margin for
     " ms ,
while for the candidate OMIB it yields:   	       ;         	  
 .
Their linear extrapolation provides an approximate CCT of 105 ms. (Remember, CCT
corresponds to zero margin.)
Given that the actual CCT is 95.7 ms, we see that the above approximation is not so bad,


























       ms
Figure 2.7.
    representations of the critical and the next to the critical OMIBs.
3-machine system. Contingency Nr 2
16Successive simulations are for example simulations run for slightly different clearing times or operating
states.
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3.6 Normalized margins
According to eq. (2.14), the margins considered so far are expressed in
MW.rad. On the other hand, a closer look at the expression of the negative
margin (2.19) shows that its numerical value is proportional to the OMIB inertia
coefficient. In turn, this coefficient depends on the number of system machines,
their inertia and their mode of separation (i.e., the way the machines separate
into CMs and NMs).
To make the range of margin values less dependent on the above factors, we
use “normalized” margins by dividing expressions (2.19), (2.21) by the OMIB
inertia coefficient. These normalized margins are thus expressed in (rad/s)

.
Along with the same lines, the “normalized distance”
     , is obtained
by dividing




Let us insist that, whether normalized or not, margins and “accelerating
power distances” do not have the same meaning and cannot be compared to
each other.
4. SIME’S TYPICAL REPRESENTATIONS
So far, SIME has illustrated various aspects of transient stability phenomena,
via two OMIB representations: the time-domain and the
    ones. In this
section a third representation will be introduced: the OMIB phase plane (or
phase portrait).
These representations will be applied first on the 3-machine system, then on
a real-world power system.
In these simulations, SIME’s accuracy is assessed in terms of CCTs: CCT
by SIME as compared with the CCT of the corresponding T-D program coupled
with SIME. Note that the CCT computation by SIME is performed according
to

2.2 of Chapter 4.
4.1 Illustrations on the three-machine system
4.1.1 Stability conditions
The stability case consists of the 3-machine system under the prefault oper-
ating conditions and the contingency considered so far (Nr 2).
The contingency is cleared at different clearing times,
 
’s , varying in
between 250 ms and 70 ms, i.e., above and below the critical clearing time,
  
,
which was found to be 95.7 ms . In all these simulations, the critical separation
pattern was found to split the machines into two CMs (    and   ) and one
NM (   	  .
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4.1.2 OMIB parameters and numerical results
Table 2.1 gathers the 3-machine system parameters, under the operating
conditions considered so far and contingency Nr 2, for
       ms . It
also lists the OMIB parameters, computed according to eqs (2.3) to (2.12).
Note that with the modeling considered here, the machine mechanical powers             are constant, and so is the OMIB mechanical power    ,
computed via eqs (2.5), (2.9).
Table 2.1. 3-machine system and
OMIB parameters;














Table 2.2. Stability conditions vs
 
              	     

















On the other hand, Table 2.2 gathers information relative to various
 
’s
for the stability conditions of Table 2.1. The values of  or      (listed
between brackets) are not normalized. The values of
 
 (
   ) are in ms. Note
that the listed positive margins are provided by the triangle approximation.
4.1.3 SIME’s three representations
The OMIB swing curves,
    plots and phase plane representations
are displayed in Figs 2.8, under various contingency clearing times. More
precisely, Figs 2.8a and 2.8b display the swing curves and
    curves for
respectively
    
		 ms and     	 ms ; Fig. 2.8c plots the phase plane
representation corresponding to four clearing times: 
		 ms, 	 ms, 
	 ms
(for which the swing and
    curves are portrayed in Figs 2.1) and    ms
(see Figs 2.2).
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(c) Phase plane representation of the OMIB
Figure 2.8. Three SIME’s representations for the 3-machine system. Contingency Nr 2.
CCT(SIME) = 95.7 ms ; CCT(MATLAB) = 95 ms
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Discussion. Obviously, the OMIB swing curve is an image of the multi-
machine system time evolution. In other words, the information about the
multimachine time evolution is compressed into that of the OMIB evolution,
with a compression rate of   , the number of system machines.
Of course, in this oversimplified academic example the compression rate is
low. And since the multimachine swing curves are quite smooth, the OMIB
swing curves do not add much to the description of the phenomena.
One might therefore think that these curves do not contribute significantly
to understand and/or interprete the multimachine stability phenomena. This,
however, is not true anymore when it comes to real power systems with intricate




    representation, on the other hand, allows getting a different
picture of the phenomena. Its simplicity enhances their understanding; besides,
it opens avenues to an impressive number of applications of all three types:
analysis, sensitivity analysis and control (i.e., stabilization). The resulting
advantages are paramount, as will be seen in the remaining chapters.
Finally, the OMIB phase plane representation provides a typical system
theory description of transient stability phenomena, conveying complementary
type of information. Obviously, clearing times
  	           drive the system
to instability, since the corresponding trajectories escape from the stability
region; on the contrary, the trajectory corresponding to
  
spirals inwards,
toward the stable post-fault equilibrium solution.
It is interesting to observe that the information contained in the phase plane
results from a compression rate of     , where  denotes the total number
of system state variables. For example, in the present 3-machine system, 
equals 21 (2 mechanical, 2 electrical and 3 AVR’s state variables per machine).
Hence, the compression rate is 21/2. This rate is impressive even for this
academic example. It becomes dramatic in real-world cases, while, at the
same time, preserving the clarity of interpretations. This is illustrated on the
following example.17
4.2 Illustrations on the Hydro-Québec system
Main characteristics of the Hydro-Québec system are provided in Section 2 of
Appendix B. Let us only specify here that it is represented by 86 machines, and
that these machines together with the network total over 2,000 state variables.
The contingency considered here creates back- and multi-swing phenomena,
that we will further analyse in Section 5.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 illustrate these phenomena in the three SIME’s repre-
sentations: swing curves,
    curves, phase plane curves.
17See also the example of

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Figures 2.9a correspond to an unstable case         ms) , Figs 2.9b to a




























































     	 ms
Figure 2.9. Illustration of back- and multi-swing phenomena on the Hydro-Québec system:
swing and
    curves. CCT(SIME) = 175.5 ms ; CCT(ST-600) = 176 ms .
Incidentally, note that the multiswing CCT is slightly larger than 175 ms.
Further, note that the first-swing CCT equals 220 ms, i.e., it is fairly larger than
the multiswing one. But the system goes first-swing unstable after 418 ms, i.e.,
much earlier than multiswing unstable (5.63 s). In other words, for
 
between
175 and 220 ms the system will lose synchronism after a few seconds, while for  
larger than 220 ms it will lose synchronism after some hundred milliseconds.
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(b) Stable case:
     	 ms
Figure 2.11. Time evolution of the OMIB mechanical power of the Hydro-Québec system
According to the discussion of

4.1.3, the compression rate of the OMIB
swing curves is 86, while that of the phase plane is over
           .
Even more important than this dramatic compression rate is that these OMIB
representations give an insight into the multimachine system behavior.
Indeed, the OMIB swing curves appraise phenomena hardly possible to
observe on the multimachine swing curves, because of their high intricacy.
On the other hand, the phase plane of Fig. 2.10 describes simply and clearly
the backswing and multiswing phenomena: multiswing instabilities, since the
unstable trajectory spirals outwards the stable equilibrium, before definitely
escaping from the stability region; backswing (stable and unstable) phenomena,
since the trajectories start spiraling backwards, contrary to those of Fig. 2.8c.
Finally, observe that the pre-fault and post-fault stable equilibrium points
are slightly different, suggesting a small change in the topology.
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Coming back to the
    plots of Fig. 2.9, observe the important OMIB’s 
vs  variations, due to the system turbines’ governors. More precisely,
observe that at the first instants of the fault application, the mechanical power
of the OMIB decreases, despite its deceleration. One may wonder why the
machines’ mechanical power regulation tends to amplify this instability phe-
nomenon. Actually, this is caused by the hydraulic type of system turbines,
which are non-minimum phase. Hence, at the very first instants, although
their primary regulation aims at increasing their mechanical power, it actually
decreases it. For information, Figs 2.11 plot the corresponding evolution of 
with time.
4.3 SIME as a reduction technique
The above three representations uncover an interesting interpretation of
SIME: that of a technique allowing a dramatic reduction of the dimensionality
of the power system transient stability problem. This significant result provides
SIME with extraordinary flexibility, strength and possibilities.
5. BACK- AND MULTI-SWING PHENOMENA
5.1 Definitions
Multiswing phenomena along with the number of corresponding swings
receive a clear interpretation and assessment through the OMIB representations,
like those of Figs 2.9, 2.10.
Observe that in Fig. 2.9a the OMIB is composed of 1 CM and 85 NMs. Ob-
serve also that the CM and the OMIB start in a backswing (decelerating) mode;
but after some oscillations, they lose synchronism in an upswing (accelerating)
mode. On the other hand, Figs 2.9b are relative to a stabilized case.
The OMIB swing curve provides a clear insight and interpretation of the
physical phenomena and readily yields the following definitions.
An   -swing (in)stability       appears if the OMIB angle during the      swings does not meet its unstable angle. Thus, the   -swing will be
unstable if the OMIB reaches its unstable angle, defined by conditions
(2.15); for example, for the unstable case of Fig. 2.9a,    
stable if the OMIB reaches its return angle defined by conditions (2.16).
A final observation: the critical machines’ identification procedure of

2.1
applies to any swing curve; it is therefore valid for multiswing phenomena also.
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5.2 Analytical expression of margins
The general first-swing margin expression (2.14) holds valid for multiswing
phenomena as well, through proper adjustment. Thus,
   
   	
  
    (2.33)
where       stand respectively for the initial and unstable OMIB angles of the
  th swing. The unstable angle is defined as for the first swing, by conditions
(2.15), except that here
 
  stands for the time taken to reach    .18
Like first-swing stability, eq. (2.33) yields the analytical expressions of mul-
tiswing stable and unstable margins as
                  (2.34)


         (2.35)
where
             stand, respectively, for accelerating power, return
angle, unstable angle and unstable speed of the OMIB of the appropriate swing
number.
6. DIRECT PRODUCTS AND MAIN BY-PRODUCTS
6.1 Description
Broadly, one may distinguish three types of information provided by SIME:
stability margins and critical machines (CMs); EAC per se; sensitivity analysis
and control techniques.
Stability margins and CMs are the two major direct achievements of SIME.
This chapter has essentially focused on their formulation, derivation and ex-
ploration.
The second type of SIME’s source of information is the very EAC, applied
to OMIB, i.e. to a faithful image of the multimachine system behaviour
under given modeling. The sheer number of physical interpretations that EAC
provides to intricate transient stability phenomena is certainly not the least asset
of the method.
The third type of SIME’s information, obtained as a by-product of the
previous two, are sensitivity analysis and control.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to a given parameter relies on the existence
of stability margins and deals with their variation with this parameter. Al-
though sensitivity coefficients may be assessed only numerically, their use is
18The initial angle of the

th swing is the OMIB’s minimum angular deviation reached at the end of the

  	 	 th swing.
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generally very simple and straightforward. Sensitivity analysis is a powerful
multiobjective tool scrutinized in Chapter 3.
On the other hand, control relies on the combined use of margins, CMs, and
suggestions provided by EAC. Control techniques devise means to determine
the type and size of action necessary to stabilize an otherwise unstable sce-
nario, be it in the preventive or the emergency mode. Control techniques are
introduced in Chapter 3 and elaborated in Chapter 4.
Sensitivity analysis and control techniques together with stability margins,
CMs, and the very EAC will allow us to tackle any type of transient stability
study, i.e., to cover the whole field of transient stability assessment and control
(TSA&C).
6.2 Organization of topics
The remainder of this monograph is devoted to the development of transient
stability techniques of the preventive and the emergency modes.
Chapter 3 focuses on sensitivity analysis in general, and the derivation of
various techniques on which rely the various types of applications derived in
the following chapters.
Chapters 4 and 5 cover all aspects of TSA&C in the preventive mode.
Chapter 6 introduces a new technique: the real-time closed-loop emergency
control.
Finally, Chapter 7 overviews salient features of preventive and emergency
SIMEs and gives a synthetic comparison of the three classes of existing ap-
proaches to transient stability.
7. PREVENTIVE vs EMERGENCY SIME
Differences between Preventive and Emergency SIME were shortly men-
tioned in
 
2.3, 2.4 of Chapter 1 and in

1.2 of this Chapter. They will fully be
specified in the following chapters. However, as a convenience to the reader,
below we summarize their basic essentials.
In essence, SIME combines information about the multimachine power
system with the OMIB stability assessment based on EAC.
The multimachine information is obtained either from transient stability
simulations of contingencies likely to occur, or from measurements acquired
from the system power plants in real-time and reflecting the actual occurrence
of a contingency. The former information is processed by the Preventive SIME,
the latter by the Emergency SIME.
Both SIMEs aim at performing successively two main tasks: transient stabil-
ity assessment and control. But while the Emergency SIME attempts to control
the system just after a contingency occurrence and its clearance, so as to main-
64 TRANSIENT STABILITY OF POWER SYSTEMS
tain synchronism, the Preventive SIME aims at proposing countermeasures
preventively, i.e. before the actual occurrence of any contingency.
7.1 Preventive transient stability assessment
Preventive TSA goes along the traditional way of assessing the system
robustness vis-à-vis occurrence of anticipated contingencies. In an on-line
context, preventive TSA should consider all plausible contingencies, in a time
horizon of, say, 30 minutes ahead: computational efficiency becomes thus
crucial.
On-line preventive TSA may effectively be decomposed into contingency fil-
tering (to detect existence of harmful contingencies while discarding the (large
majority of) harmless ones), contingency ranking (to classify the contingencies
found to be potentially harmful, according to their degree of severity), and
contingency assessment, to scrutinize the harmful ones.
According to the Preventive SIME, these tasks are achieved using T-D sim-
ulations to determine stability margins and critical machines. The resulting
filtering and ranking procedures are significantly faster than those relying on
conventional pure T-D approaches. Nevertheless, the paramount advantage is
control.
7.2 Predictive transient stability assessment
Unlike preventive TSA, predictive TSA has not been used so far, for two
main reasons: on one hand, because this task is hardly achievable - if at all -
by conventional approaches; on the other hand, because its interest is directly
linked to the feasibility of closed-loop emergency control and, again, this cannot
be tackled by conventional approaches.
Unlike preventive TSA, the predictive TSA deals, in real-time, with (suc-
cession of) events which have been detected but not necessarily identified, and
generally automatically cleared by the protective devices. Thus, in order to
be effective, the prediction of the system behaviour must be performed early
enough so as to leave sufficient time for determining and triggering appropriate
control actions, whenever necessary. To get a stability diagnostic ahead of
time, the predictive TSA relies on real-time measurements (see Chapter 6).
7.3 Control
Whether for preventive or for emergency use, the very design of control
techniques relies on common principles. But the way of applying them dif-
fers substantially in many respects (speed of action, closed-loop vs open-loop
fashion, character of absolute necessity or not, etc.).
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8. SUMMARY
SIME’s roots have been traced back to the Lyapunov’s direct method, and
its features as an OMIB-based method were specified. It was suggested that
the conjunction of direct criteria with detailed temporal information about
multimachine parameters (provided by a T-D program or by real-time mea-
surements) allows evading the weaknesses of both (direct criteria and temporal
information) while keeping their strengths and even magnifying them substan-
tially.
It was pointed out that the basic information furnished by SIME concerns
stability margins and critical machines. This chapter has essentially focused
on their derivation and specifics.
The results were illustrated mainly on a three-machine example to help
the reader get familiar with essential aspects; on the other hand, real-world
stability cases were used to uncover phenomena specific to large-scale systems.
Through these developments and illustrations it was shown that SIME may
be seen as a reduction technique able to transform the multidimensional state
space of the multimachine power system into a two-dimensional phase plane.
The resulting plot is a faithful picture of the multimachine stability phenomena,
no matter whether they correspond to a small test system, modeled in a rather
simplified way, or to a large-scale real system modeled in detail.
Chapter 3
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Chapter 2 has dealt with two major achievements of SIME: calculation of
stability margins and identification of critical machines; stability margins are
at the very core of SIME-based sensitivity analysis.
In a broad sense, sensitivity may be viewed as the ratio of response to cause
and appraised in terms of sensitivity coefficients. In the context of control
theory, sensitivity coefficients express the dependence of a system state variable
or a performance index on system parameters.
In transient stability studies, “the performance index” should naturally be
related to (the degree of) system stability. The margin provided by SIME appears
to be a very powerful stability index. As for parameters likely to have signifi-
cant impact on power system stability, we may distinguish “elementary” and
“global” ones. Elementary parameters can for example be: contingency char-
acteristics (e.g., clearing scenario) or network characteristics (e.g., number of
lines on a heavily loaded corridor, FACTS devices, etc). Global parameters,
on the other hand, are meant to be suitable combinations of elementary ones;
OMIB parameters developed in the context of SIME are good candidates.
Like in many other fields, an ultimate goal of transient stability sensitivity
analysis is control, i.e., design of corrective actions able to stabilize an oth-
erwise unstable case. Now, in the sense of SIME, this may be viewed as the
direct extension of sensitivity investigations, since the purpose is to cancel out
the corresponding negative margin.
This chapter lays the foundations of sensitivity analysis techniques. More
precisely, the objectives are:
to describe sensitivity analysis in general, scrutinize conventional methods,
and show that the use of SIME’s margin makes sensitivity analysis a valuable
tool in transient stability studies;
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to derive SIME-based sensitivity analysis;
to devise SIME-based compensation schemes which provide one-shot pro-
cedures for calculating stability limits ;
in short, to lay the foundations of key techniques for TSA&C.
1. ELEMENTS OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
1.1 Problem statement
The sensitivity of a system to variations of its parameters plays an important
role in analysis and control. Indeed, on one hand, the values of a system param-
eters differ from the nominal ones (because of inaccuracies in the computed
data, of their variation with time, of imperfect realization of the controlled
devices). On the other hand, information about the way the characteristics
of a system depend on its parameter variations may be used to improve its
performances as, for example, in adaptive systems.
Power system dynamics in general is governed by the sets (1.1), (1.2) of
differential-algebraic equations re-written below as:
   	

 (3.1)  	

 (3.2)
where,  is the   -dimensional state vector,  the   -dimensional vector of
algebraic variables, and  the   -dimensional vector of parameter variables.
The   algebraic equations define a manifold of dimension       , the
constraint manifold, in the             -dimensional space of    and  .
Differential-algebraic systems can be analyzed using the implicit function
theorem. According to this theorem, under the assumption that the algebraic
Jacobian    	
 is non-singular at point    and  , there exists a
locally unique, smooth function

of the form:
      
 
   
 (3.3)
from which the algebraic variables have been eliminated. Equations (3.3) are
preferred to the set (3.1), (3.2) because they get rid of any constraint manifold.
Sensitivity analysis can be related to various types of variations : those which
do not alter the order of the system or its initial conditions are referred to as  -
variations; variations of the initial conditions, called  -variations; variations
leading to changes in the system order, the  -variations. For example the
change of a feedback gain can be referred to as an  -variation; a change
of the fault duration can be considered as a  -variation if the state vector
of the system entering its post-fault configuration is considered as the initial
state. Power rescheduling among a group of generators can be considered as a
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combination of both  -variations (changes in machine generation modify the
state space of the system) and  -variations (generation power references are
modified). On the other hand,  -variations are mostly due to the presence of
small parameters not taken into account in the mathematical system modeling;
for example, they could be introduced by the placement of a new control device
which increases the system order [Kokotovic and Rutman, 1965].
Three types of sensitivity analysis methods are briefly described below:
(i) sensitivity analysis of the linearized system; (ii) analysis of supplementary
motion which studies the influence of parameter variations on the system mo-
tion; (iii) sensitivity analysis based on performance indexes rather than system
state variables.
N.B. Paragraphs 1.2 to 1.5 of this section deal with theoretical aspects of
conventional sensitivity analysis methods, and attempt to highlight, by compar-
ison, the significance of SIME’s contributions in the field. The reader who is
familiar with such methods may skip these paragraphs and go directly to

1.6.
1.2 Sensitivity analysis of the linearized system
The linearization of the Differential-Algebraic (D-A) system described by
eqs (3.1) and (3.2) leads to:              (3.4)
where  is the unreduced Jacobian of the D-A system :
             (3.5)
For complex systems, where the Jacobian cannot be calculated analytically,
a numerical method is used. Starting from the states determined from model
initialization, a small perturbation is applied to each state successively. The
variation of all the states divided by the magnitude of the perturbation gives a
column of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the disturbed state.
Assuming that    is nonsingular we eliminate   from eq. (3.4) and get:
             
	           (3.6)
In the power system literature, the state matrix  of the linearized system is
often called the reduced Jacobian as opposed to the unreduced one. This matrix,
which depends on vector  can also be viewed as the result of linearization of
eq. (3.3).
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The sensitivity analysis of the linearized system, via matrix  , may be
performed using standard techniques of linear systems sensitivity analysis.
Sensitivity techniques applied to linearized systems are efficient even for very
large-scale systems. But their validity depends on the validity of the system
linearization, which is questionable for highly non-linear phenomena as those
involved in transient stability.
1.3 Sensitivity analysis of the supplementary motion
The original system (3.3)1 will be decomposed here into an equation for
each one of its
 
-th components:
       	         	                     (3.7)
with initial conditions    
    .
If we consider that the parameter values undergo variations     , then the
varied motion is described by the system2
  	    	         	      	               
    
                 (3.8)
System (3.8) corresponds to the varied motion
 	    , while system (3.7) to
the fundamental or unperturbed motion. The supplementary motion is defined
as the difference
                                
 (3.9)
Assuming that the solutions of (3.7) and (3.8) are differentiable with respect
to    , we represent the supplementary motion (3.9) in a Taylor series expansion
in powers of    . If we can accept to limit the expansion to the first linear
terms, we get:
         	         
  	 

     

               (3.10)
where the higher order variations of    will be considered to be negligible.
Thus, according to eq. (3.10), the study of supplementary motion leads to
the calculation and analysis of partial derivatives
  
      

     

   
             (3.11)
1The original system can also be considered as the unperturbed system.
2except for  -variations.
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The sensitivity function or coefficient
  
      of the coordinate  relative
to the parameter    , reflects the trend of variation of the coordinates under
parameter variations. It is also known as trajectory sensitivity. Note that the







         
  
     (3.12)
Note also that the partial derivative of
  
      with respect to parameter   
is given by:

   
     

     

     

      (3.13)
It may be difficult or even impossible to get an analytical expression for the
sensitivity function. We can then resort to numerical computations, relative
to the temporal evolution of the original and the perturbed systems associated
with the set of parameters   	                      . If     is small enough,
then
  
      can be suitably approximated by:
  
       
          
     (3.14)
Note that in the case of  -variations the varied motion corresponds to
system (3.7) with different initial conditions                . However, if
the initial conditions are also considered as system parameters, we can apply
the same formulation. The formulation of varied motion for  -variations is
different and will not be discussed here.
Unlike sensitivity analysis of the linearized system, an analysis of the sup-
plementary motion is able to reproduce correctly the phenomena involved in
the original non-linear system, since it does not imply their linearization. Nev-
ertheless, none of these two methods provide global information about the
influence of parameter variations on the system behaviour.
This approach is also the basis of the research work reported in [Laufenberg
and Pai, 1997, Hiskens et al., 1999, Hiskens and Pai, 2000].
1.4 Synthetic sensitivity functions (ssfs)
Such a global information may be obtained by using appropriate synthetic
sensitivity functions (ssf for short). Such a function aims at expressing the
dependence of a performance index on the corresponding set of parameters (
and
 ) of the original and the perturbed systems.
Letting  be this function we write:
                     
  (3.15)
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Admittedly, expression (3.14) can also be considered as an ssf function. But
in contrast to eq. (3.15), sensitivity analysis relying on system state variables
can be an extremely tedious task, which, moreover, does not necessarily provide
a comprehensive account of the physical phenomena.
For example, consider the influence of a parameter    on the dynamics of
the state vector      when the system is subjected to a constant perturbation.
An analysis of the supplementary motion would need the computation of  
sensitivity functions
  
      ,              . And the influence of   parameters
would imply    
 
sensitivity functions. Another even more serious difficulty
comes from the fact that these sensitivity functions are time dependent; hence
the necessity to analyze   trajectories. Note, however, that this difficulty
might partly be circumvented by determining for each
 
the time
            
for which
             is maximum over the time interval and hence by
considering as a synthetic sensitivity function, the expression:
  
  
            
        (3.16)
The existence of a convenient performance index yielding an appropriate
synthetic sensitivity function may provide very interesting alternative solutions.
Suppose for example that the output of the synthetic sensitivity function is a
good picture of the parameters’ influence on stability. Suppose further that ssf  is the scalar output of the ssf obtained with a perturbed motion relative to
the parameter vector
      	                                           
Then the vector
   ssf       ssf    gives in the   -dimensional parameter space
the direction that provides the largest rate of the stability domain increase.
Using this information, a steepest descent could determine the set of parameters
corresponding to the largest stability domain.
Applications of this approach are described in [Rovnyak et al., 1997].
Below we give some simple illustrations on the 3-machine system.
1.5 Illustrative examples
1.5.1 Simulation conditions
We illustrate the above considerations by performing sensitivity analysis of
transient stability phenomena on the three-machine system under the conditions
described below.
This system is modeled with constant impedance loads and 7 state variables
per machine: 2 mechanical variables (rotor angle and speed), 2 electrical
variables and 3 variables for the AVR modeling.
The single-line diagram of this system in its prefault configuration is rep-
resented in Fig. 3.1a. Prior to any fault, i.e. for
     the system is in
























Figure 3.1. One-line diagram of the 3-machine system
a steady-state operation; hence its state vector      is a stable equilibrium
solution of eqs (3.3). At time
    , the system suddenly changes configu-
ration, because a three-phase short-circuit is applied at node
  	 as illustrated
in Fig. 3.1b. The duration of the fault is   ms: at      ms , the fault
is cleared by opening the line connecting nodes
  	 and    , and the system
enters its final configuration represented in Fig. 3.1c.
Since in transient stability machine angles and speeds are acknowledged
to be variables of great concern, we concentrate on the six state variables:
             ,          . Figures 3.2 plot their angle and speed evolution
with time, from
    to         s , corresponding to a maximum angular
deviation of  where, presumably, the machines lose synchronism. Note
that at
    , machine angles and speeds are different from zero. Observe also
that at
     ms , the slope of the speeds experiences a new discontinuity
due to the change in the system configuration.
1.5.2 Discussion
The trajectories of the above simulation describing the loss of synchronism
between machines are relative to the unperturbed system motion. The question
is now how to choose the parameters which mostly influence the system motion.
Indeed, a priori the number of parameters is very large, even for such a small
system. We could for example consider AVR gains, line impedances, machine
electrical characteristics, machine generation powers, and so on.
In what follows, we will choose machine inertias to illustrate the preceding
theoretical considerations;3 nominal values of these inertias are:
M 	 = 12.54 ; M  = 3.39 ; M  = 1.59 .
Accordingly, the unperturbed parameter vector associated with the unperturbed
motion is       	                                
3The reason of this choice is that machine inertias provide conclusions easy to interprete.






















Figure 3.2. Temporal evolution of machine rotor angles and speeds
Note that since the fault application and clearance take place at given time
instants (
    and 150 ms), the set of equations (3.3) is time-dependent, and
should be expressed as:
         
   
 (3.17)
However, one can show that the developments of previous paragraphs dealing
with the analysis of the supplementary motion or the synthetic sensitivity
function are still valid. In the context of a time-dependent non-linear system,
the inertias variations can be referred to as  -variations.4
An alternative approach to the analysis of this time-dependent system is to
treat the various time periods separately in order to get a succession of time-
independent systems described by eq. (3.3). The analysis would consist of
first studying the influence of parameter variations in the during-fault period            ) with initial conditions given by the equilibrium point of the
initial system configuration. This is a typical  -variation study. Then, the
study would continue with the influence of parameter variations in the final
configuration. This study is a combination of  -variations (the final state of
the during-fault period which depends on the parameter values in the initial
state of the final period) and  -variations. A difficulty appears here because
the study of  -variations depends on  -variations analysis of the during-fault
period.
Although such an analysis of the various time periods separately can be
interesting, it will not be pursued here because of the above difficulties.
4The initial state is    
	 . Because we open a line to clear the fault, the new equilibrium point of the system
is different from the initial one. So even with a zero fault duration, we will observe changes in the values of
the state variables.


























Figure 3.3. Sensitivity analysis of the supplementary motion: influence of machine
   inertia
on machine rotor angles and speeds: —— :
   $ 
   ; - - - - :   $ 
  ; ...... :    $ 
  
1.5.3 Supplementary motion of state variables
The sensitivity study around the initial set point relies on eq. (3.14). The con-
sidered state variables are the machine angles  	       and speeds  	       ;
the considered parameter is the inertia of the most advanced machine m  .5
To compute the sensitivity of the trajectory around the nominal value of M  we
consider the initial parameter vector
                     
then perform another simulation under the same conditions but with a small
change of the parameter vector
               
For example, let us comment on the sensitivity function related to state
variable   (solid line curve of Fig. 3.3a). The curve has been computed using
the function6
             
          


            
   

This sensitivity function is zero at the beginning of the simulation (the initial
state is the same for the perturbed and the unperturbed motions) and strictly
negative otherwise. An increase in
   decreases   . Since the loss of
synchronism is caused by machine    going out of step, an increase in   
is beneficial to transient stability provided that this has only a second order
influence on machines   	 and    .
5Actually, according to SIME,

  is the CM for the considered contingency.
6The sensitivity functions relative to the other state variables                  take on similar
expressions.
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Figure 3.4. Sensitivity analysis of MAD vs
  
1.5.4 Supplementary motion of time-varying ssf
The variable used here is the maximum angular deviation (MAD in short).7
The parameter vector related to the unperturbed motion is again composed of
the machines’ inertia coefficients.
At each time instant, the difference between MAD of the perturbed and
the unperturbed motions divided by the variation of
   (0.05) provides a
time-dependent synthetic sensitivity function, plotted in Fig. 3.4a:
     
      
    
   
         
nom

Inspection of Fig. 3.4a suggests that an increase in
   tends to decrease
MAD and hence to improve system’s stability.
Figure 3.4b illustrates the synthetic sensitivity function dependence on the
parameter value around the nominal value:
the dotted-line curve represents the ssf for                      
the solid-line curve represents the ssf for                      .
the dashed-line curve represents the ssf for                       
This figure shows that the larger the increase in
   , the larger the decrease in
the absolute value of the synthetic sensitivity function. This can be interpreted
as follows: a variation of a light machine’s inertia has more influence on
transient stability than the same variation of a heavier machine.
7The choice of MAD rather than individual rotor angle/speed state variables is justified by the observation
that MAD seems to track well transient stability phenomena.
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1.5.5 Discussion
The above two paragraphs performed sensitivity analyses to assess the in-
fluence on the 3-machine system stability of the critical machine’s inertia co-
efficient variations. Both studies have reached the same conclusion, although
via different ways, namely, an increase in M  reinforces the system stability.
Examination of these investigations call for many observations. Below we
quote only some salient ones.
Computational burden involved. Both studies rely on two T-D simulations
carried out from
    (contingency inception) till       ms (system
loss of synchronism). The sensitivity analysis involving state variables has
in addition required about 150 sensitivity coefficient computations (150 time
steps in the time interval      ) per state variable and for one value of M  .
The sensitivity analysis involving MAD has required the same number (150)
of sensitivity coefficient computations for one value of M  .
Admittedly, such computations are quite trivial. We only mentioned them
to fix ideas.
Sensitivity analysis involving state variables. In the 3-machine system, the
machine responsible for the system loss of synchronism is quite easy to identify.
In a large-scale system the phenomena can be very unclear. The possible
existence of multiswing phenomena are likely to add even more burden: the
simple question of exploring the impact of machines’ inertias on the system
stability may then become inextricable, unless a method like SIME contributes
to identify the CMs and also their degree of criticalness.
Sensitivity analysis involving MAD. Here, interpretations become easier.
But their validity relies on the validity of MAD as a reliable performance
index. Besides, the time-dependence of MAD is another source of confusion.
Again, SIME can contribute with its stability margin; indeed, not only is this
margin a fully reliable stability index but, in addition, it is time-independent.
Interpretation of parameters’ impact on stability. This interpretation often
depends on whether a parameter is linked to the CMs or the NMs of the system;
or whether the parameter is electrically close to CMs or to NMs. Again SIME
can help significantly.
Limitation of sensitivity analyses of the supplementary motion. These
studies relying on the supplementary motion deal with small parameter varia-
tions. But what about finite (large) parameter variations ? For such investiga-
tions SIME provides other types of techniques, discussed in Section 2.
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Figure 3.5. Sensitivity analysis of  vs   
1.6 Supplementary motion of time-invariant ssfs
The use of SIME’s stability margins provides sound synthetic sensitivity
functions and makes sensitivity analysis of the supplementary motion a pow-
erful technique in transient stability studies.
Indeed, by its very definition, the margin provides time-independent ssfs
and, what is even more important, faithful replicas of the system behaviour.
Denoting  the margin associated with the unperturbed motion and  that






where   is the parameter responsible for the difference between the two
motions.
We illustrate this approach with the same parameter vector as in

1.5.4.














         
nom

Using this procedure, we compute the value of the ssf for
                                    
and find   	      (see in Fig. 3.5a the coordinate of the “bullet”): thus,
an increase in
   will increase the stability margin and hence the system
robustness.
Note that reaching this conclusion has necessitated a single sensitivity com-
putation (instead of 150 for MAD).
The same procedure but for different values of
   where
                    
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and
                                          
furnishes the results represented in Fig. 3.5a. The slope of the curve suggests
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Figure 3.7. Sensitivity analysis of

  vs 
In Fig. 3.5b, one can observe the margins computed for
                .
The slope of the curve at a point gives the corresponding value of the ssf. For
values of
   larger than 4.06 the system is stable: no loss of synchronism
happens anymore. If
   is smaller than 1.68, the system is too unstable and
SIME is unable to provide a margin.
Now, with respect to the impact of inertias M 	 and M  we mention that the
value of the above ssf related to a variation of
  	 is     . Since this
value is negative, we conclude that an increase in M 	 deteriorates the system
stability. The output of the ssf related to M  is also negative (
      . Hence,
variations of inertias of machines   	 and    have an opposite effect to
that of
   . Figures 3.6 and 3.7 represent curves similar with those drawn for
Fig. 3.5 but referring to respectively
  	 and    .
In the three-dimensional parameter space (      	           ) the di-
rection that provides the highest rate of increase of the stability region around
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                      is given by  
 










                	          
It would thus be possible to get the optimum set of parameters
  	        
with respect to the contingency considered here. (Note, however, that this
would be of academic rather than practical interest.)
2. SIME-BASED SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
2.1 Specifics and scopes
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the major direct products of SIME are mar-
gins and corresponding CMs. These products are the core of all SIME-based
sensitivity analyses, whatever their objectives, classified into three types:
sensitivity analysis per se
sensitivity analysis for the purpose of stability analysis
sensitivity analysis for the purpose of control.
By definition, sensitivity analysis per se aims at exploring the influence of
parameter variables on system stability. This type of sensitivity analysis may
use the method of the supplementary motion in conjunction with synthetic




Sensitivity analyses in the context of stability analysis were already used in
Chapter 2; for example, in

3.2.2 to assess the unstable angle   used to calculate a triangle-based
stable margin

3.4 to cancel out the
     , a substitute for the stability margin  .
More generally, the search of stability limits (critical clearing times (CCTs)







          
               (3.18)
to compute the stability limit
                    

 (3.19)
8Note that, here, margins

   	 	 basis and    	 generally correspond to finite (large) variations of
parameter  ; hence, eqs (3.18), (3.19) hold valid, provided that the margin behaves in a linear fashion.
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In the above expressions, parameter   stands for clearing time or OMIB
mechanical power, depending upon whether the stability limit sought is CCT
or PL.
Finally, sensitivity analysis for the purpose of control addresses the question:
how much change to impose on parameter   in order to stabilize the system,
i.e., in order to move the system operating conditions from the unstable to the
stable region. Again, eqs (3.18), (3.19) form the basis of this exploration. Note,
however, that here parameter   may have a broader definition than merely
clearing time or OMIB mechanical power.
In some sense, analysis and control pursue sort of complementary objectives,
while using a common technique relying on eqs (3.18), (3.19); indeed, analysis
aims at determining the distance to the stability region under given operat-
ing conditions, whereas control aims at determining the operating conditions
under given (generally zero-) distance to the stability region. Stated other-
wise, stability analysis deals with the calculation of stability limits relative to a
contingency, whereas control deals with means of stabilizing the system with
respect to a contingency.
Sensitivity analysis for the purpose of control in general is dealt with in
Section 4 of Chapter 4, while next section of this chapter deals with a particular
stabilization technique directly inspired by the equal-area criterion.
2.2 On the validity of linearized approximations
We just mentioned that expressions (3.18), (3.19) are the basis for calculating
stability limits:
CCTs for which parameter   represents contingency clearing time,
  
PLs for which parameter   represents OMIB mechanical power,
  
.
As will be shown in Chapter 4 these calculations are generally performed
using pair-wise linear margins extrapolations (and sometimes interpolations,
though quite seldom). The validity of these linear extrapolations relies on the
observation that the variation of  with    and with   is quite linear,
provided that
successive simulations       and   are not too far away from each other
the corresponding margins concern the same OMIB, i.e., the same set of
CMs.
The second observation is self-explanatory. Let us also remind that ways to
circumvent this condition were proposed in

3.5 of Chapter 2.
With respect to the first observation, it would be hardly possible to give a
mathematical proof of the linear behaviour of  vs    and  vs    , given
their extremely intricate relationships. Note, however, the following.
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Figure 3.9. Variation of margin with contingency clearing time. EPRI 627-machine test system
(i) The near linear character of  vs    and vs    is corroborated by
large-scale simulations conducted on a large variety of power systems
whose size, in terms of number of machines, varies between 3 and over
600. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 give a sample of typical curves plotted with
respectively the 3-machine and the 627-machine EPRI test systems.





restricted. Besides, this range is decomposed so as to conduct iteratively
pair-wise extrapolations as described in Section 2 of Chapter 4. This
requires only piecewise linear conditions.
A final remark: the non-satisfaction of the above linear approximation used
to compute the solution sought (CCT or PL) would yield a larger number
of simulations to reach this solution, and hence would affect computational
efficiency; but it would not affect accuracy.
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3. COMPENSATION SCHEMES (CSs)
3.1 General scope and principle
A given stability scenario is defined by the (pre-fault) operating conditions
and the contingency of concern; in turn, this latter may be defined by its type,
location and sequence of events including the last clearing time, i.e. the time
when the system enters its post-fault configuration. Note that, generally, the
severity of a contingency depends strongly on the clearing scenario which may
weaken the system’s post-fault configuration, as, for example, when tripping
many lines connected to the faulted bus.
Stabilizing severe contingencies likely to threaten the power system stability
is a task of paramount importance. SIME tackles it by using the large variety
of tools that it produces: margins, CMs, and the very OMIB-based equal-area
criterion (EAC).
This section focuses on a particular approach, directly inspired by EAC, and
summarized in the following two propositions:
the instability of a multimachine power system is measured by the OMIB
margin;
stabilizing an unstable case consists of canceling out this margin, i.e. of
increasing the decelerating area and/or decreasing the accelerating area in
the OMIB
    plane (e.g., see Fig. 2.1b).
Broadly, stabilization may be achieved by changing either the contingency
scenario (more specifically its clearing time) under preassigned operating
conditions, or the operating conditions under preassigned contingency sce-
nario. These changes can be suggested by EAC, by designing “compensation
schemes” (CSs) able to appraise approximately the two types of stability limits,
namely:
either critical clearing time (CCT) by adjusting the OMIB
  
curves
or power limit (PL) by adjusting the OMIB
  
curve.
The following paragraphs deal with the design of these two types of CSs.
3.2 CSs appraising critical clearing times
3.2.1 Description
This paragraph addresses the question: given an unstable case, characterized
by the contingency clearing time,
  
and appraised by its negative margin,
determine the clearing time decrease necessary to stabilize the case, i.e. to
cancel out the margin; in other words, determine the critical clearing time
(CCT).
Note that in Chapter 4, CCTs are computed iteratively, in sensitivity-based
ways. Here the approximate computation relies on a one-shot EAC-based
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fashion; it consists of adjusting the accelerating/decelerating areas of the OMIB    plane by acting on the OMIB electrical power,    , so as to compensate











CT 2 = 160 ms
CT 3 = 180 ms
CT 4 = 200 ms











  $   
vs
      
for stability case Nr 672 of the Brazilian system
(CCT=141 ms). Adapted from [Ernst et al., 1998a].
Four compensation schemes (CSs) are tentatively proposed. They are sug-





with the clearing angle   ); such typical variations are displayed in Fig. 3.10
for various clearing conditions. These curves were plotted for a contingency
simulated on the Brazilian system described in Section 4 of Appendix B, on
which the proposed CSs were initially tested.
Figures 3.11 display these CSs9, along with the margin, represented by
the shaded rectangular area; it is computed for
   	 ms and is equal to   	 (rad/s)  . The margin is compensated in four different ways of increasing
the decelerating and/or decreasing the accelerating areas. They yield four
different approximate critical clearing angles,    ’s , and hence approximate
critical clearing times,
    ’s . Note that Figs 3.11a to 3.11d yield increasing    
values: 125, 136, 143 and 144 ms respectively (vs 141 ms, which is the actual
CCT).
Generally, it is quite likely that the closer the clearing time to the actual CCT
and the better the approximate
    ’s. Also, the degree of modeling sophistication
of a power system is likely to influence the performances of the CSs.
CSs may be useful in various practical applications, in particular, the fol-
lowing two.
9The compensation schemes in Figs 3.11b and c were proposed by [Zhang, 1996]




































Figure 3.11. Four compensation schemes for CCT assessment. Stability case Nr 672.     " ms      #  rad) ;      
#  . Taken from [Ernst et al., 1998b]
For filtering purposes, whenever the clearing time,
  
, is not too far away
from the actual CCT, the CSs may save one out of the two simulations used
by the two-margin extrapolation filter of Chapter 4,

2.4.2. The resulting
CPU gains are particularly interesting for simulations run with detailed
power system models. 10
For CCT assessment, whenever the initial
 
is far away from (i.e. much
larger than) the actual CCT, using new
  
’s suggested by the CSs may
contribute to speed up significantly the convergence procedure with respect
to the pure extrapolation procedure described in

2.2 of Chapter 4.
A final remark: the CPU times needed for CSs computations per se are
virtually negligible.
3.2.2 Illustrative examples
In this paragraph, the CSs described in Figs 3.11 are tested on two sets of stability cases
relative to two power systems.
The one is the 3-machine system, described in Section 1 of Appendix B. Twelve contingencies
are simulated and their approximate
   
’s are computed by using the CSs, with a clearing time
of 200 ms; these values are compared with the accurate values computed by SIME in Chapter 4,
 2.4, Table 4.8.
Table 3.1 collects the results. Note that for this clearing time, contingency Nr 2 has no





  are closer to the actual CCT of Column 3. But the number of cases is not sufficient to
draw conclusions.
10The gain is even more important when the OMIB structure changes from one simulation to the other(s).
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Table 3.1. CCTs of the 3-machine system.








                 
2 / / / / 95
3 36 69 88 98 130
7 49 65 94 101 147
6 162 180 181 181 189
1 186 186 194 194 194
4 194 193 196 196 196
5 S S S S 220
10 S S S S 225
11 S S S S 227
8 S S S S 251
12 S S S S 272
9 S S S S 297
Table 3.2. CCTs of the Brazilian system.
      ms
1 2 3 4 5
Cont.
Nr






  50 – 126 134 119 117
656    57 12 130 137 133 132
686  	  136 149 174 175 136 138
672   
 82 116 132 137 141 143
630    95 105 153 157 146 147
680    100 132 145 149 149 152
708  
#  103 134 148 151 149 152
598    103 134 148 152 150 152
629    95 107 153 157 153 152
463  
#  104 136 149 152 154 152
692    103 116 157 160 156 157
707     108 139 151 154 157 157
690    117 126 164 166 161 162
437    110 151 159 163 165 162
434  
#  119 158 165 168 170 168
689  " 
 143 155 177 178 173 173
628  "  141 153 176 177 173 173
522    130 166 171 173 175 173
362  	  145 157 178 179 177 178
516  
   150 177 180 181 183 183
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The second set of simulations is performed on the Brazilian system described in Section 4
of Appendix B. The results collected in Table 3.2 report on the simulation of 20 contingencies;
their CCTs are computed in three different ways:
by means of the 4 CSs for a clearing time of 200 ms; see Columns 3; the corresponding
margin is listed in Column 2
by using the algorithm of  2.2 of Chapter 4; the results are listed in Column 4, labeled
“SIME”
by using the T-D program ST-600 [Valette et al., 1987]; see Column 4 labeled “T-D”
The table shows that:
  
provides a lower bound of the actual CCT (though sometimes much smaller than it);     behaves in a similar way, though with some failures;  
  is sometimes larger and sometimes smaller than CCT;  
  is generally larger than the actual CCT; and whenever smaller, it is very close to it. It
may thus provide an upper CCT bound.
The above observations suggest in particular that:
  
might be used as a “safeguard”, i.e. to avoid missing contingencies in the context of
contingency filtering;;     $      show to be less interesting;  
  seems quite suitable, in particular for screening contingencies.
Finally, observe the good agreement of SIME with the T-D program of Hydro-Québec.
3.3 CS appraising power limits
3.3.1 Principle
This paragraph addresses the question: given an unstable case characterized
by its negative margin, determine the decrease in generation power necessary
to stabilize it, i.e., to cancel out this margin. This question will be subdivided in
the following two tasks: (i) devise a CS which assesses the necessary variation
of the OMIB mechanical power; (ii) report this power on system machine
generation.
3.3.2 Power limit of OMIB





modifies the accelerating and deceler-
ating areas of OMIB
    representation. More precisely, it increases the
decelerating area (by areas   to    ), decreases the accelerating area (  	 and
  ), and increases the accelerating area (  ). Thus,
   

  	      (3.20)
Expression (3.20) links directly




   , thus adding one more
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Figure 3.12. Compensation scheme for controlling generation. Stability case Nr 672
of the Brazilian system.
     " ms ;      
   ;      	
 MW ;      " MW .
Taken from [Ernst et al., 1998b]
decelerating area, say    , comprised between curves  
   and    . But
its computation would imply another T-D simulation. On the other hand,
neglecting    gives a pessimistic assessment, i.e. an overestimation of
            , which, however, is rather minor (a small percentage).
Computation of areas   	 to    is elaborated below, in  3.3.5.
3.3.3 Power limits of system machines
With regard to above question (ii), observe that the distribution of the OMIB
   among actual machines’ generation must obey eq. (2.9). This equation
suggests that decreasing
 
implies decreasing generation in critical machines
(CMs) and increasing generation in non-critical machines (NMs) according to:
      
  
             
  
            (3.21)
where
                
       (3.22)
Further, when the concern is to keep unchanged the overall system genera-
tion, the condition11
          (3.23)
11neglecting variation of losses.
Chapter 3 - SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 89
yields, according to eq. (3.21):
                    (3.24)
In the example case of contingency Nr 672 considered in Fig. 3.12, the computation of
    
via expression (3.20) yields 91 MW, to be compared with 85 MW provided by a pure (but much
more tedious) T-D procedure12 . Hence, according to eq. (3.24), the generation of the critical
machine (Nr 2712) will be decreased by 91 MW and that of non-critical machines increased by
the same amount.
3.3.4 Discussion
Equations (3.20), (3.24) govern any stabilization procedure relying on active
power reallocation (shift). Their inspection calls for many observations.
1.- The value     computed via (3.20) (and hence     ) is only approx-
imate; the accurate value (corresponding to    ), will be computed via the
iterative procedure described in Chapter 4.
2.- A priori, eq. (3.24) may receive a (very) large number of solutions,
depending on the number of CMs and NMs.
3.- It will therefore be possible to derive various solutions able to encounter
various requirements.
4.- More specifically, transient stability requirements will generally impose
conditions on CMs, while other types of requirements (e.g., market’s require-
ments) can be met via NMs’ rescheduling. These issues are addressed in
Chapter 4.
3.3.5 Numerical example
Let us use the compensation scheme for controlling the generation power in the 3-machine
system, subjected successively to contingencies Nr 2 and 3.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results obtained for a clearing time of 150 ms.
Column 3 indicates the corresponding margin, while Column 5 indicates the power decrease
suggested by the CS for stabilizing the case (cancelling out the margin). Columns 4, 6 and 7 list
successively the initial power generated by the CM(s), the power corrected according to the CS,
and the actual power limit for which the margin is indeed zero. Comparison of the results of the
last two columns shows that the correction provided by the CS is quite good.
Note that the above stabilization may be refined via the iterative procedure of Chapter 4,
where more examples will also be reported.





computation of this area yields 6 MW.
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Table 3.3. Contingency stabilization via the CS of Fig. 3.12.
     	  ms













     (MW)
(actual)
2
   $     	  248    215 219
3
       163  	 148 153
3.3.6 Computing areas of the CS
Let us compute areas  	 to   , under the assumption that the    curve
variation with
  




According to Fig. (3.12),  	 and   are expressed respectively by
 	                 (3.25)
                   (3.26)
where      may be derived from eq. (2.2) as:
            

         (3.27)
              
  
          (3.28)
Therefore, eqs (3.25), (3.26) yield
 	                       (3.29)
On the other hand, inspection of Fig. 3.12 shows that
                       (3.30)
and that
            (3.31)
where

is the slope of the curve
   at   .
Finally, Fig. 3.12 and eqs (3.27), (3.28) yield:
            

     

           
  
          (3.32)
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In this latter expression,    is not known. Hence,   may either be
approximated by neglecting the corresponding term and writing




     (3.33)
or expressed correctly by computing    . In turn, this latter computation
requires either a mere sensitivity computation or running an additional load
flow and using the following iterative procedure:
(i) compute a first-approximation     	 	 by solving eq. (3.20) with  
expressed by (3.33);
(ii) decrease the generation power in the critical machines by     	 	 and
increase accordingly in non-critical machines; run a new LF with these
new power levels; let 
  	 	
  be the corresponding prefault OMIB angle;
(iii) compute a new value for   , using (3.32) with     
  	 	
  ;
(iv) solve eq. (3.20) for    ; set
    
	     
if     
	 is close enough to     	 	 , stop;
otherwise, set
    	 	      
	
and go to (ii).
4. SUMMARY
Elements of conventional sensitivity analysis methods have first been re-
called. The analysis of the supplementary motion was found to suit transient
stability concerns, provided an appropriate performance index can be defined
to derive time-invariant “synthetic sensitivity functions”. Such an index is the
stability margin provided by SIME.
Three application contexts of sensitivity analysis were then identified, namely:
(i) sensitivity analysis per se; (ii) sensitivity analysis for the purpose of stability
analysis; (iii) sensitivity analysis for the purpose of control.
Type (i) can be performed using the supplementary motion method.
Types (ii) and (iii) rely on first order sensitivity coefficients appraising margin
vs finite parameter variations. Such parameters of concern are contingency
clearing time and OMIB mechanical power. Pair-wise extrapolations of linear
margins will be used in Chapter 4 to compute contingency critical clearing times
(CCTs) and power limits (PLs). These compensation schemes will further be
used in Chapter 4, in particular to devise control techniques.
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Finally, two compensation schemes were proposed, yielding one-shot pro-
cedures for computing approximate CCTs and PLs. Such schemes will further
be used in Chapter 4, in particular to devise control techniques.
Chapter 4
PREVENTIVE ANALYSIS AND CONTROL
Chapter 2 has dealt with calculation of margins and identification of critical
machines. Chapter 3 has used them to derive sensitivity analysis techniques.
This chapter shows that stability margins, critical machines and sensitivity
analysis are the necessary and sufficient ingredients for conducting any type of
transient stability study, including analysis, filtering, ranking, assessment and
stabilization of contingencies. More precisely, the objectives of Chapter 4 are:
to derive a systematic procedure for computing stability limits (critical
clearing times and power limits);
to describe a variety of techniques able to screen contingencies and select
the “interesting”, i.e., the constraining ones;
to set up a unified approach to contingency filtering, ranking and assess-
ment;
to derive systematic procedures for stabilizing the constraining contin-
gencies;
to pave the way towards on-line TSA&C techniques, able to meet various
needs already existing or emerging in the restructuring electricity market.
These techniques will be elaborated in Chapter 5.
1. PRELIMINARIES
1.1 Chapter overview
This chapter covers all aspects of transient stability assessment (TSA) and
control in the preventive mode.
TSA aims at determining whether the system is able to withstand plausible
contingencies and, if not, at measuring the severity of those found to be “harm-
ful”, i.e. able to cause system’s loss of synchronism, should they occur. Hence,
TSA addresses the twofold problem: contingency filtering and analysis.
93
94 TRANSIENT STABILITY OF POWER SYSTEMS
In conventional transient stability studies, analysis aims at measuring con-
tingency severity in terms of stability limits (SLs). The SLs of current concern
are critical clearing times (CCTs) and power limits (PLs). Recall that for a
contingency applied under preassigned operating conditions, CCT is the maxi-
mum time that the contingency may remain (i.e. the maximum clearing time),
without the system losing its capability to recover a synchronous operation.
The precise definition of a PL is more difficult. Loosely, we will say that for
a given contingency applied under preassigned duration (clearing time), PL is
the maximum power that the system may sustain without losing synchronism.
From a physical point of view, it is clear that PL depends on a large number
of factors, and in particular on generation patterns of the system power plants.
Hence, it is not a univocally defined quantity: different procedures will yield
different PLs, as shown in

2.3.
The choice between these two “measures” of the system robustness vis-à-vis
a contingency is a matter of operating practices, which in turn are linked to
system specifics and physical limitations. Generally, CCTs are more popular
in Europe, while PLs are preferred in the United States. As will be shown
below, they are both assessed by SIME on the basis of margins and sensitivity
techniques developed in Section 2. But while following the same pattern, CCTs
will appear to be more straightforward to assess than PLs.
Section 2 of this chapter is devoted to the computation of SLs.
Contingency filtering, on the other hand, is the indispensable complement
of stability analysis. Indeed, in practice, accurate assessment of a stability
limit (be it CCT or PL) is interesting only for “severe” or “constraining”
contingencies.1 Hence, prior to analysis, it appears convenient to discard all
“mild” contingencies on the basis of a faster, though less accurate procedure.
This is precisely the role of contingency filtering techniques. And since, as
just mentioned, CCTs are easier to compute than PLs, contingency filtering
techniques will generally rely on approximate assessment of CCTs. Stability
margins will also be the basis of this assessment.
In practice, it is interesting to rank the contingencies selected by the filtering
phase according to their severity and, further, to assess in a finer way the
severest among them. Again, contingency assessment uses stability margins.
Section 3 proposes an integrated technique called FILTRA (for FILTering,
Ranking and Assessment of contingencies). FILTRA is made up of two blocks
adaptable to power system specific features and needs.
Another paramount achievement of SIME is control. Its objective is to
“stabilize” harmful contingencies (processed one-by-one or simultaneously),
i.e., to design proper countermeasures which modify the system operating
1The different classes of contingencies are defined in

3.2.
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conditions so as to render the contingencies harmless. Stabilization procedures
are developed in Section 4, on the basis of margins and CMs.
A final, general reminder: without exception, use of the Preventive SIME
and of all derived techniques implies its coupling and combined use with a
transient stability T-D program.
1.2 A measure for assessing computing performances
This chapter is the first to deal with SIME’s practical applications to real-
world problems. For such applications, computing performances is an issue of
great concern; it becomes crucial when it comes to real-time operation.
We therefore need a “unit” able to appraise the computing performances of
the various SIME based techniques. And, since SIME is coupled with a T-D
program, it is interesting to define a “unit” in terms of the computing effort
required by the corresponding T-D program.
This “unit” relies on the observation that the CPU time imputable to SIME
itself is virtually negligible vis-à-vis any other task involved. (To fix ideas,
it corresponds to about one iteration of the power flow program.) Hence, the
overall computing effort reduces to that for running the T-D program during
the short periods required by SIME. Therefore, a handy means for comparisons
appears to be the corresponding seconds of Time-Domain Integration (sTDI
for short).
This “measure” renders comparisons independent of the computer used and
of the system size. 2
2. STABILITY LIMITS
2.1 Basic concepts
The computation of stability limits (CCTs or PLs) follows the general pattern
of SIME-based sensitivity analysis expressed by eqs (3.18), (3.19) of Chapter 3.
1. According to SIME, a stability limit (SL) corresponds to zero margin
conditions.
2. Since SIME relies on the OMIB concept, i.e. on unstable multima-
chine trajectories3 , the search of zero-margin conditions will consist of using
successive unstable simulations of decreasing severity.
3. Further, sensitivity considerations suggest to process pair-wise margins’
extra-(inter-)polations.
4. Recall also that unstable margins exist only for a limited range of condi-
tions (see

3.3 of Chapter 2). For very unstable simulations,

3.4 of Chapter 2
2Note, however, that for T-D programs with variable stepsize, the number of sTDIs may depend on the
simulation range.
3Recall that, strictly speaking, an OMIB is defined on unstable scenarios only.












Figure 4.1. Schematic description of the CCT search procedure
has proposed sensitivity calculations yielding conditions within the range of
existing margins; nevertheless, to reduce the number of simulations as much
as possible, usage will be made of “hints” able to judiciously choose initial
conditions.4
5. Finally, recall that to detect multiswing instabilities (whenever they are
of interest) a first-swing stable simulation should tentatively be carried out for
the entire integration period: either the simulation will be stable throughout,
showing that the system is also multiswing stable; or it will meet multiswing
instabilities. In this latter case, further simulations should be carried out under
milder conditions, until reaching fully stable ones. (Recall that multiswing
phenomena are addressed in Section 5 of Chapter 2.)
2.2 Critical clearing times
2.2.1 Basic procedure
For a given contingency and pre-fault operating conditions, the above con-
siderations lead to the iterative computation summarized below and described
in Fig. 4.1. The rationale and choice of parameter  is discussed in  2.2.2.
4Ideally, these conditions should drive the system in the range of margins’ existence (see

3.3 of Chapter 2).
In other words, they should be severe enough to yield negative margins, yet not too severe to avoid going
beyond the range of margins’ existence. This issue is considered below, in

2.2.2.
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(i) Set
    and choose        so as to get an unstable simulation.5
Compute the corresponding margin         . Set         and        
                      .
(ii) Run a T-D simulation with
      as clearing time. If        , set
       . If         , set       .
(iii)
if         extrapolate the margins of the two last unstable simulations
to get
          .
if        interpolate between the last stable and the last unstable
simulations to get
          .
(iv)
If no stable simulation exists, set
        ,      
             and
go to (ii).
If a stable simulation exists, and if
     

            , set         ,      
             and go to (ii); otherwise go to (v).
(v) The value of the critical clearing time is
          .
In short, the overall CCT search consists of using pair-wise linear margins’
extra-(inter-)polations iteratively, until getting the accuracy sought.
Figure 4.1 gives a schematic description of the basic algorithm. Many other




2.2.2 Parameters and technicalities
1.- Parameter  is chosen small enough to preserve the validity of mar-
gins’ linear inter-(extra-)polation, yet large enough to restrict the number of
simulations. Note that  may take on different values for different ranges of  
’s . For example,    % for    ranging in between 50 and 200 ms, and     % for        ms .
2.- Parameter  is taken quite small (e.g.        ). Indeed, we want the
stable simulation to be close enough to the last unstable one so as to use, by
continuation, the same OMIB.
3.- In essence, the above margin-based iterative procedure is much more
effective than the “blind” search of a pure T-D simulation, be it dichotomic or
not.
5The cases where
    
	 does not yield an unstable (negative) margin are treated below, in  2.2.3.
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4.- Finally, let us again stress that the algorithm of

2.2.1 describes just
method’s very principle. Many refinements can be thought of, and are actually
used.
2.2.3 Initial clearing time conditions
It has been emphasized that the proper choice of the initial clearing time           contributes to the efficiency of the overall procedure6 . Indeed,
a too small
      could yield a stable simulation that SIME cannot treat at
once for want of information about the mode of machines’ separation; in such
a case a new simulation is run using
      larger than       in order to get an
unstable margin.7 On the other hand, a too large
      would yield an unduly
unstable simulation, beyond the range of margins’ existence; in such a case,





3.3 of Chapter 2).
To avoid such inconveniences, the following pragmatic criteria are used to
choose
      automatically. These criteria stop the during-fault T-D simulation
and switch to the post-fault one8 as soon as:
the maximum angular deviation between extreme system machines reaches
a given, preassigned value,    	
 ; or
the angle of a candidate OMIB reaches a maximum, preassigned value,
 OMIB 	
 ; or
a preassigned maximum clearing time,
   	

, is reached before any one
of the above criteria.
Note that the choice of    	
 and      	
 needs an off-line tuning,
which, however, is quite easy. Indeed, experience shows that the range of
variation of “optimal” values is quite restricted and rather independent of the




depends on the particular application sought.
2.2.4 Performances
Computing requirements. The number of iterations needed for the accurate
computation of a CCT depends on various parameters: the power system
itself10, the severity of the contingency, the good choice of
      , the size of
6Note, however, that this choice does not affect accuracy.
7Subsequently, the simulation corresponding to
    
	 is re-run (unless already stored) until reaching  
for which the corresponding stable margin is computed.
8the procedure has to be adjusted in the case there is a sequence of contingency scenarios.
9For large-scale systems it is advisable to consider machines rotor angles relative to their initial (pre-fault)
values.
10though not its size.
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 and, last but not least, the absence or not of multiswing instabilities and
interest in their search. A rough estimation based on thousands of simulations
(on a large number of power systems and a very large number of contingencies)
suggests the following mean values per contingency:
(i) computation of first-swing CCT only: 3.5 simulations, of which 1 may
or may not be stable; the stable simulation, if any, is conducted up to
  
(determined by condition (2.16))
(ii) search for existence and computation of multiswing CCT, otherwise of
first-swing CCT:
– in the presence of multiswing instabilities, 4.5 unstable and 1 stable
simulations performed on the entire integration period
– in the absence of multiswing instabilities, 3.5 unstable and 1 stable
simulations performed on the entire integration period.
In terms of sTDI defined in

1.2, the computing performances of the above
different cases rely on the following considerations:




the computing time needed to run a stable simulation corresponds to
  
sTDI or to MIP,11 depending upon whether the stable simulation is stopped
at
   or is performed on the entire integration period.
Of course, the values of these parameters vary with the very power system,
the contingency under consideration and for a given contingency with the
severity of the simulation conditions (i.e., with
 
): the larger the
  
, the
severer the simulation conditions and the smaller the
 
 . As for MIP, it mainly
depends on the degree of power system modeling sophistication.
These considerations will be illustrated below, on the example of

2.2.5.
Accuracy. The accuracy of the above procedure depends on the accuracy
of margin computations.12 And since according to Section 3 of Chapter 2
negative margins are much more accurate - and in fact very accurate - than
positive margins, it is advisable to rely on negative margins only: in terms of
CPU this is quite unexpensive, since it “costs” an additional unstable simulation,
which is significantly less “expensive” than the stable simulation that anyhow
is needed to detect possible multiswing phenomena.
11MIP stands for “Maximum Integration Period”. Recall also that
 	
corresponds to conditions (2.15) and 
to conditions (2.16).
12Note that the linearized margins inter-(extra-)polation affects the convergence but not the accuracy of the
final result. Chapter 3 (see Figs 3.8, 3.9) suggests that this linearized approximation is generally valid.
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2.2.5 Illustrations on the 3-machine system
We consider the 3-machine system described in Section 1 of Appendix B and compute the
CCT of contingency Nr 3. The search relies on the iterative procedure of  2.2.1 together with
considerations of   2.2.2, 2.2.3. Accordingly, we use the following parameter values:
    	 ms ;     " ;         "  ;  OMIB        ;          ms .
Table 4.1. Iterative CCT computation. 3-machine system. Contingency Nr 3
1 2 3 4 5





(ms)  (rad/s)   (ms) (s)
1 218  

#  / 0.239
2 198  
#  123 0.259
3 123   134 (3)
4 134    
 131 0.510
Table 4.1 summarizes the procedure. It shows that the initial clearing time
        " ms .
(Incidentally, here, this time is imposed by the criterion on

OMIB   which was first met.)
Thus, the system enters its post-fault configuration at
        " ms ; it reaches the instabil-
ity conditions (2.16) at
  	    ms . At this time, the OMIB is found to be composed of 1 CM
(m   ) and 2 NMs (m   and m  )13; the corresponding (normalized) margin is  

   (rad/s)   .
Table 4.1 displays in bold the result of the iterative procedure: CCT    # ms .
On the other hand, the last column of the table lists the successive values of
  	
(apart from
the stable simulation for which one reads MIP    s .) It shows that   	 varies inversely to    ,
i.e., to the contingency severity. Further, the sum of
  	
’s and MIP listed in this column provides
the total computing time:     
  # sTDI: obviously, a large proportion of this time is
devoted to run the stable simulation on the MIP (here 3 s); this is the price to pay for tracking
multiswing instabilities. We mention that, here,
     # ms; this suggests that if we are not
interested in multiswing phenomena, we can “save” 2.5 sTDI: the overall computing effort then
reduces from 4.01 to 1.50 sTDI, which corresponds to speeding up the procedure by a factor of
about 2.67.
Figure 4.2 displays the phase plane representation summarizing the above simulations.
In order to compare SIME’s accuracy with respect to the T-D program coupled with SIME,
we have computed the CCTs of the 12 contingencies with the T-D program run alone and with
SIME.
Table 4.2 gathers these results (Columns 2, 3). Note that the T-D program proceeds by
dichotomy; the error is bounded in the interval   ms. Obviously, the CCTs provided by T-D
and by SIME are virtually the same.
Observing that the dichotomic search requires a quite larger number of (lenghty) stable T-D
simulations suggests that SIME allows significant computing savings; this is not one of SIME’s
major accomplishments, though.
Finally, Column 4 informs about the CMs corresponding to the different contingencies.
13Incidentally, recall that Fig. 2.1 drawn for contingency Nr 2 has 2 CMs (m   and m   ) and 1 NM 
  	
.
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Figure 4.2. Phase plane representation of simulations of Table 4.1. 3-machine system.
Table 4.2. CCTs (in ms) and CMs of the 12 contingencies on the 3-machine system
1 2 3 4
Contingency T-D SIME Crit.
identif. CCT CCT machines
2 95 95.7 m   m  
3 131 131 m  
7 148 147 m   m  
6 189 189 m  
1 192 194 m   m  
4 195 196 m  
5 218 220 m  
10 225 225 m   m  
11 227 227 m   m  
8 250 251 m   m  
12 274 272 m   m  
9 297 297 m   m  
2.2.6 Illustrations on the 627-machine system
Let us now consider the EPRI 627-machine test system A. Its data are
described in Section 3 of Appendix B. (See also Table 4.9.)
Table 4.3 summarizes the simulation results of CCT computation for contin-
gency Nr 9. Observe that, according to Column 6 of the table, this contingency
creates multiswing and backswing instabilities (denoted (B)). Note also that
the number of swings changes during the simulations. Finally, notice that, here
the times to instability,
 
 ’s are much larger for these multiswing phenomena
than for first-swing ones.
The resulting CCT is indicated in bold. We mention that the ETMSP transient
stability program run alone gives the same value.
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Table 4.3. Iterative CCT computation. 627-machine system. Contingency Nr 9
1 2 3 4 5 6





(ms)  (rad/s)   (ms) (s) swings
1 180  #  / 3.19 2 (B)
2 171    / 7.75 5 (B)
3 162   168 (10.0) /
Figures 4.3 plot two sets of curves corresponding to two different clearing
times: one (
    
	  ms) yields an unstable simulation, the other (    
   ms) a stable one. Each set consists of respectively the multimachine swing
curves,14 the OMIB swing curve and the OMIB
    representation. From
the multimachine swing curves one can see that there is one CM only. The
OMIB swing curve, on the other hand, illustrates the backswing and multiswing
instability phenomena.
Finally, Fig. 4.4 plots the corresponding phase plane representation of the
above simulations. Notice that the somehow additional complexity of this figure
with respect to Fig. 4.2 is merely due to multiswing phenomena, absent in the
3-machine system. Other differences between these two figures come from




Basically, the general pattern of

2.2 dealing with CCTs applies also to the
computation of PLs with, however, some significant differences.
1. First, observe that the successive pair-wise iterations are performed with
changing power levels (but fixed contingency clearing time); hence, the pre-
fault operating conditions have to be refreshed at each iteration; thus, a new
power flow must be carried out prior to each stability run.
2. Another difference concerns the choice of initial stability conditions:
unlike contingency clearing time, the choice of initial power level is often
dictated by practical considerations. Generally, the exploration concerns insta-
bilities caused by contingencies applied under stressed operating conditions.
The question is then how much to relax these conditions in order to stabilize
the system. Or, conversely, starting with mild conditions, how much to stress
them in order to reach stability limit conditions.
14the machine rotor angles refer to their respective pre-fault rotor angles.
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Figure 4.4. Phase plane representation of simulations of Table 4.3. 627-machine system.
CCT(SIME) = 168 ms ; CCT(ETMSP) = 168 ms
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3. But the main and very important difference is that the search of PLs may
be conducted under a large variety of generation and load allocation patterns,
yielding a possibly very large number of solutions.
Below we consider two families of approaches. The one consists of changing
generation and, to compensate for the generation change, of changing the load
level too. The other aims at shifting generation from some machines to other
machines in such a way so as to avoid modifying the load (at least to the extent
possible).15
Let us describe the two approaches successively, then compare and illustrate
them.
For reasons discussed below, we will henceforth refer to as “pragmatic”16
and SIME-based approaches respectively.
2.3.2 “Pragmatic” approach
The approach consists of running successive power flows and stability sim-
ulations while adjusting generation and load levels until hitting the stability
boundary. The objective may be for example to determine maximum load-
ability conditions, or maximum power flow on given set of tie-lines. The
adjustment may for example be realized by a homothetical variation of gener-
ation and consumption.
2.3.3 SIME-based approaches
Obviously, existence of margins as those provided by SIME helps enor-
mously, by guiding the above search.
The approach complies with the following general pattern.





by    17, and hence the CMs’ generation,    , by
        (see eq. (3.24))
3. Increase accordingly the NMs’ generation,
   , by
          (see eq. (3.24))
4. Run a power flow18, and a stability simulation; compute the corresponding
new margin and new
  
15Throughout the developments of

2.3 we assume that instabilities are of the upswing type. In case of
backswings the reasoning holds valid but with opposite load and generation variations.
16“pragmatic” or “heuristic”, for want of a more appropriate term; this is why we will use it between inverted
commas.
17except in the case of backswings, where
 
should be increased.
18which readjusts    to account for variation of the losses.
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5. Extra-(inter-)polate the above two margins, as appropriate
6. Continue according to the pattern of

2.2.1, suitably adjusted.
Figure 4.5 sketches the beginning of this iterative procedure.
η (0)
η (1)(2)η
Pc (1) Pc (0)







Figure 4.5. Sketch of SIME-based first two steps of PL search
Remark. The choice of     may influence computational efficiency19.
Indeed,
a too small     will increase the number of iterations
a too large     may drive the system to the stable region too far away
from its border; the resulting positive margin and/or its linear interpolation
with the previous negative margin can be inaccurate, and hence increase
implicitly the number of iterations.
Note that after the first two stability runs, the iterations use pair-wise linear
extrapolations (together with a final interpolation), and converges readily to the
PL sought.
Discussion. Obviously, the above general pattern has a very large number of
degrees of freedom with respect to:
the initial value    
its distribution among CMs (whenever there are many)
distribution of     among NMs
and their combination.
Below, we quote only a few of them.
19but not accuracy.
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2.3.4 Variants of the SIME-based approach
A large number of variants may be obtained by combining the following
parameters.
1. Initial decrease         (above step (2)): it may be chosen as a
percentage of     (e.g.,       ) or computed via the compensation
scheme of Fig. 3.12, (see

3.3.2 of Chapter 3).
2. Shift of generation from CMs (when there are many ). For example, the
total amount     may be shifted from CMs :
(i) proportionally to the nominal power of the respective CM
(ii) equally from all CMs
(ii) proportionally to their respective degree of criticalness, i.e. to their
electrical distance
  , defined as the angular deviation of the   -th CM
with respect to the most advanced NM, measured at
 

(iv) proportionally to their respective inertia,
  
(v) proportionally to their respective product,
       :
    
     
    
      (4.1)
The above systematic patterns are only a sample of the combinations one
could think of. But they are physically rather sound and easy to implement.
Other variants will be described and used in
 
4.2, 4.3.
3. Generation reallocation on NMs. Whatever the pattern used to decrease
generation in CMs, the number of degrees of freedom for shifting it to NMs
is even larger. However, experience shows that this reallocation does not
affect, unless marginally, transient stability. Hence, this opens possibilities
to meet other types of objectives, as discussed in Chapter 5.
4. A final remark: Stabilizing a case without shedding load cannot be
always possible; we should then resort to mixed solutions of generation
shifting/shedding combined with load shedding.
2.3.5 Discussion
The number of solutions provided by SIME-based approaches and their
combination is undetermined and can be very large.
But which one of these solutions will be optimal ?
Obviously, this question can be answered only after defining the objective
sought, and of course, different objectives will call for different solutions.
However, a priori, SIME-based approaches are likely to be superior to “prag-
matic” ones. Indeed, decreasing the generation level in CMs while increasing
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it in NMs brings the two groups of machines closer to each other and hence the
system closer to stability; whereas, decreasing generation in CMs and NMs has
a less beneficial effect. Hence, SIME-based approaches are likely to achieve
stabilization much more straightly; besides, they provide many other advan-
tages. An obvious practical advantage is that these approaches require an as
small as possible load decrease - if any.
Among other advantages of SIME-based approaches we quote:
the possibilities to choose various patterns of generation reallocation among
CMs
the possibilities left to NMs to comply with constraints other than transient
stability
the resulting possibilities to set up systematic criteria and make them work
automatically, not only for qualitative but also for quantitative assessment
and stabilization.
All these important advantages are own to the existence and role of the OMIB.
Obviously, T-D methods are just unable to provide such powerful techniques;
admittedly, engineering know-how can contribute to shed some light to the
“blind” T-D procedures, but only qualitatively and only to a limited extent.
A final remark: since SIME proceeds from “right to left” i.e. from unstable
to stable conditions, the PL search may be viewed as a stabilization procedure.




The accuracy performances of PL search are similar with those of CCT
search, discussed in

2.2.4. But the computing requirements are slightly more
demanding, since besides stability simulations, one should perform one power
flow per iteration.
2.3.7 Illustration of SIME-based computations
We consider the 3-machine system, apply contingency Nr 2 (which is the most constraining
among the 12 selected contingencies, since it has the smallest CCT: 95.7 ms), and compute the
PL corresponding to a clearing time of 150 ms. We will use the procedure of  2.3.3 under the
following 3 variants:
the initial decrease in
  
is chosen rather cautiously:
             ; the successive
    
variations are equally shared among CMs
the initial decrease in
  
is chosen rather cautiously:
             ; the successive
    
variations are reallocated proportionally to the product

   (cf eq. (4.1))
the initial decrease in
  
is computed by the CS of Fig. 3.12.
The first procedure is described in Table 4.4 and summarized in Fig. 4.6. We will first
comment on the synthetic results displayed in this figure before considering the details of the
table.


















Figure 4.6. Schematic description of the PL search procedure. Contingency Nr 2, cleared at    	 ms
The first iteration is carried out under normal pre-fault operating conditions and contingency
clearing time of 150 ms. The OMIB is found to be composed of 2 CMs (m   and m   ) and 1 NM
(m

). The pre-fault total power generated by the CMs,
  
, is 248 MW. The corresponding
unstable margin is    
     "  (rad/s)   . It is decided to decrease    by about 3 %
(actually by 8 MW) and to report these 8 MW on the NM. A power flow is then run to compute
the new pre-fault operating conditions.
Using these conditions, the second stability simulation yields a margin    
         .
Extrapolation of the two margins yields 215 MW. As described earlier in  2.3.1, a new power
flow is performed with this value and proper change in
  
.
The third simulation yields a positive margin 7.15. Interpolating this margin with the
previous unstable one (   #  ) yields         	
 MW ; with this new       value and
corresponding
  
a new power flow is performed.
The fourth iteration provides   	
      
 . Since the “distance” ( 	
  	    MW)
is reasonably small, the algorithm decides to extrapolate the corresponding negative margins
(   #  and   
 ). The result is       MW . The other parameters are computed by a
power flow program.
A cross-check of the above result is obtained by computing the CCT of the considered
contingency with the new pre-fault conditions provided by the last run of the power flow
program: it is found to be exactly 150 ms, i.e., the contingency clearing time imposed above.
Let us now complement the above description with additional information displayed in
Table 4.4.
Column 6 shows that
 	     rad corresponds almost to the maximum value of  	 : 	
     	     . This is in agreement with  3.3, Fig. 2.5c, of Chapter 2. Incidentally, note




is much sharper for
large values of
  
than for values near the limit stability conditions.
On the other hand, Column 7 suggests again that the more unstable the case and the shorter
the time to instability. Note that the value
  
is provided just for information; actually, the
stable simulation has been pursued on the entire simulation period (3 s) to look for possible
multiswing phenomena.
Further, Column 2 shows that the mode of instability (CMs) remains unchanged throughout
the simulations. In addition, the second part of this column lists the electrical distances of the
CMs m   and m   with respect to machine m  at       	 . These distances “measure” critical
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Table 4.4. Detailed description of the PL search of Fig. 4.6 (Ctg Nr 2, cleared at
    " ms).
Power rescheduling: equally shared among CMs
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machines’ degree of criticalness. Note that machine m   remains the most critical throughout
the simulations.
Finally, Columns 4 and 5 check that the simulations carried out here have distributed the
variations of CMs’ power,
  
, (be it increase or decrease) equally in the two CMs. Obviously,
this is not the only way of reallocating power among CMs.
In particular, it could be physically more “reasonable” to reallocate power proportionally to
the machines’ degree of criticalness and size, according to eq. (4.1). The resulting procedure is
summarized in Table 4.5.
Finally, Table 4.6 gathers results obtained when the initial
    
value is computed by the
compensation scheme.
2.3.8 Observations and comparisons
1.- The above PL searches may be viewed as stabilization procedures, aiming
at stabilizing a contingency scenario under given clearing time. Or, conversely,
as a means of increasing the contingency CCT (in the above example, from
95.7 ms to 150 ms). These stabilization procedures will therefore be considered
as “control” procedures, in Section 4.
2.- Comparing results of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 suggests that reallocating gener-
ation on CMs proportionally to their respective product
  
allows stabilizing
the system at the expense of
             MW decrease in CMs (and almost
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Table 4.5. Search of PL. Contingency Nr 2, cleared at
    	  ms. Initial    decrease:
3  . CMs’ reallocation according to product
 


















dist. (  ) (rad/s)
 












































Table 4.6. Search of PL. Contingency Nr 2, cleared at
     " ms. Initial    decrease
according to the CS of Fig. 3.12. CMs’ reallocation according to product
 
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equal increase in NM). This decrease is more important when the generation
reallocation is shared equally among CMs (27 MW). This is physically sound.
3.- Comparing Tables 4.4 and 4.5 with 4.6 shows that the initial    
provided by the compensation scheme of Fig. 3.12 is less cautious and allows
“saving” one unstable simulation. Note that when the CS cannot be used (e.g.,
in case of multiswing phenomena), it is advisable to choose a cautious decrease
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2.3.9 “Pragmatic” vs SIME-based stabilization
Let us now compare the stabilization of the above stability case (3-machine system; contin-
gency Nr 2 cleared at
     	  ms ) performed by a SIME-based and a “pragmatic” approach.
We specify that the decrease
 in critical machines’ generation for the SIME-based approach
 in all the machines’ generation and in load for the “pragmatic” approach
are distributed proportionally to their initial generation and/or consumption. We also specify
that, here, to facilitate computations of the “pragmatic” approach we use also SIME’s margins.
Table 4.7 summarizes the  vs    variations for the two approaches and Fig. 4.7 plots them.
Table 4.7. Comparison of “pragmatic” vs SIME-based approach.
3-machine system. Ctg Nr 2;
    " ms.
  
Convent. SIME-based
248  "   " 
242  " #   
 
236   #   #  
231   #   
225     # 




#    
 












210. 220. 230. 240.
-15.
Figure 4.7. “Pragmatic” vs SIME-based stabilization
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Observe that the SIME-based stabilization has required:
 generation decrease in CMs of   
  	
  MW   #   ;
 an almost equal increase in the NM;
 and no load decrease.
The “pragmatic” stabilization, on the other hand, requires:
 a decrease of   
     MW , i.e., about 17  decrease in CMs;
 about 17  decrease in the NM;
 and about 17  of load decrease.
In other words, the system stabilization has required:
 by the SIME-based approach: rescheduling 24 MW generated power and no load decrease
 by the “pragmatic” approach: total generation decrease of 
       " 20 and about
as much (54.7 MW) of load shedding.
2.3.10 Concluding remarks
Let us summarize some interesting observations resulting from the PL search
of this paragraph.
1. SIME contributes to set up systematic, easy to implement and sound ap-
proaches. Hence, it may yield a significant number of sound solutions.
2. Various solutions may encounter various power system specifics and oper-
ational objectives. The a priori choice among them is quite transparent.
3. Unlike CCTs, PLs are not well suited as objective indicators for screening
contingencies, given the large variety of PL solutions.
4. In the context of Preventive TSA&C, procedures of PL search may be
viewed as stabilization, i.e. control procedures. The panoply of approaches
developed in this paragraph will therefore be used in Section 4.
5. In short, SIME-based approaches provide interesting techniques for preven-
tive control, sorely missing so far, since T-D methods are helpless in this
area.
2.4 Stability limits approximate assessment
2.4.1 Scope and principle
So far we dealt with accurate assessment of stability limits (SLs).
However, accuracy is not always sought. For example, mild contingencies,
which do not threaten the system integrity, do not need accurate assessment;
rather, what matters is their identification in order to possibly discard them.
SIME provides straightforward identification techniques, relying on approx-
imate SLs and their comparison with a threshold SL.21
20given that the initial generation of the NM 
  	
is 72 MW.
21Threshold SLs should be chosen cautiously in order to avoid discarding harmful contingencies; on the
other hand, a too cautious choice would fail to discard actually “uninteresting” contingencies, i.e., would
produce false alarms.
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The proper choice of threshold SLs is an important issue addressed in Sec-
tion 3. This paragraph deals with approximate search of SLs.
Two types of approximation are used. The one consists of limiting the search
to first-swing stability phenomena, thus avoiding lengthy computations on the
entire integration period. This approximation uses therefore either negative
margins only or, on a stable simulation, stopping criteria described below in

2.4.4. The second approximation consists of limiting the accuracy of the
search. It relies either on previous results of this Section or on compensation
schemes developed in Chapter 3. As described below, the former uses a pair of
margins, while the latter relies on a single margin.
In all cases the SLs of concern will be CCTs for the reasons advocated so
far.
2.4.2 Two-margin approximation
The two-margin approximation relies on the extra-(inter-)polation of two
margins corresponding to two successive simulations22: of them, the first is
necessarily unstable23 and yields a negative margin,    . The second simulation
may be stable or unstable:
if it is stable, the resulting margin is interpolated with    to yield the
approximate CCT sought
if it is unstable, it is stopped at
 
 and the resulting margin  	 is extrapolated
with    to yield the approximate CCT sought.
Note that if the approximation seeks for a first-swing CCT, the stable simulation
(if any) should be stopped at
   , instead of being carried out on the whole
integration period.
To fix ideas, in the example of  2.2.4 described in Table 4.1, the approximate CCT of
concern is found by extrapolating the margins  

#  and  
   and equals 	 ms. This
value is quite close to the actual CCT (131 ms); note however that, here, multiswing phenomena
have not been explored, since no stable simulation has been performed on the entire simulation
period.
In terms of computing effort, the above approximate assessment requires 0.498 sTDI
    
   , i.e., much less than 4.008 sTDI required for the accurate CCT assessment.
Finally, observe that application of this two-margin approximation on the numerical example
of  2.3.7 provides the approximate value PL   " MW (see Fig. 4.6); again, this is quite close
to the accurate value (221 MW).
22Note that the two-margin approximation can also be used to assess PLs, in addition to CCTs.
23Remember, if the simulation is too unstable and hence outside the interval of margins’ existence, additional
simulations (generally two) will be used to recover a margin; however, these very unstable simulations will
generally be rather unexpensive.
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2.4.3 Single-margin approximation
The single-margin approximation relies on the compensation schemes de-
scribed in Figs 3.11,

3.2 of Chapter 3. It is illustrated below, in

2.4.5. It
will be used in the filtering schemes of Chapter 5.
2.4.4 Stopping criteria for first-swing screening
The previous two paragraphs deal with approximate CCT assessment. This
paragraph describes a technique which identifies and discards first-swing stable
(FSS) contingencies, while assessing and keeping first-swing unstable (FSU)
ones. The distinction between FSS and FSU is made on the basis of a threshold
clearing time, CT 
  .
The procedure is as follows. Upon choosing CT 
  , run the T-D program,
first in the during-fault then in the post-fault configuration entering at CT 
  ;
continue simulating until reaching one of the following conditions:
(i) the system extreme machines reach a maximum angular deviation and a
candidate OMIB reaches the stable conditions (2.16)
(ii) a candidate OMIB reaches the unstable conditions (2.15).
In the former case, the contingency is declared FSS and discarded. In the
latter case, the contingency is declared FSU and stored for possible finer assess-
ment, along with the corresponding margin and CMs. Note that the candidate
OMIB mentioned above is one of the few (about 5) candidates identified along
the T-D simulation.
2.4.5 Illustrations on the 3-machine system
We consider the 12 contingencies applied on the 3-machine system (see Section 1 of Ap-
pendix B) and assess their CCT according to:
the approximation of  2.4.2, using the two clearing times,       and 150 ms
the approximation of  2.4.3, using the clearing time        ms.
Further,
a contingency which at
      ms has no margin is declared FSU
a contingency which meets criteria (i) of  2.4.4 is declared FSS.
The validity of the above assessments is checked by computing the CCTs provided by SIME.
Table 4.8 gathers the results of the investigation .
Column 2 recalls the accurate CCT values computed by SIME, listed in Column 3 of
Table 4.2;
Column 3 gives the CCT values obtained by the two-margin approximation, where the
margins are computed for the following two clearing times: 200 ms and 150 ms.
Columns 4 list the CCTs relying on the sole margin computed for
     ms via two of
the compensation schemes of Figs 3.11.
Column 5 identifies the FSU and FSS contingencies for CT  
    ms , relying on the
CCTs of Column 2.
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Table 4.8. Approximate CCT assessment















cont. 2 95 / / / FSU
3 131 131 88 98 FSU
7 147 148 94 101 FSU
6 189 184 181 181 FSU
1 194 190 194 194 FSU
4 196 195 196 196 FSU
5 220 – – – FSS
10 225 – – – FSS
11 227 – – – FSS
8 251 – – – FSS
12 272 – – – FSS
9 297 – – – FSS





  look quite convenient.
Column 5 shows that all approximate CCTs identify correctly the FSU and FSS contingen-
cies.
3. FILTRA
N.B. The contingency FILTering, Ranking and Assessment (FILTRA) tech-
nique developed in this section is mainly transcribed from [Ernst et al., 2000b,
Ruiz-Vega et al., 2000b].
3.1 Scope of contingency filtering, ranking, assessment
The previous section has focused on the (accurate or approximate) computa-
tion of stability limits (CCTs or PLs) relative to a contingency. But, in practice,
the number of “plausible” contingencies is very large; besides, their occurrence
is a priori rather unpredictable, apart maybe from a restricted number of con-
tingencies. Yet, the system should be able to withstand any contingency or at
least to design “last moment remedial actions” and trigger them, if necessary.
On the other hand, a properly designed power system is likely to withstand the
large majority of contingencies. Thus, in the context of the preventive mode,
to overcome this “curse of dimensionality” we design appropriate contingency
filtering tools able to screen out the “mild” and hence “uninteresting” contingen-
cies, while ranking the “potentially interesting ones”. These filtering-ranking
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Figure 4.8. Two-block general organization of FILTRA: CT   CT   CT 
phases should further be followed by an assessment phase able to scrutinize
those contingencies whose stability limits have been found to be unacceptably
low.
This section deals with the design of a general contingency FILTering, Rank-
ing and Assessment (FILTRA) technique, using tools developed in the previous
section.
Section 4 will then set up control techniques able to stabilize the “harmful”
contingencies identified and assessed by FILTRA.
FILTRA is a technique designed so as to meet the requirements stated in

3.2. The resulting general structure is developed in

3.3 and schematically
described in Fig. 4.8. Its mechanism is scrutinized and main properties are
highlighted in

3.4. Paragraph 3.5 proposes illustrative real-world examples.
Paragraph 3.6 suggests possible variants. Finally,

3.7 points out features and
draws conclusions.
3.2 Basic concepts and definitions
Any good contingency filter should meet some key requirements, expressed
hereafter in terms of conditions. Main terms used in the remainder of the book
are also defined.
CONDITION 1: Classification ability. A good classifier should be able
to screen and rank contingencies on the basis of increasingly severe criteria.
According to FILTRA, the various contingencies are classified into first-swing
stable or unstable; these latter are then classified into (first- and multi-swing)
harmless, potentially harmful or harmful. Further, the harmful ones are ranked
according to their degree of severity and assessed. These terms are defined
below and illustrated in Fig. 4.8. A contingency is said to be
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Harmful (H) if its occurrence drives the system out of step; in other words,
a contingency whose critical clearing time is smaller than the assumed time
response of system protections;
Potentially Harmful (PH) if it is “almost” harmful, i.e., milder than, but
likely to become harmful under slightly modified operating conditions;
First-Swing Unstable (FSU), if under given clearing scenario it drives the
system to first-swing instability, First-Swing Stable (FSS), otherwise;
Harmless (Hs), if it is FSU24 but neither harmful nor potentially harmful.
The severity criterion used in the above definitions is contingency clearing time
(CT). To classify a contingency as FSS or FSU, the filtering block chooses a first
threshold, CT 	 ,25 quite larger than the time response of the system protections
of concern. Further, to rank an FSU contingency, the second block chooses
a second threshold, CT  slightly larger than the protections’ time response:
accordingly, it declares an FSU contingency to be H, if it is unstable for this
CT  ; otherwise, it ranks it as Hs or PH depending upon whether it is stable or
unstable with respect to a third threshold, CT  (see Fig. 4.8).
CONDITION 2: Accuracy. The more unstable a contingency, the more
interesting from a stability viewpoint, and the more accurately it should be
assessed. This is achieved by using detailed power system models to rank and
assess the harmful and potentially harmful contingencies.
CONDITION 3: Reliability. The contingency filter should be 100 % reli-
able, i.e., able to capture all the harmful and potentially harmful contingencies.
This is achieved by the combined use of detailed system models and fairly large
threshold values for CT 	 (see also below,  3.3).
CONDITION 4: Efficacy. The contingency filter should have an as low as
possible rate of false alarms, i.e., of contingencies suspected by the filter to be
harmful or potentially harmful while they are not.
Note that the identification of all harmful and potentially harmful contingen-
cies is a condition of paramount importance for the very validity of the filter,
while false alarms may affect its computational efficiency.
CONDITION 5: Computational efficiency. The overall procedure of
contingency filtering, ranking and assessment should be as fast as possible,
whatever the application context. This condition becomes crucial when it




24defined for a larger clearing time, CT
  
CT  
25In general, thresholds CT

, CT   , should be contingency dependent.
118 TRANSIENT STABILITY OF POWER SYSTEMS
3.3 General design
Figure 4.8 portrays the general two-block structure of FILTRA. The first
block is devoted to the filtering task; it may consist of several successive sub-
blocks, with increasing modeling details and filtering accuracy, as discussed in

3.6. The second block ranks and assesses the “interesting” contingencies sent
from the first block.
As suggested by Fig. 4.8, the ranking of FSU contingencies relies on margins
(  ’s) computed for two clearing times (CTs), fixed so as to comply with the
conditions of

3.2. Note that CCT  , shown in the upper part of block 2, is
obtained by linear interpolation of  	 and   (see  3.4 and sketch (II) of
Fig. 4.9). Recall also that CT  is an intermediate value between CT 	 and CT 
(CT 	  CT   CT   26. Margins and CTs are used as follows.
3.3.1 Contingency filtering block
Whatever the internal structure, the last step of this block performs a stability
computation with detailed power system modeling and contingency clearing
time CT 	 to classify each contingency as first-swing stable or unstable and,
accordingly, to:
discard the contingency if it is FSS
send the contingency to block 2 along with its (negative) margin  	 , if it is
FSU.
3.3.2 Contingency ranking and assessment block
This block uses detailed power system modeling and a threshold CT  to
compute a stability margin,   and classify a contingency as:
Harmful, if     
Potentially Harmful (PH) or Harmless (Hs), if     : the CCT value
resulting from the linear interpolation of  	      and       decides
whether the contingency is unstable for CT  (CCT    CT  ) , and hence
PH, or stable (CCT   CT  ) and hence Hs.
To summarize, only the harmful contingencies would actually threaten the
power system, and deserve finer exploration (see

3.4.3). The potentially harm-
ful contingencies may be put in a stand-by list and checked after stabilization
of the harmful ones.
26See for example the values used in Fig. 4.9.
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3.3.3 Remarks
1.- Detailed power system modeling in the last step of block 1 is used with the
twofold objective: for better accuracy, and for allowing extra-(inter-)polating
the resulting margin with that computed for CT  , in block 2.
2.- Many variants of FILTRA may be thought of in order to comply with power
system specifics. They all differ in the structure of the filtering block (see

3.6),
whereas the second block, which carries the main properties of the approach,
is less liable to changes.
3.4 A particular realization of FILTRA
The general FILTRA technique is here scrutinized on the simple structure
of Fig. 4.9, in order to describe its mechanism and uncover main features and
properties. This structure will subsequently be used in the simulations of

3.5;
the parameter values and contingency numbers displayed in this figure are
borrowed from these simulations.




















































Figure 4.9. A realization of FILTRA. Schematic description of the various contingency classes.
Application to the Hydro-Québec power system
3.4.1 Contingency filtering
According to Fig. 4.9, 377 contingencies are inputted to block (I). In order to
classify them as first-swing stable or unstable, SIME drives the T-D program,
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first in the during-fault then in the post-fault configuration entering at CT 	 





In case (i) of

2.4.4, the contingency is declared to be first-swing stable
(FSS) and discarded. In case (ii), the contingency is declared first-swing
unstable (FSU) and sent to block 2 along with its corresponding negative
margin,  	 , and list of critical machines. For example, in Fig. 4.9, out of the
377 contingencies, 343 are discarded and 34 are sent to the second block.
3.4.2 Contingency ranking
Following the general pattern of

3.3, SIME ranks the FSU contingencies
by driving the T-D program with CT     ms onwards. The simulation is
either stopped as soon as the instability conditions (2.15) are met or pursued
on the entire integration period (5, 10 or 15 s, as appropriate), if the simulation
is found to be stable27. In the former case, the contingency is declared to be
harmful and the corresponding (negative) margin   is computed; in the latter
case, the (positive) margin   is computed and interpolated with  	 to get
CCT  , and: if CCT  is larger than CT  , the contingency is harmless; otherwise,
it is potentially harmful and stored in the “waiting list”.
3.4.3 Refined ranking of harmful contingencies
To rank harmful contingencies, two parameters obtained as by-products of
the above simulations may a priori be considered: the unstable (negative)
margin; the time to instability,
 
 .
Concerning margins, observe that the approximate CCT obtained by extrap-
olating the negative margins,  	 , and   (see sketch (III) of Fig. 4.9) might
be a good “measure” of contingency severity. However, these two margins
(especially margin  	 ) seldom exist for very unstable scenarios like those
of harmful contingencies. In addition, although normalized, if these margins
correspond to different OMIBs they cannot be compared validly.
The time to instability,
 
 , seems to be more convenient for ranking
contingencies; indeed as already observed, the more unstable a contingency the
faster the system loses synchronism. Note, however, that only
 
 ’s referring
to the same type of instability may be compared. (See a counter-example and
its discussion in

3.5.) Note that [Ejebe et al., 1997] uses also the time to
instability, though computed in a different way.
27Recall that the reason for performing the time-domain simulation on the entire integration period is to
make sure that the contingency is indeed multiswing stable; otherwise, i.e., in case multiswing instabilities
are detected, the contingency is harmful and treated as such.
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3.4.4 Assessment of harmful contingencies
What mainly characterizes a harmful contingency is its margin,   , and
corresponding critical machines (CMs). Knowledge of these two pieces of
information opens avenues towards control, i.e., stabilization. This issue is
addressed in Section 4.
3.4.5 Computing requirements of FILTRA
For the particular FILTRA of Fig. 4.9, the computing times required to



























   (CT 	 ) denotes the time to reach the first-swing stable
conditions. Similarly,
 
 (CT 	 ) (respectively    (CT  ) ) is the time to reach
the unstable conditions for CT  CT 	 (respectively CT  ). Finally,    
denotes the “Maximum Integration Period” (e.g., in

3.5 it is taken equal to
5 s for the EPRI system and 10 s for the Hydro-Québec system).
Note that the refined ranking proposed in

3.4.3 does not require any
additional computing time.
3.4.6 Main properties of FILTRA
Although drawn for the particular FILTRA of Fig. 4.9, the properties uncov-
ered so far and summarized below are quite general.
1. The approach is “unified” and straightforward. Indeed, it uses the same
SIME program throughout. Further, the resulting pieces of information
are generally used twice: thus, for FSU contingencies, the margin  	 ,
computed at the filtering block is subsequently used in the second block,
together with the margin   to rank these contingencies; similarly, the
margin   is subsequently used to assess the severity of H contingencies
and, if desired, of PH contingencies as well.
2. The very stable cases are assessed only approximately, thus requiring little
CPU time.
3. The more unstable a contingency, and the more detailed and accurate the
information provided about it.
4. In all practical simulations, the procedure has shown to be 100 % reliable,
i.e., able to capture all harmful contingencies; this reliability is obtained
while keeping a low rate of false alarms.
5. The above properties contribute to make the procedure computationally very
efficient and compatible with on-line requirements. Besides, the most time-
consuming steps may easily be parallelized and performed by distributed
computing.
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Table 4.9. Main characteristics of simulated power systems
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Power Nr of Nr of Machine modeling Total Nr of
system buses lines DM SM power cont.
(MW)
EPRI A 4112 6091 346 281 76,170 22
EPRI C 434 2357 14 74 350,749 252
Hydro-Québec 661 858 86 0 36,682 377
3.5 Illustrating FILTRA techniques
3.5.1 Simulation description
Two power systems are considered: the EPRI test system C [EPRI, 1995] and the Hydro-
Québec (H-Q) power system. These systems are described in Appendix B, while their main
characteristics are summarized in Table 4.9. Columns 4 and 5 of the table indicate the number
of machines with detailed model (DM) and with simplified model (SM) respectively. On both
systems, the contingencies considered are 3-  short-circuits, applied at EHV buses (500 kV for
the EPRI and 315, 345 and 735 kV for the H-Q system); they are cleared by tripping one or
several lines. Note that the 252 contingencies mentioned in the table for the EPRI system result
from the simulation of 36 contingencies under 7 different operating conditions. Paragraph 3.5.4
zooms in simulation results obtained with one of these conditions.
For both power systems, the FILTRA structure and parameters are those displayed in Fig. 4.9.
In addition, the number of reported contingencies and their classification correspond to the
simulations of the H-Q system.
The T-D program used for the EPRI system is ETMSP [EPRI, 1994], and for the H-Q system
is ST-600 [Valette et al., 1987]. These programs are coupled with SIME and, in addition, used
as reference for accuracy comparisons. Note that in order to comply with operational uses, the
maximum integration period for a stable simulation was fixed at 5 s for the EPRI system and
10 s for the H-Q system.
Below we report on two types of simulations:
a synthetic assessment of the two-block FILTRA, using the number of contingencies listed
in Table 4.9, then a zoom in the assessment of H contingencies (   3.5.2, 3.5.3)
a detailed classification of the 36 contingencies used with EPRI system C under a given
operating point, as provided by the two-block scheme (  3.5.4).
3.5.2 Zooming in harmful contingencies
Filtering block. For the EPRI system, out of the initial list of 252 contingencies, 172 have
been found FSS and discarded. The remaining 80 FSU contingencies have been selected and
sent to the second block for ranking and assessment.
For the H-Q system, out of the initial list of 377 contingencies, 343 were found to be FSS
and 34 FSU.
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Table 4.10. Ranking and assessment of harmful contingencies














EPRI 88-machine test system C
1   6 4,832 (485) 395 1 0
30     28 20,008 (550) 1010 2 0
11    37 26,938 (365) 1325 3 66
10     39 27,714 (390) 1395 4 70
Hydro-Québec system
33   5 5572 (258) 320 1 0
39   5 5572 (258) 322 2 0
1405   5 5572 (284) 364 3 0
13   5 5572 (258) 322 4 0
1405   
  5 5572 (332) 438 5 48
243    8 2293 (324) 971  6 67
37  
#   5 5572 (260) 414 7 80
636   	
 1 42 (258) 921 8 92
Ranking and assessment block. For the EPRI system: the 80 FSU contingencies
are decomposed into 31 Hs, 25 PH and 24 H contingencies. For the H-Q system: the 34 FSU
contingencies are decomposed into 13 Hs, 13 PH and 8 H contingencies.
The harmful contingencies are further ranked, according to  3.4.3. The obtained results are
gathered in Table 4.10, where:
Column 2 gives the margin    computed for CT    ms . An asterisk indicates that there
is no margin; (
 
remains always positive). Obviously such cases are very unstable;
Column 3 specifies the number of critical machines;
Column 4 lists the total power generated by these CMs. This information is useful, though
not indispensable;
Column 5 lists the time to instability; the first, between brackets, refers to the first simulation,
using CT
   	 ms ; the second to the second simulation, using CT      ms . Note
that all harmful contingencies are first-swing unstable, apart from contingency Nr 243 of
the H-Q system which loses synchronism after a backswing excursion;
Column 6 ranks the contingencies in increasing order of
  	   (apart from contingency 243,
which has a different mode of instability);
Column 7 provides the reference CCTs furnished by SIME.
Finally, we mention that for the EPRI system only the 4 harmful contingencies corresponding
to operating point Nr 6 (see Section 3 in Appendix B) are displayed, the others exhibiting quite
similar behavior.
Comments. 1.- Concerning contingency ranking, the margin is not a good indicator; in
particular, because most of the harmful contingencies do not have margin for CT      ms ,
and a fortiori for CT
   " ms .
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In contrast, the time to instability shows to be a convenient contingency severity indicator;
the ranking of column 6 of Table 4.10 coincides with that relying on the reference CCTs of
last column, except for contingency Nr 243, which has a different mode of instability: it loses
synchronism after a backswing excursion.
2.- The distribution of contingencies into FSS, Hs, PH and H is much more realistic for the
H-Q than for the EPRI system, where the 252 contingencies under consideration seem to result
from a pre-selection having discarded most of the stable contingencies.
3.5.3 Performances
Reliability. Simulations not reported here show that all contingencies discarded by the
filtering block are indeed stable, and that all harmful contingencies are properly captured. Note
also that the CCTs obtained with the T-D programs run alone are found in perfect agreement
with the CCTs of SIME [Ruiz-Vega et al., 2000b]. This is corroborated by the results listed
below, in Table 4.11.
Computational efficiency. The only lengthy computation is the one concerning harm-
less contingencies: 13 out of the 377 for the H-Q system, and 13 out of the 252 for the EPRI
system. However, these computations are worth for guaranteeing full reliability.
Ranking ability of FILTRA. It is very good, according to the comparison of Columns 6
and 7 of Table 4.10.
Computational performances. In terms of sTDI, the total computing times required








(CT2)      
   = 6.4
PH :
  	
(CT1) + MIP        = 135.5
Hs :
  	
(CT1) + MIP       = 135.9
Total time = 419.4 sTDI
This total may be decomposed into the time required by:
the first block: 155.3 sTDI
the second block: 264.1 sTDI.
Of the above 264.1 sTDI, 260 sTDI are spent to run 26 stable simulations on the entire
integration period (10 sTDI per contingency), while the harmful contingencies require only
a few percentage (about 1.5  ). In other words, apart from the contingency filtering of the
first block, which is unavoidable, most of the computing time is spent to explore existence
of multiswing phenomena. This computation might be avoided if such phenomena are not of
concern (for example, if the system operator knows by experience that they don’t exist).
In this latter case, the time needed to compute the H, PH and the Hs contingencies reduces
to about 30.5 sTDI, and the total computing effort from 419.4 to 172.0 sTDI. The corresponding
mean computing times are, respectively, 1.1 and 0.5 sTDI per contingency.
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3.5.4 Zooming in classification ability of FILTRA
Table 4.11 zooms in one of the 7 operating conditions of the EPRI system mentioned earlier
in  3.5.2, in order to assess reliability and computational requirements of FILTRA; the accuracy
of SIME with respect to ETMSP program run above is also compared.
The table is subdivided in three blocks:
the first gathers the benchmark CCTs obtained by the ETMSP program run alone;
the second gives the CCTs obtained by SIME and their comparison with the above; more
specifically, Columns 5 and 6 display respectively the difference in ms and in percentage
between the CCT values computed by the ETMSP alone and by SIME. The accuracy is
assessed in ms and % :
 
(CCT)   CCT(ETMSP)  CCT(SIME)   
 
(CCT) (%)       CCT  CCT(ETMSP)   "   
the third block reports on results obtained with FILTRA.
Obviously, SIME is in a good agreement with ETMSP: apart from few exceptions, the
discrepancies are within the tolerance range of ETMSP and SIME (  
 ms). Note that this goes
along the general observation: the agreement of SIME with the T-D program that it uses has been
obtained consistently, whatever this program, the power system, and its modeling. Actually,
SIME gives an even more reliable and unbiased assessment than the T-D program.28
Regarding FILTRA, the results are gathered in Columns 7 to 9 of the table:
Column 7 shows the number of simulations required;
Column 8 displays the corresponding sTDIs;29
Column 9 gives the contingency classification under the conditions specified so far.
Comparing the classification of Column 9 with the actual CCT (Columns 2 to 4), one observes
that FILTRA has provided consistently reliable results: it has captured all H contingencies and,
in addition, has classified correctly the remaining contingencies into FSS, PH and Hs.
3.6 Variants of the filtering block
The ultimate objective of the filtering block of Fig. 4.8 is to realize a good
compromise between reliability (ability to capture all the harmful contingen-
cies), efficacy (as low as possible rate of false alarms) and computational
efficiency. Note that accuracy is not the main concern at this stage. Hence,
many approximate filtering schemes may be thought of, a sample of which are
described below.
An issue of concern is whether and to which extent it is interesting to
use power system simplified modeling (SM). Actually, this raises the twofold
question: (i) is the SM at all usable ? (ii) if yes, does SM give a “reasonable”
28SIME’s (in)stability criteria are unambiguously defined, while those of a T-D program are system- and
operator-dependent, see

2.4.4 of Chapter 2
29Note that the resulting mean filtering time is about 2.2 sTDI, i.e., larger than the one mentioned earlier,
in

3.5.3. This is because the dynamics of the considered EPRI test system is slower than that of the
Hydro-Québec system.
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Table 4.11. Simulation result with EPRI test system C. Case
 
6. Adapted from [Ruiz-Vega
et al., 2000b]


















1 0 1 0 0 0.0 2 0.88 H
2 113 5 115 -2 -1.8 2 5.7 PH
3 156 11 161 -5 -3.2 2 6.36 Hs
4 145 10 147 -2 -1.4 2 6.32 Hs
5 172 16 179 -7 -4.1 1 1.49 FSS
6 277 22 280 -3 -1.1 1 1.15 FSS
7 320 25 316 4 1.3 1 1.13 FSS
8 430 32 426 4 0.9 1 1.09 FSS
9 297 23 308 -11 -3.7 1 1.13 FSS
10 70 4 72 -2 -2.9 2 1.79 H
11 66 3 69 -3 -4.5 2 1.69 H
12 172 17 174 -2 -1.2 1 1.51 FSS
13 172 18 174 -2 -1.2 1 1.51 FSS
14 168 12 173 -5 -2.9 1 1.64 FSS
15 168 13 173 -5 -2.9 1 1.64 FSS
16 168 14 173 -5 -2.9 1 1.64 FSS
17 168 15 173 -5 -2.9 1 1.64 FSS
18 316 24 324 -8 -2.5 1 1.13 FSS
19 324 26 325 -1 -0.3 1 1.12 FSS
20 434 33 436 -2 -0.5 1 1.08 FSS
21 434 34 436 -2 -0.5 1 1.08 FSS
22 113 6 116 -3 -2.7 2 5.72 PH
23 113 7 116 -3 -2.7 2 5.72 PH
24 172 19 174 -2 -1.2 1 1.51 FSS
25 172 20 174 -2 -1.2 1 1.51 FSS
26 328 27 331 -3 -0.9 1 1.12 FSS
27 328 28 331 -3 -0.9 1 1.12 FSS
28 434 35 436 -2 -0.5 1 1.08 FSS
29 438 36 463 -25 -5.7 1 1.08 FSS
30 0 2 0 0 0.0 2 1.56 H
31 328 29 332 -4 -1.2 1 1.14 FSS
32 328 30 332 -4 -0.2 1 1.14 FSS
33 332 31 333 -1 -0.3 1 1.14 FSS
34 215 21 218 -3 -1.4 1 1.19 FSS
35 137 8 141 -4 -2.9 2 5.9 Hs
36 137 9 141 -4 -2.9 2 5.9 Hs
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(or realistic) account of the system behavior, i.e. of the system modeled in its
normal (detailed) way ? This twofold question may receive many answers:
“no”: the real system modeling is so sophisticated that SM is meaningless;
“yes”, but: SM does give a picture of the real power system behavior but also
introduces distortions (e.g., multiswing phenomena which may disappear
with detailed models (DM));
“yes, indeed”: the power system behaves in a similar way with SM and
DM, though its transient stability limits (power limits or critical clearing
times) are generally lower with SM than with DM.
Obviously, systems belonging to the third class are good candidates for a
pre-filter with SM, whereas those belonging to the first class cannot use such
SM filters. The “yes, but” category is more difficult to apprehend and needs
off-line tuning on the considered power system. For example, if multiswing
phenomena exist, one should determine the maximum ratio between first and
multiswing CCTs, in order to fix a first CT small enough to avoid missing any
multiswing instability, but large enough to avoid unduly large number of false
alarms.
The above considerations lead to three ways of screening contingencies;
(i) first-swing (in)stability; (ii) approximate CCTs relying on a single-margin;
(iii) approximate CCTs relying on two margins.
Filter (i) was described in

2.4.4 and used in

3.4, Fig. 4.9. Filter (ii) was
described in

2.4.3. It will be used in Chapter 5. Filter (iii), described in

2.4.2, may be designed so as to detect multiswing phenomena; in this case, to
save CPU, it is advised to use it only when simplified modeling is practicable.
The above elementary classifiers may further be combined to yield a large
variety of filters, especially when SM is of concern. The choice must take
into account power system specifics and could hardly be discussed on general
grounds. The need for off-line tuning appears clearly, notably, in order to
inform about the interest in using SM, the existence and nature of multi-swing
phenomena, and the choice of threshold CTs. Note that this tuning should be
performed once and for all, unless the power system undergoes major changes.
3.7 Concluding remarks
FILTRA is a general approach to contingency filtering, ranking and assess-
ment. It is made up of two blocks, one for screening contingencies, the other
for ranking and assessing the “potentially interesting” ones.
The approach is unified, accurate, flexible and powerful: unified, since it uses
the same transient stability package throughout and takes multiple advantages
of each computed margin; accurate, since it achieves a faithful assessment of
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the T-D program; flexible, since it may handle any power system modeling,
contingency scenario and mode of (in)stability; powerful, since it furnishes
efficient filtering, ranking and assessment tools.
From the general two-block structure of Fig. 4.8, the particular FILTRA
scheme of Fig. 4.9 was designed to comply with the specifics of the two power
systems used for illustration.30 Throughout, the power systems were simulated
with detailed modeling. The technique was shown to be reliable (i.e. to
capture all harmful contingencies), accurate and computationally efficient, i.e.,
compatible with real-time requirements under detailed power system modeling.
4. PREVENTIVE CONTROL
4.1 Generalities
Preventive control aims at stabilizing cases involving anticipated contingen-
cies whose occurrence would cause system’s loss of synchronism. For con-
venience, we will say in short that control deals with harmful contingencies,
and aims at designing countermeasures or corrective actions able to “stabilize”
them. The decision about whether to actually trigger such actions is left to the
operator.
In this section the corrective actions rely on generation shifting and reschedul-
ing considered earlier in
 
2.3.3, 2.3.4 of this chapter. The contingencies, sup-
posed to be assessed by their margin and CMs, will be stabilized by canceling
out this margin. As described in

2.3.3, the procedure is iterative, and may be
initialized either by using the compensation scheme of Fig. 3.12 or by applying
an arbitrary (but suitable) initial OMIB generation change. This change may
be reported on the individual system machines in very many ways, some of
which have been identified in

2.3.4.
On the other hand, whenever there are more than one harmful contingencies,
one may wish to stabilize them simultaneously.
The following paragraphs consider in a sequence individual and simultane-
ous stabilization of contingencies.
4.2 Single contingency stabilization
4.2.1 Principle of generation reallocation
For a single unstable contingency, the stabilization procedure of
 
2.3.3,
2.3.4 consists of computing the corresponding (negative) margin and from
there on     and     defined by (3.21) to (3.24). The next step concerns
30As an indication, recall that over 600 contingencies have been screened; of them, about 82 % were readily





), and harmful (5
 
) contingencies. These latter were further ranked in terms of severity and assessed
in terms of their margin and critical machines.
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generation rescheduling of CMs (distribution of total generation shifting of
CMs whenever there are many), and of NMs. Recall that the initial    is
only approximate, be it provided by the compensation scheme of Chapter 3 or
taken as a percentage of the initial
   . Hence, the procedure will be iterative.
Experience shows and engineering common sense suggests that the effi-
ciency of this iterative procedure depends only marginally on the choice of
NMs on which to distribute     .31 But it depends significantly on the
way     is reallocated among CMs. A convenient way suggested in  2.3.4
consists of distributing     according to the degree of the CMs criticalness,
cf. eq. (4.1).
4.2.2 Illustration
This procedure has already been illustrated on the 3-machine system (see  2.3.7 and Ta-
bles 4.4 to 4.6).
Below, we illustrate it on the EPRI and Hydro-Québec systems simulated in  3.5, where
FILTRA identified the harmful contingencies listed in Table 4.10.




       or   , depending upon
whether an initial margin exists or not.
Table 4.12 summarizes the results obtained with four dangerous contingencies, two for each
power system (one with, the other without initial margin). Column 2 of the table provides the
margin values; in their absence, the asterisk indicates that, instead, the “minimum distance”,     , between    and    curves is given (in MW). In Column 4,     denotes the initial
power of the CMs, i.e., the power for which the stability margin of Column 2 was computed
at the iteration of concern; in Column 5,
    





denotes the final value of
  
; this value is used as the initial
  
value for the
next iteration (provided that the critical group does not change from one iteration to the other).
The stabilization procedure starts (iteration Nr 0) with the output data of the second block of
FILTRA reported in Table 4.12:    (or asterisk), number of CMs, and    .
To facilitate explanations, let us comment on the case Nr 13 of the H-Q system, where
the group of CMs is the same for all successive simulations. A first iteration is run using
                  MW . This      decrease is distributed among CM,
and an increase of the same amount is distributed among non-critical machines. A load flow
is then run, followed by a transient stability simulation. The results are shown in the table:
the procedure converges after three iterations; the power of the group of CMs guaranteeing
stabilization is finally found to be 4791 MW (in bold in the table); in other words, stabilizing
this case implies shifting 14 % of the CMs’ initial generation power.32 This is admittedly a quite
large decrease; it reflects the severity of this stability case.
The same procedure yields the power limits for the other cases in Table 4.12, as well. Observe
that, generally, cases which involve CM changes during the procedure and/or very unstable
31Though it may be of great importance for other issues such as maximum power transfer or cost, see
Chapter 5.
32The corresponding generation reallocation in NMs is here proportional to their initial power.
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Table 4.12. Stabilizing harmful contingencies individually

















0  	   6 4831  
  4392 395
1  "   7 5162 Extr. 3448 460
2   	
  7 3448 Extr. 2826 745
3     7 2826  	
 2572 1040
4  #  7 2572 Extr. 2454 1320
5 0.37 7 2454 Inter. 2489 5000
Cont.30
0    28 20008   19425 1010
1  # # 16 9175   8907 1625
2 0.0 39 26889 – – 3025
Hydro-Québec system
Cont.13
0     5 5572   5065 364
1  
   5 5065   
 4917 470
2   	 5 4917 Extr. 4787 670
3 0.07 5 4787 Inter. 4791 10000
Cont.37
0  
   5 5572  " 5409 414
1    5 5409 Extr. 5292 556
2   5 5292 Inter. 5334 2000
behavior (without initial margin) require a larger number of simulations; nevertheless, this
number remains reasonably small (see contingency Nr 1 of the EPRI system which accumulates
the two “difficulties”).
4.2.3 Comparing stabilization patterns
Paragraph 2.3.4 proposed a sample of possible patterns for stabilizing con-
tingencies. Of course, there are many others. Below, we report on comparative
simulations performed on the Brazilian power system described in Section 4 of
Appendix B. Three different patterns are compared, namely:
Pattern # 1: stabilization by reallocating power on the CM Nr 2707 only
Pattern # 2 : stabilization by reallocating power on the CM Nr 2706 only
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Table 4.13. Comparing stabilization patterns on the Brazilian power system










































































































































Pattern # 3 : stabilization by reallocating power on all CMs, according to
eq. (4.1).
Table 4.13 collects these results for five harmful contingencies, identified in
Column 1.
Column 2 identifies the CMs.
Column 3 lists their corresponding initial electrical distance

.33
Column 4 lists their corresponding initial generation      and, between
brackets the corresponding sum.
Columns 5 to 7 collect the results relative to the three rescheduling patterns;   
denotes the total generation decrease, and
     the corresponding generation
of each CM (and their sum).
Comparing the three patterns in terms of total generation decrease in CMs,
   , we observe that:
33Remember,
 
is the angular deviation between the

th CM and the most advanced NM, computed at
 	
.
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- is more interesting (i.e., requires smaller decrease    ) for contingency
Nr 687 and 686;
- is equally good with Pattern
 
3 for contingency Nr 656
Pattern
 
2 seems less effective, probably because for severe contingencies
machine Nr 2706 is not the most critical
Pattern
 
3 is never “the best” but provides consistently good results.
Even if the above comparison cannot help draw conclusions, it shows however
that different patterns may yield quite different practical results.
Incidentally, note that the number of iterations needed to stabilize the various
cases and patterns is 2 or 3: 34 obviously, the number of iterations has not
increased with the system size (compare with Tables 4.4 to 4.6, corresponding
to the 3-machine system).
4.3 Multi-contingency simultaneous stabilization
4.3.1 Principle of generation reallocation
To stabilize the whole set of harmful contingencies simultaneously, the
procedure of

4.2.1 may readily be adapted as follows.
(i) For a given unstable contingency: compute the decrease in generation of
the group of CMs following the procedure of

4.2.1 and
if this group contains a single CM: impose this decrease on that CM
if this group contains many CMs, distribute this decrease according to
eq. (4.1).
(ii) Proceed similarly with all unstable contingencies.
(iii) For each CM, choose the generation decrease to be the maximum among
those computed in above steps (i), (ii);
(iv) Compute the total generation decrease obtained for all CMs, and com-
pensate by an equal generation increase in NMs.
(v) Run a power flow program, followed by a T-D program to assess the new
margins of all contingencies, and decide whether to iterate further or not.
4.3.2 Illustration on the 3-machine system
We consider again the 3-machine system for which contingencies Nr 2, 3 and 7 are found to
be harmful when cleared at 150 ms.35
Table 4.14 summarizes the obtained results.
34More about the involved computations may be found in [Ruiz-Vega et al., 1998]
35This value was chosen quite large on purpose, i.e., in order to get many harmful contingencies. Further,
the example is a little artificial, since the CMs are necessarily almost always the same. Nevertheless, it is
interesting for illustration.
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Table 4.14. Simultaneous stabilization procedure. 3-machine system.
Contingencies cleared at
    	  ms
















    
(ms)
Iteration Nr 1







248   157
83
240 331
Ctg 3  #  101.3    163   158 381




















240    142
78
220 391
Ctg 3    131.1    157   154 481
Ctg 7 


















220   147
80
227 (551)
Ctg 3 "  131.1    142  " 154 (391)
Observe that, of course, to stabilize the most constraining contingency (Nr 2), the other
two (especially contingency Nr 7) have to be overstabilized. Note also that, again, the power
decrease in CMs has been compensated by a generation increase in the NM, thus avoiding any
load shedding.
And again, the procedure behaves almost the same way, be it applied to a large system or to
an academic small system. This is illustrated with the example reported below.
4.3.3 Illustration on the Brazilian system
This example uses again the Brazilian system, for which 14 harmful contingencies have been
identified, when cleared at
     " ms (about 10 cycles). Table 4.15 summarizes the results.
Column 3 of the table lists the power generation change (generally decrease) in CMs. Note
that the initial change,
    
, is computed via the compensation scheme of Fig. 3.12.
Column 4 identifies the CMs, and lists between brackets, the corresponding electrical distance
and generation decrease reported in each CM according to eq. (4.1). The bold face characters
denote the CM and corresponding generation decrease chosen (i.e., the maximum power de-
crease). Table 4.15 shows that the stabilization procedure needs two iterations only, except
maybe for contingency Nr 672 for which an additional generation decrease might be needed.
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Table 4.15. Simultaneous stabilization procedure. Brazilian 56-machine system. Contingency
cleared at
     " ms . Adapted from [Bettiol et al., 1999a]










        
(MW)
CM
               
(rad/s)
         
(MW)
687             
  ; 1.4 4  
#      ;








686  	 
            ; 7.7 29  
    "  ;
672   
#           ;  #   

630  	   
 	     
  8.9 16
680      "   
      4.3 25
708   
   "        4.0 25
598   
   "        4.1 25
629  "   # 	      	 13.9 14
463     
  "   
    
   5.8 34
692  
#   "   
       15.4 44  
    
  ;        ;
707      "        7.2 42
690   
  "   
      14.8 75  
#    
  ;        ;
437      
       1.7 1
However, the small size of the corresponding margin (  #  ) suggests that this decrease would
be insignificant.
Note that stabilizing the 14 contingencies simultaneously has required 180 MW, i.e. 8.5 
of the total CMs’ initial generation power. Again, this power decrease in CMs has been
compensated by increasing generation in NMs, without any load shedding.
4.3.4 Stabilizing inter-area mode oscillations
Description. Typically, inter-area oscillations involve a large group of ma-
chines swinging against another group of machines.
To stabilize a contingency creating inter-area oscillations, it seems a priori
convenient to act on a sub-set of CMs, generally chosen among the more
advanced ones, rather than the whole set of CMs.
To stabilize simultaneously many contingencies creating inter-area oscilla-
tions it seems reasonable to choose CMs common to the various contingencies,









































(a) Unstable case (b) Stabilized case
Figure 4.10. Multimachine and corresponding OMIB swing curves of an inter-area mode.
EPRI 88-machine test system. Contingency Nr 11;
      ms
and more specifically those common CMs which are the more advanced ones
for the more harmful contingencies.
Illustration. We illustrate these matters on the EPRI 88-machine system
on which four contingencies create inter-area oscillations, involving 33 to 38
CMs.36
One of these inter-area oscillations is plotted in Fig. 4.10. The simultaneous
stabilization procedure is described in Table 4.16. This stabilization takes
advantage of the fact that at least 10 CMs are common to all 4 contingencies
(actually, there are 32 common CMs).
Column 1 of Table 4.16 lists the 10 more advanced CMs for contingency 1, as
well as the initial generation of these machines. On the other hand, Columns 2
to 5 of the table specify these machines’ classification for the other contin-
gencies, along with their respective angular distance (in degrees),
  , from
the corresponding most advanced NM. Note that of these 10 CMs, 7 are top
machines for contingencies Nr 1 and 30, which are the severer contingencies
36With respect to the contingencies listed in Table 4.10, contingency Nr 1 has been slightly modified so as
to get a margin. The operating conditions are also slightly different.
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Table 4.16. Simultaneous stabilization of multi-contingency inter-area mode oscillations.
Adapted from [Ruiz-Vega et al., 2000b]
1 2 3 4 5




  (rad/s)   -0.88 -0.96 -0.83 -1.21   
24623 26162 26162 27014
Nr of CMs 32 36 36 38












1877 821 1 (66.5) 21 (53.3) 19 (52.4) 2 (79.4)
1878 769 2 (66.4) 23 (52.9) 21 (51.9) 1 (79.2)
1873 821 3 (66.3) 22 (52.0) 20 (50.9) 4 (79.1)
1870 821 4 (66.3) 19 (46.7) 18 (47.9) 3 (79.1)
1771 779 5 (63.1) 24 (44.8) 26 (47.9) 5 (74.8)
1855 821 6 (63.1) 2 (44.7) 24 (46.6) 6 (74.5)
1854 769 7 (61.2) 30 (43.6) 30 (46.0) 7 (74.2)
1783 220 8 (46.0) 26 (43.3) 25 (45.7) 19 (65.7)
1871 340 9 (43.0) 18 (42.9) 16 (45.4) 22 (59.6)




  (rad/s)   0.218 1.22 0.22 0.01   
23,811 25,351 25,351 26,203
(23,973) (25,871) (25,833) (26,210)
Nr of CMs 32 36 36 38
among the 4, while for contingencies Nr 10 and 11 these CMs are located rather
far away from the top.
The simulations start with a total power decrease             	      MW. (Actually, this is the maximum power decrease, imposed by the
severest contingency, Nr 30.) Decreasing the initial powers
     of the 4
contingencies by this     yields the    	 values indicated in row 2 of
iteration Nr 1. The corresponding new margins are all positive, though for
contingency Nr 30 it is almost zero. The
   values listed between brackets
are obtained by interpolating    and  	 .37
37For example, it was found that to stabilize contingency Nr 30, the generation of the 38 machines should
be shifted by
     	       	         MW .
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Discussion. Computationally, stabilizing simultaneously all harmful contin-
gencies is more expensive than stabilizing a single one, but less expensive than
stabilizing them sequentially.
But the main advantage of the simultaneous stabilization is that it furnishes
near optimal solutions.
Of course, stabilizing the most constraining contingency requires overstabi-
lizing the others. For example, in the above illustration, contingencies Nr 1,
10 and 11 are slightly overstabilized: according to their
   values indicated
between brackets in Table 4.16, this overstabilization corresponds to respec-
tively 154, 513 and 475 MW.38 These powers are, however, negligible in terms
of percentage of the total CMs’ generation (the maximum decrease is 2  ).
And again, the generation decrease in CMs has been compensated by an
(almost) equal increase in NMs without any load shedding.
4. SUMMARY
This chapter has collected all necessary ingredients for performing real-time
preventive TSA&C.
Section 2 described various types of stability limit computations: CCTs and
PLs; accurate as well as approximate ones.
Section 3 proposed approximate CCT computation techniques able to devise
an integrated software called FILTRA, which filters out uninteresting contin-
gencies, ranks potentially interesting ones and finally assesses the harmful
contingencies.
Section 4 addressed the important issue of control. Techniques have thus
been devised, able to stabilize harmful contingencies, relying on generation
power shifting from CMs to NMs. Many patterns were suggested to reschedule
generation of CMs taking into account the type of instability, the number of CMs
and other important factors. In short, Section 4 has shown that stabilization,
i.e., control which has long been considered a problematic issue becomes a
straightforward task for SIME. Besides, it has shown that this stabilization, if
well designed, is not as “expensive” as used to be considered.
Finally, it was suggested that rescheduling generation of NMs may open
avenues to other objectives, additional to meeting transient stability constraints.
Chapter 5 will focus on such objectives.
38For example, for stabilizing contingency Nr 1 alone, one should shift
                   MW ,
i.e.
   
        	    MW less.
Chapter 5
INTEGRATED TSA&C SOFTWARE
In this chapter, techniques developed in Chapter 4 are organized to set up a
unified TSA&C software aiming to cover an as large as possible spectrum of
preventive security issues.
Section 1 concentrates on this unified software, first considered alone, then
interfaced with an OPF algorithm, in order to broaden further its possibilities.
In Section 2 this software is applied to a real-world problem: the computation
of transient stability-constrained maximum power transfer between areas. Two
cases are considered. The one deals with local modes of transient stability
constraints; the other with inter-area modes. The use of OPF is shown to be
beneficial in many respects: quality of the obtained result (amount of allowable
power transfer); computational performances; simultaneous coverage of other
types of limits, like static ones (bus voltage and thermal line limits).
Finally, Section 3 envisages various ways of integrating the TSA&C package
in an EMS environment in order to perform on-line congestion management
and available transfer capability calculations. It also proposes use of this
package in a dispatcher training simulator environment.
The various developments illustrate the flexibility of the integrated TSA&C
software, and its ability to comply with any type of preventive studies, be it for
planning, operational planning or real-time operation.
1. INTEGRATED SOFTWARE
1.1 Basic TSA&C software
The functions developed in Chapter 4 to conduct a complete TSA&C task
are combined here to get an integrated TSA&C package. Subsequently, this
basic software will be augmented with an OPF program so as to meet transient
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Figure 5.1. Organization of the preventive TSA&C software package
Figure 5.1 displays the basic integrated software package, that we shortly
describe below.
(i) The output of the state estimator furnishes the data for running a power
flow to determine the current operating state. This, together with the contin-
gency set are injected to FILTRA.
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(ii) FILTRA (Block (1) in Fig. 5.1) identifies the harmful contingencies from
this generally very large initial list of plausible contingencies. Further, for
each one of the harmful contingencies, it provides the stability margin and
corresponding CMs.
(iii) Upon receipt of this information, the Transient Stability Control Block
(Block (2) in Fig. 5.1):
determines the corresponding control actions (active power change in each
CM) for each one of the harmful contingencies;
combines the resulting control actions to compute the amount of active
power change in each CM necessary to stabilize the set of harmful contin-
gencies simultaneously;
reallocates the corresponding amount of active power on NMs so as to
encounter predefined objective functions, additional to the transient stability
constraints; let us recall that this reallocation on NMs affects only marginally
- if at all - transient stability.
(iv) The Transient Stability Assessment Block (Block (3) in Fig. 5.1) re-
ceives the “improved” operating state found by the power flow program after
applying the preventive control actions (in this case, generation rescheduling),
and assesses power system transient stability with respect to the previous set of
harmful contingencies. If the assessment block finds that some contingencies
are still unstable, it computes the corresponding margins, identifies the CMs
and sends this information back to the Transient Stability Control block. If the
power system is stable for all contingencies, the new operating state is declared
to be stable and the process stops.
The cycle: “identification of the harmful contingencies, their corresponding
margins and CMs - computation of active power reallocation on each one of
them - reallocation of the corresponding power among NMs” is repeated until
stabilizing all harmful contingencies.
Generally, two to three iterations are sufficient.
A final check is then performed to verify that the procedure has not destabi-
lized any of the previously potentially harmful contingencies (mandatory) and
harmless contingencies (optional).
1.2 Multi-objective TSA&C software
The above important achievement in real-time TSA&C may further be broad-
ened by interfacing the TSA&C block of Fig. 5.1 with an OPF software. Indeed,
this “augmented” software package allows extending TSA&C along at least the
following two directions (Fig. 5.2).
(i) At the input of Block (1), by determining an operating state which meets
a predefined objective function (e.g., maximum allowable transfer on a cut-













































Figure 5.2. Organization of the TSA&C-OPF software package
set, congestion management, etc.), while satisfying static constraints of the
transmission network (bus voltage and power line limits).
(ii) At the output of Block (2), by reallocating active power on NMs so as to
meet the predefined objective while satisfying above static constraints.
At the same time, the combined use of OPF contributes to the overall inte-
gration of all security functions in the EMS environment, discussed below, in
Section 3.
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The particular way the OPF software is adapted to cope with TSA&C soft-
ware requirements is briefly described below.
1.3 Adapting the basic OPF algorithm
Figure 5.1 shows that transient stability constraints are satisfied by reschedul-
ing the generation of CMs. To meet other types of objectives, OPF acts on NMs.
The resulting integrated TSA&C and OPF software is portrayed in Fig. 5.2.
As an example, the formulation of the OPF problem to maximize the power
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       (5.3)
                 (5.4)              (5.5)                 (5.6)            (5.7)
where the following notation is used:
 
  total interface flow
  
interface flow through interconnecting line    active power injection in bus    reactive power injection in bus  
  voltage magnitude in bus    voltage angle of bus   
apparent power through line    and    elements of the bus admittance matrix.
is the set of all generator busses,  the set of all buses.   denotes the
set of system’s lines and      the set of the interconnecting lines of interest.  
and
 
denote lower and upper limits respectively.
Equation (5.1) represents the objective function, eqs (5.2) and (5.3) are the
network equations, and (5.4) and (5.5) are generation limits. Static security
constraints are represented by eqs (5.6) and (5.7) [Bettiol et al., 1999b].
After receiving margins and CMs from FILTRA (Block (1) of Fig. 5.2), the
Transient Stability Control block (Block (2) of Fig. 5.2) provides the new values
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of the upper limit (or the lower limit, depending on the instability phenomena)
for the active power output of each CM necessary to meet the transient stability
constraints. Note that the power generation of these CMs is not going to be
fixed at these values but only bounded by them, and that their final values are
going to be found after the optimization process. In the case of NMs, their
limits do not change and their power outputs depend only on the objective
function.
Finally, the OPF study gives a new optimal steady state operating state that
takes into account not only transient stability and static constraints, but also
maximizes the power flow in interface lines. This new operating state is used
by SIME for assessing all harmful contingencies. If the system is stable for the
whole set of contingencies, the process stops; if not, new preventive control
actions are computed and another OPF is run.
Figure 5.3. Power transfer among areas of an interconnected power system
2. A CASE-STUDY
2.1 Maximum allowable transfer: problem statement
Consider an interconnected power system operating with inter-area power
transfers as schematically shown in Fig. 5.3, where three different areas are
distinguished: the exporting area (denoted X ), the importing area (Y) and the
set of “non participating” areas (Z) , i.e., areas which are not directly involved
in the power transfer between areas X and Y . Assume that the amount of power
to be transferred between areas X and Y is transient stability-limited, i.e.,
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that for this amount there exists (a set of) harmful contingencies. Under these
conditions, the Maximum Allowable Transfer (MAT) problem addresses the
following question: “determine the transient stability-constrained maximum
power transfer from area X to area Y ”.
This problem may be decomposed into the following sub-problems:
(i) determine the initial operating (base-case) state which achieves a maxi-
mum power transfer X   Y;
(ii) apply to this base-case the set of plausible contingencies, and determine
whether there are some constraining, i.e., harmful ones;
(iii) if yes, apply procedures of

4.3 of Chapter 4 to assess the necessary
generation power decrease in CMs1 and its distribution among them;
(iv) at the same time, report the corresponding (almost equal amount of) power
increase in NMs in such a way so as to achieve maximum power transfer.
Obviously, both schemes of Figs 5.1 and 5.2 can properly handle sub-
problems (ii) and (iii). On the other hand, sub-problems (i) and (iv) can be
handled by using either proper logical rules, or the OPF algorithm of Fig. 5.2.
Both approaches have been investigated on the Brazilian South-Southeast
power system described in Section 4 of Appendix B [Bettiol et al., 1999a]. An
in-depth description of these investigations is given in [Bettiol, 1999], where
two types of transient stability-limited explorations have been carried out: one
concerns plant mode instabilities, the other inter-area mode instabilities. Main
results of this large-scale investigation are reported below, in
 
2.2, 2.3.
2.2 Plant mode instability constraints
2.2.1 Problem description
The objective here is to determine the transient stability-limited maximum
power transfer in the South part of the system (see Fig. 5.4) between areas 12
to 15 and area 16 which operates under a generation deficit. This transfer is
limited by a “local” or “plant” mode, as will appear below.
To search this “local” power transfer limit, only the 17 machines of the South
power system are included in the generation rescheduling procedure. The
active power dispatch of the remaining machines of the Southeast-Centerwest
power system (about 27,445 MW) is kept unchanged during the search. All
machines of the exporting areas operate in their upper generation power limits
(6,394 MW) and the machines of the importing area in their lower generation
limits (918 MW). Thus, the computed base case corresponds to a large amount
of power (about 2,621 MW) transferred from areas 12 to 15 of the South power
1Remember, generation decrease in CMs corresponds to upswing instabilities, while generation increase to
backswing ones.
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system to area 16. Figure 5.4 portrays schematically the tie-lines of interest for
the desired operating condition.
To check whether the maximum power transfer limit established in steady-
state meets also transient stability constraints, the MAT problem is subdivided
into the following tasks.
Figure 5.4. Schematic representation of the tie-lines of interest. Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
2.2.2 Contingency filtering, ranking, assessment
1η < 0
η 2 > 0
η 2 < 0
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Figure 5.5. A realization of FILTRA with a special purpose filtering block. First case study.
Block 1: Contingency filtering (Fig. 5.5). The initial list of plausible contin-
gencies (list
  	 ) comprises 850 contingencies. They are processed according
to the general two-block organization of FILTRA displayed in Fig. 4.8 where,
however, Block 1 is composed of two sub-blocks. (See Fig. 5.5).
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Sub-block Nr 1 is made of a special-purpose SIME program which uses
fixed large size T-D integration steps (e.g., of 25 ms), a short maximum inte-
gration period (1 s) and a CT       ms . The power system is modeled in the
conventional simplified way (constant emf behind transient reactance; constant
mechanical power; constant impedance loads).
Thus, with CT       ms , and using the first-swing stopping criteria
of

2.4.4 of Chapter 4, the program declares a contingency either FSS and
discards it, or FSU and includes it in list
   .
Sub-block Nr 2 uses detailed power system model (DM). It relies on the
compensation scheme (c) of Fig. 3.11, which provides an approximate first-
swing CCT, labeled
    , for all contingencies found to be unstable (i.e., having
a negative margin,  	 ). Thus, for a clearing time, CT 	 , a contingency
found to be FSS or to have a
      ms , is discarded
having a
       ms , is stored in list    and sent to the ranking-
assessment block.
Note that, here, CT 	 is not constant, but determined according to the initial
clearing time conditions of

2.2.3 of Chapter 4. This CT 	 along with the
corresponding margin,  	 , is sent to Block 2 for contingency ranking and
assessment.2
Block 2: Contingency ranking and assessment (Fig. 5.5). Following the
general pattern, FILTRA considers the FSU contingencies and their (positive
or negative) margin ,   , using detailed power system modeling (DM), and
CT   	 ms .
In this case study, out of the 30 FSU contingencies:
16 are found to be harmful       
10 are found to be potentially harmful (CCT    CT    ms)
4 are found to be harmless (CCT    ms) .
The harmful contingencies are stabilized below, in

2.2.3.
Table 5.1 gathers FILTRA’s information about them:
Columns 2, 3 list the first clearing time, CT 	 , and the corresponding nor-
malized margin,  	
Column 4 lists the second margin,   , corresponding to the second (fixed)
clearing time, CT   	 ms
Column 5 gives the contingencies CCTs computed by extrapolating linearly
2Let us stress that design of Block 1 of Fig. 5.5 follows the general pattern of Fig. 4.8 but is different from
that of Fig. 4.9 in various respects. In particular, by the use of a simplified power system model (sub-block 1)
and of a variable CT

(sub-block 2). Besides, Block 2 uses CT  
 	   ms , i.e. larger than that of Fig. 4.9.
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Table 5.1. Harmful contingencies ranking and assessment by FILTRA















826 240 -46.69 -11.81  1
827 190 -36.46 -23.48 125 2
784 190 -29.98 -18.59 129 3
831 230 -49.21 -11.48 148 4
802 210 -46.14 -13.85 148 5
830 230 -49.68 -8.76 153 6
841 250 -73.43 -8.40 156 7
816 250 -73.42 -8.58 156 8
832 230 -48.42 -6.93 157 9
744 250 -72.84 -7.72 157 10
843 250 -72.8 -7.58 157 11
828 240 -49.12 -5.14 159 12
715 250 -72.83 -6.68 160 13
842 250 -72.83 -5.33 160 14
704 220 -103.46 -7.38 163 15
701 220 -100.78 -0.41 167 16
the above two margins.3 This provides another way of ranking contingen-
cies, more reliable than, though as unexpensive as
 
 used in Chapter 4.
The potentially harmful contingencies will be stored for a stability check
under the new operating conditions resulting from the stabilization of the
harmful contingencies.
The harmless contingencies are discarded. They might be reconsidered for
a final check of all 850 contingencies, if deemed necessary.
Summary of contingency screening. Figure 5.5 summarizes the FILTRA
results. It shows that, out of the 850 screened contingencies (list L1), the first
sub-block discards 770 (90.6  ) of them, and sends 80 to the second sub-block
(list L2). Similarly, the second sub-block eliminates 50 contingencies (5.9  ),
“sending” 30 (3.5  ) to Block 2; these 30 contingencies compose list L3 (FSU
contingencies). Finally, FILTRA identifies 16 harmful, 10 potentially harmful
and 4 harmless contingencies.
3in all cases, except for the first contingency (Nr 826) where the CMs are not the same for the two stimulations.
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To summarize, FILTRA finds that the generation pattern and corresponding
power transfer level between exporting and importing areas of the base case
conditions are actually constrained by 16 harmful contingencies.
2.2.3 Contingencies’ simultaneous stabilization
Base case. As stated earlier, the base case aims at achieving the “maximum”
power transfer between areas X and Y . Actually, this amount will be different
when determined heuristically or via an OPF program.
However, here, to allow easy comparison of the two stabilization procedures,
we consider the common base case used so far by FILTRA, obtained by an OPF
program. From this base case, the iterations for stabilizing the contingencies
will be carried out on one hand by the logical rules defined below, on the other
hand by an OPF program [Granville, 1994, Mello et al., 1997].
Table 5.2 gathers the resulting solutions that we comment hereafter.
Column 3: time to instability
 
 (maximum integration period, MIP). This
time expresses the computational requirements in terms of sTDI (actually, in
msTDI)
Column 4: type of the OMIB swing: +1 means single upswing4
Column 5: total amount of generation decrease necessary to cancel out the
unstable margin of Column 2, as provided by the compensation scheme of

3.3 of Chapter 3
Column 6: identification of the CM(s) classified in decreasing order of criti-
calness, assessed in terms of the angular distance     of each CM  .
Recall that to stabilize all harmful contingencies simultaneously, the amount
of generation power decrease in each CM is chosen to be the largest among
those listed in Column 6 for all contingencies that contain this CM (cfr

4.3
of Chapter 4). In other words, the procedure consists of monitoring only the
contingencies which contain the most severely disturbed CMs. Hence, only
contingencies 827, 784, 802 and 704 are monitored.
The resulting generation decrease (i.e, the sum of power excess in machines
2707   MW), 2706   MW), 2705    MW), 2704   MW) and 2573   MW),
2712  	 MW)) totals 180 MW.
Below we reallocate these 180 MW on NMs according to (I) logical rules,
and (II) OPF.
I. NMs’ generation rescheduling via logical rules. Basically, the following
three selection rules are used
4Obviously, in Table 5.2 all contingencies are of type 1; but in Table 5.9,

2.3 there are of various other
types
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   : available generation, complying with lower and upper machines’ power
limits
   
: generation rescheduling for maximizing the power transfer between ar-
eas. For example, it is obvious that the power transfer will increase by
increasing the generation in a NM if this NM belongs to area X
   : additional criteria; for example generation cost.
These criteria, gathered in a “logical table” [Bettiol et al., 1999a, Bettiol,
1999], lead to the stabilization procedure summarized in Table 5.2 and com-
mented below.
Base case. Selection rule
 
1 compares the current values of power gen-
eration of the NMs with their operational upper limits5 so as to reschedule
generation of only those NMs that operate below their upper generation limits.
Selection rule
 
2 advocates considering the NMs of exporting areas. How-
ever, all these NMs operate in their upper generation limit. One is therefore led
to increase generation in the 8 NMs of the importing area 16, by considering
their available generation power. Thus, the amount of 180 MW is distributed
among these 8 machines proportionally to their maximum power generation
capacities.
A new power flow is then performed with the indicated generation resched-
uling of both CMs and NMs. Using the resulting new operating state, SIME
is run again to assess the 4 more constraining harmful contingencies under
monitoring.6
First iteration. Here, only one contingency has still negative margin
imposing a further generation decrease in machine 2573. Note that the positive
margins suggest also minor readjustments.
Second iteration. After a new power flow accounting for these small ad-
justments, SIME indicates that contingency 704 is now stabilized: the iterative
procedure is thus finished.
Final check. Concerning a final check, let us observe again the following.
1. In real-time preventive TSA&C (which could be performed, for instance,
each 15 or 20 minutes), a final check could be mandatory only for the
harmful and potentially harmful contingencies.
2. For the remaining contingencies (i.e., those initially discarded by FILTRA),
the final check could be optional; for example, it could be performed after
significant modifications of the actual operating state (resulting from sig-
nificantly different generation patterns, load scenarios, topology changes,
5

  reported in [Bettiol, 1999].
6Remember, stabilizing contingencies 827, 784, 802 and 704 stabilizes all other contingencies as well.
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Table 5.2. Simultaneous stabilization of all harmful contingencies via: (i) logical rules; (ii)
OPF. Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]











     $       (MW) )
826 -11.81 355 +1 -38 2707(36,-22) , 2706(31,-16)
827 -23.48 305 +1 -78 2707(45,-48) , 2706(33,-30)
784 -18.59 315 +1 -90 2707(102,-39) , 2706(90,-30) ,
2705(88,-15) , 2704(52,-6)
831 -13.85 375 +1 -52 2707(118,-25) , 2705(89,-8) ,
2706(88,-16) , 2704(53,-3)
802 -13.85 375 +1 -76 2712(91,-76)
830 -8.76 390 +1 -58 2706(115,-21) , 2707(103,-23) ,
2705(100,-10) , 2704(62,-4)
841 -8.40 410 +1 -44 2712(94,44)
816 -8.58 415 +1 -44 2712(95,-44)
832 -6.93 405 +1 -29 2705(106,-5) , 2707(106,-12) ,
2706(104,-10) , 2704(69,-2)
744 -7.72 415 +1 -39 2712(95,-39)
843 -7.58 420 +1 -38 2712(96,-38)
828 -5.14 420 +1 -19 2705(114,-4) , 2706(102,-6) ,
2707(98,-7) , 2704(70,-2)
715 -6.68 420 +1 -34 2712(93,-34)
842 -5.33 445 +1 -27 2715(95,-27)
704 -7.38 370 +1 -5 2573(105,-5)
701 -0.41 465 +1 -1 2573(103,-1)
Logical rules: first iteration
827 1.08 (4,000)  +3 2707(  ,+2) , 2706(  ,+1)
784 2.60 (4,000)  +12 2707(  ,+5) , 2706(  ,+4) ,
2705(  ,+2) , 2704(  ,+1)
802 0.07 (4,000)  0 2712(  ,0)
704 -1.34 440 +1 -2 2573(102,-2)
Logical rules: second iteration
704 0.50 (4,000)  0 2573(  ,0)
OPF: one sole iteration
827 1.51 (4,000)  +5 2707(  ,+3) , 2706(  ,+2)
784 3.27 (4,000)  +15 2707(  ,+6) , 2706(  ,+5) ,
2705(  ,+3) , 2704(  ,+1)
802 1.33 (4,000)  +7 2712(  ,+7)
704 5.21 (4,000)  +2 2573(  ,+2)
maintenance schedules, etc.), or upon request of the system operator. This
final check could be performed in off-line mode.
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II. NMs’ generation rescheduling via OPF. In this approach, the OPF
program reallocates automatically the amount of 180 MW in NMs, with the
objective to maximize the power transfer on the tie-lines of Fig. 5.4; at the
same time, this program determines the new operating state. SIME is then run
again to assess the existence and severity of harmful contingencies.
Last part of Table 5.2 summarizes this stability assessment and shows that
all harmful contingencies are stabilized after one iteration.
2.2.4 Logical rule vs OPF-based procedures
Below, we compare the results of the two approaches described above with
respect to:
generation power rescheduling of CMs and NMs





Generation rescheduling of CMs and NMs. Table 5.3 compares the resched-
uling patterns. In Column 1, the asterisk identifies the CMs. In Columns 3 and
4, the bold-face values between brackets indicate the generation power changes
imposed respectively by logical rules and OPF.
Observe that the differences of the solutions provided by logical rules and
by OPF are essentially marked on NMs, while they are quite marginal for CMs,
which goes along the very strategy of SIME-based stabilization procedures.
Incidentally, note that the OPF procedure imposes on the slack bus to furnish
its maximum generation capacity; more generally, its generation rescheduling
pattern is quite different from that of the logical rules. This is a direct con-
sequence of the “optimal” generation rescheduling of the NMs provided by
OPF.
Interface power flows. Table 5.4 summarizes the changes in the interface
flows imposed by the two stabilization procedures. Columns 2 to 5 list the
power flows (measured on the bus of the exporting area) on the tie-lines of
interest. The total power flow leaving the exporting area is shown in Column 6.
Observe that the total interface flow decrease imposed by the logical rules and
by OPF is respectively 208 MW (7.94  ) and 151 MW (5.76   . Obviously,
this latter is closer to the maximal, steady-state unconstrained initial value
obtained by the OPF program. This is a direct consequence of the better
generation rescheduling of NMs determined by OPF.
Figure 5.6 displays the differences resulting from the two approaches.
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Table 5.3. Generation rescheduling patterns: logical rules vs OPF.
Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999].
1 2 3 4
Generation power (MW)
Machine Initial Final
(Base-case) Logical rules OPF
2094 300 337 (+37) 303 (+3)
2101 90 107 (+17) 94 (+4)
2174 60 72 (+12) 63 (+3)
2176 120 157 (+37) 123 (+3)
2183 80 91 (+11) 84 (+4)
2569 1,672 1,672 1,672
2573

248 241 (-7) 243 (-5)
2674 (slack) 1,260 1,215 (-45) 1,260
2702 30 35 (+5) 33 (+3)
2704

100 94 (-6) 94 (-6)
2705

132 117 (-15) 117 (-15)
2706

250 220 (-30) 220 (-30)
2707

350 302 (-48) 302 (-48)
2710 80 106 (+26) 190 (+110)
2712

1,050 974 (-76) 974 (-76)
2714 1,332 1,332 1,332
2769 158 193 (+35) 161 (+3)
Table 5.4. Interface flow changes: logical rules vs OPF. Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
1 2 3 4 5 6
Interface flows (MW)
Case 525 kV 230 kV
2736-2750 2722-2750 2826-2812 2824-2047 Total
Initial 1,141.5 949.8 308.0 221.7 2,621
Final Logical rules 1,073.9 897.0 259.7 182.4 2,413
OPF 1,110.5 927.2 246.4 186.0 2,470
Active power losses. Table 5.5 shows the changes in active power losses
for the entire power system (exporting, importing, and “remaining” areas),
resulting from the generation rescheduling. Note that the OPF allows a larger
reduction of the total active power losses: 46 MW (2.51  ) for OPF vs 2 MW
(0.11  ) for the logical rules. This might be attributed to the fact that the
static constraints (especially bus voltages and power limits) are met by the OPF
approach at each step of the iterative procedure.
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Figure 5.6. Maximum transient-stability constrained power transfer limits.
Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
Table 5.5. Active power losses: logical rules vs OPF. Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Active power losses (MW)















Initial 1,373 376 86 1,835 1,373 376 86 1,835
Final 1,385 371 77 1,833 1,367 344 78 1,789
Reliability. The reliability of the two procedures was checked by comparing
the resulting CCTs with those obtained by the ST-600 program (with simpli-
fied and detailed power system modeling, as appropriate), used here as the
reference.7
For the proposed contingency filtering and assessment task, it was found that
all discarded contingencies are, indeed, harmless, i.e. that their CCTs are larger
than the threshold values at each step of the contingency filtering, assessment
and final check.
Similarly, as a validation of the overall procedure, the CCTs of all 850
contingencies have been again computed by the ST-600 program at the end of
the iterative procedure. Table 5.6 displays the initial and final CCT values of
the previously 16 harmful contingencies (in bold) and 10 potentially harmful
ones. Note that:
7In these case-studies SIME is coupled with the Hydro-Québec T-D stability program, ST -600.
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Table 5.6. Changes in (potentially) harmful contingencies’ CCTs
1 2 3 4
CCT values (ms)
Contingency Initial Final
Nr Logical rules OPF
827 115 173 173
784 120 178 178
826 133 197 197
831 134 188 192
802 143 168 168
830 144 197 197
828 147 198 198
832 148 197 198
744 152 173 178
816 152 173 178
841 152 173 178
843 152 173 178
715 157 178 178
842 159 178 183
704 161 168 168
701 165 173 173
824 168 222 222
796 169 183 173
825 169 212 197
834 169 216 222
103 170 168 168
726 171 178 178
140 173 181 172
809 177 199 193
112 178 168 169
725 180 183 188
after the generation rescheduling by the two approaches, the CCT values
of the previously harmful contingencies (marked in bold in Table 5.6), are
quite similar, and close to the adopted threshold (167 ms)
the CCT values of contingencies 103, 112, and 140 are smaller after the
generation rescheduling (this latter with the OPF approach) but never smaller
than 167 ms.
Computational requirements. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 list the computational
requirements of the various tasks of the two MAT procedures. The simula-
tions were run on a single SUN UltraSPARC-II workstation (Ultra-10 model,
300 MHz, 1024 MB of RAM).
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Table 5.7. Computational requirements of the procedure using logical rules
Task Task Computational requirements
Nr identification sTDI seconds %
1 OPF (base case) 0.20 5 0.11
2 FILTRA
Filtering block
First sub-block (SM) 5.00 125 2.86
Second sub-block (DM) 30.53 804 18.42
Assessment block 62.28 1,672 38.29
Total FILTRA 97.81 2,601 59.57
3 Stabilization 16.44 421 9.14
4 Final check
Harmful and potentially harmful ctgs (26) 44.29 1,163 26.62
Remaining contingencies (824) 7.00 177 4.06
Total final check 51.29 1,340 30.68
TOTAL 165.74 4,367 100.00
Globally, they correspond to about 73 minutes (using the logical rules) and
77 minutes (using the OPF program), respectively.
Table 5.8. Computational requirements of the procedure using OPF
Task Task Computational requirements
Nr identification sTDI seconds %
1 OPF (base case) 0.20 5 0.11
2 FILTRA
Filtering block
First sub-block (SM) 5.00 125 2.71
Second sub-block (DM) 30.53 804 17.46
Assessment block 62.28 1,672 36.30
Total FILTRA 97.81 2,601 56.47
3 Stabilization 16.16 387 8.40
4 Final check
Harmful and potentially harmful ctgs (26) 56.73 1,452 31.53
Remaining contingencies (824) 6.40 161 3.49
Total final check 63.13 1,613 35.02
TOTAL 177.30 4,606 100.00
A more detailed inspection of the above tables suggests that
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usage of OPF affects rather marginally the computing effort
stabilization requires less than 10  of the overall computing effort
FILTRA, together with the final check, are the most time consuming proce-
dures. Note however that their computations can very easily be distributed
among many computers.
To fix ideas, using 5 PCs would reduce the overall computing effort to
about 20 min, in both cases (logical rules or OPF). This CPU could further be
reduced if the final check was restricted to a small sub-set of contingencies, see
in

2.2.3. Additional speeding up procedures could easily be thought of.
2.3 Inter-area mode instability constraints
2.3.1 Problem description
While in the previous case the power was transferred between areas of the
same region (Brazilian South system), this case considers the power transferred
between different regions (Brazilian Southeast-Centerwest and South systems),
where each region is composed of several areas.
This breeds various differences with the previous study. In particular:
inter-area mode instabilities, resulting in multi- and back-swing phenomena
rather than local mode instabilities;
larger size of the optimization problem, which involves 56 machines instead
of 17;
use of logical rules becomes more problematic.
Thus, in what follows, the transient stability-constrained MAT problem will
be solved by using OPF only. The comparative study with the logical rules-
based procedure may be found in [Bettiol, 1999].
2.3.2 Base case conditions
The OPF program determines the steady-state maximum power transfer limit
between exporting and importing areas (i.e., the base case conditions). This
base case is set up with the same objective function, control variables, and
functional constraints as in

2.2.
Here, the MAT problem concerns the transient stability-constrained maxi-
mum power transfer between the Southeast-Centerwest (areas 01 to 11) and
South (areas 12 to 16) power systems, see Fig. 5.7. For the computed base case,
the 39 machines of the exporting area operate with 94 % (i.e., 28,969 MW) of
their maximum generation power capacity, while the 17 machines of the im-
porting area operate with their lower power generation limit (i.e., 4,784 MW,
which is equivalent to 58 % of the maximum generation capacity of this part
of the power system). In this way, the generation deficit in the South power
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Figure 5.7. Schematic representation of the tie-lines of concern. Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
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Figure 5.8. Contingency classification by FILTRA. Second case study.
system is compensated with a large power import (about 3,545 MW) from
the Southeast-Centerwest power system. Figure 5.7 shows schematically the
tie-lines linking the two power systems under monitoring.
The transient stability-constrained maximum power transfer will be com-
puted following the general organization of Fig. 5.2, whose various sub-tasks
are briefly commented below.
2.3.3 Contingency filtering, ranking, assessment
The FILTRA scheme of Fig. 5.5 is again used, with same parameter values.
The result is displayed in Fig. 5.8. It shows that the filtering block discards 832
(i.e., 98  of the) contingencies. Further, from the 18 remaining contingencies,
the second block identifies 6 harmful contingencies, whose main features are
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described below, in Table 5.9. It is interesting to zoom in physical phenomena
of some cases reported in this table, before focusing on their stabilization.
2.3.4 Contingencies’ simultaneous stabilization
Base case: physical phenomena description. Obviously, the above-identified
6 harmful contingencies suggest the need for generation shifting with respect
to the base case.8
Let us describe some peculiar physical phenomena caused by some contin-
gencies9 under this base case power transfer.
A first type of multiswing instability is caused by contingency Nr 159 (back-
swing) which causes loss of synchronism because machine 2706 (a medium
size thermal power plant) decelerates during its third oscillation, as shown in
Fig. 5.9. This contingency, which is located at the 765 kV bulk transmission
system of the Itaipu power plant and near the most important transformers
linking the Southeast-Centerwest and South power systems, causes the accel-
eration of all machines of the Southeast-Centerwest power system and of some
large machines of the South power system near these interfaces (due to their
important synchronizing torques). This causes the deceleration of all thermal
power plants (machines 2174, 2176, 2702, 2704, 2706, 2707, and 2769), which
are blocked by an under-frequency control device, and of machine 2101 (a
small hydro power plant). All these machines are located at the South power
system. For this stability scenario, the loss of synchronism main mechanism is
the inter-area mode between the Itaipu hydro power station (equivalent machine
16, which is located in the Southeast-Centerwest power system) and thermal
power plants of the South power system.
A second type of multiswing instability is caused by contingency Nr 167,
illustrated in Fig. 5.10. This contingency leads to loss of synchronism by
acceleration of machine 21 (located at the Southeast-Centerwest power system)
during its second oscillation.
Another inter-area mode restricting the initial power transfer is caused by
contingency Nr 239, described in Fig. 5.11. This contingency causes 10
machines (located at a same hydropower generation site of the Southeast-
Centerwest power system) to accelerate together, causing the system loss of
synchronism during their first oscillation.
Stabilization. All these phenomena are properly detected and treated by
SIME, as shown in parts (b) of Figs 5.9 to 5.11. The first part of Table 5.9
8We specify that all these contingencies are located in the Southeast-Centerwest power system (i.e., in the
importing area); further, we mention that contingencies 112, 140, and 159 are located at 765 kV buses, while
contingencies 239 and 263 at 440 kV buses [Bettiol, 1999].
9Recall that the contingencies are cleared after 167 ms.























    OMIB representation
Figure 5.9. Loss of synchronism by backswing multiswing instability phenomena.
Contingency 159;




























    OMIB representation
Figure 5.10. Loss of synchronism by multiswing instability phenomena. Contingency
167;
     " ms . Base case operating conditions. Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
summarizes their characteristics, including their CCTs found, as previously, by
extrapolating linearly margins  	 and   of FILTRA (see Fig. 5.8).
Concerning the amount     , listed in Column 6 of the table, recall that:
    is negative for upswing instabilities and positive for backswing ones;
the use of the compensation scheme (

3.3 of Chapter 3) is not applicable
to multiswing instabilities. For such cases (here for Contingencies Nr 159
and 167)     is taken arbitrarily 10 % of the actual generation of the
corresponding CMs.
Accordingly, the individual generation power decrease (for upward oscilla-
tions) or increase (for backward oscillations) for the 13 CMs, are indicated in
bold in Table 5.9. Hence, the total generation power decrease required for the
base case is 911 MW, i.e., the sum of the following CMs’ generation shifts:
16 (-252 MW), 21 (-139 MW), 179 (-63 MW), 181 (-115 MW), 182 (-46 MW),
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(b)
    OMIB representation
Figure 5.11. Loss of synchronism by first-swing inter-area mode instability. Contin-
gency 239;
     " ms . Base case operating conditions. Adapted from [Bettiol,
1999]
184 (-22 MW), 186 (-55 MW), 187 (-215 MW), 290 (-6 MW), 291 (-2 MW),
292 (-7 MW), 293 (-5 MW), and 2706 (+16 MW).
Thus, recalling that SIME monitors only the contingencies which have the
most severely disturbed CMs, i.e., the CMs which require the largest generation
shifting, we see that contingency Nr 140 won’t be monitored, despite it is
initially quite severe.
2.3.5 NMs’ generation rescheduling via OPF
Iteration 1. As in the previous case study, the OPF program is run in order to
reallocate automatically and “optimally” generation power on NMs, i.e., so as
to meet the operating constraints and, at the same time, to maximize the power
transfer between exporting and importing areas.
The stability assessment, summarized in Table 5.9, shows that all harmful
contingencies are stabilized after the first generation rescheduling.
However, contingency Nr 167 has been significantly over-stabilized (more
than 5 % of the maximum generation capacity of the corresponding CM).
Hence, the method initiates a second iteration.
Iteration 2. A generation power increase of 134 MW is thus imposed on
machine 21. A new OPF is then run for reporting this generation power change
on NMs. With the new operating state thus defined, SIME determines a new
stable margin for contingency Nr 167, and consequently a small generation
power increase to cancel out the stability margin. The convergence criteria
being now satisfied, the generation rescheduling iterative procedure is finished.
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Table 5.9. Simultaneous stabilization of harmful contingencies. Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]















(  ) ,       (MW) )
263 -9.30 390 125 +1 -333 187(92,-215), 186(82,-55),
179(55,-63)
140 -2.46 605 142 +1 -185 16(75,-185)
112 -2.99 580 141 +1 -252 16(64,-252)





159 -82.31 2,805 157 -3 +16 2706(-13,+16)
167 -0.33 2,020 166 +2 -139 21(76,-139)
Iteration 1
263 1.53 (4,000)   +47 187(  ,+30), 186(  ,+8),
179(  ,+9)
112 1.49 (4,000)   +84 16(  ,+84)
239 3.01 (4,000)   +248 181(  ,+97), 184(  ,+18),
182(-,+38), 292(  ,+6),
187(  ,+46), 186(  ,+13),
179(  ,+20), 29(  ,+1),
290(  ,+5), 293(  ,+4)
159 37.79 (4,000)   -5 2706(  ,-5)
167 9.76 (4,000)   +134 21(  , +134)
Iteration 2
167 5.84 (4,000)   +4 21(  ,+4)
Final Check
 
1. As already pointed out, a final check should be mandatory
for contingencies initially identified by FILTRA as harmful and potentially
harmful (in our case, 6+6, see Fig. 5.8).
Thus, the 12 contingencies undergo again the FILTRA procedure, which
identifies that contingency Nr 140 is still harmful. Actually, what happened
is a change in CM: machine 16 (initially the CM for this contingency) was
stabilized after the generation shifting, while machine 2101 becomes now the
CM responsible for the loss of synchronism (driven by a backswing multiswing
instability).
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Table 5.10 summarizes the stabilization procedure of this contingency.
Table 5.10. Iterative stabilization of contingency Nr 140
1 2 3 4 5 6







( d(  ) ,      (MW) )
140 -3.14 3.21 -3 +9 2101 (-137,+9)
Iteration 4
140 5.46 4.00  -5 2101 (  ,-5)
Table 5.11. Interface flow changes: logical rules vs OPF. Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Interface flows (MW)
Case 765 kV 230 kV 138 kV Total
110-109 222-2559 202-2603 202-2622 303-2946 337-2608 337-2837
Initial 2,368 178.0 158.0 129.5 342.0 248.5 121 3,545
Final Logical
rules 2,056.6 252.5 203.7 143.6 327.6 233.3 119.6 3,337
OPF 2,184 257.6 206.8 145.6 326.8 235.8 111.8 3,468
Final Check
 
2. Both, the mandatory and optional checks conclude that all
contingencies have been properly stabilized [Bettiol, 1999].
Interface power flows. Table 5.11 compares the OPF results with those
obtained by the logical rules reported in [Bettiol, 1999]. As can be seen,
the logical rules require 5.87  , while OPF only 2.17  of interface power
decrease: obviously, as concerning the MAT problem, OPF is superior to the
logical rules [Bettiol, 1999].
Further, OPF is found to be superior also with respect to total losses.
Reliability. The reliability of the results was again checked and found to be
fully satisfactory.
164 TRANSIENT STABILITY OF POWER SYSTEMS
Table 5.12. Computational requirements of MAT+OPF
Task Task name Computational requirements
Nr sTDI seconds %
1 OPF (base case) 0.24 6 0.14
2 FILTRA
Filtering block
First sub-block (SM) 5.04 126 2.84
Second sub-block (DM) 23.19 585 13.18
Assessment block 54.95 1,503 33.87
Total FILTRA 83.18 2,214 49.89
3 Stabilization 28.72 788 17.76
4 Final check
Harmful and potentially harmful ctgs 38.53 1,021 23.01
Remaining contingencies 16.22 408 9.20
Total final check 54.75 1,429 32.21
TOTAL 166.89 4,437 100
Computational requirements. Table 5.12 summarizes the computing times
required by the various tasks. It is worth observing that the overall procedure
is little less demanding here than in the first study (4,437 s vs 4,606 s).
This seemingly surprising result may be explained by the fact that the lion’s
share is taken by FILTRA. And since FILTRA is less demanding here (list L3
contains 18 contingencies vs 30 in the previous study), stabilization influences
CPU marginally, even if its size is significantly larger.
2.4 Concluding remarks
The simulations conducted so far suggest the following observations.
Comparing the TSA&C software interfaced with OPF and with logical
(“pragmatic”) rules shows that the former is superior. Indeed:
– the TSA&C + OPF approach yields safe operating conditions closer to
the transient stability limits. This permits a larger power transfer limit
between exporting and importing areas;
– use of OPF guarantees that after a generation rescheduling all pre-fault
operating constraints (i.e., bus voltages, thermal limits of lines and
transformers, etc.) are still met;
– since the operating constraints of the power system are met by the OPF
program, the resulting generation rescheduling pattern has less active
power losses.
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The transient stability-constrained maximum allowable transfer (MAT)
problem receives a straightforward and systematic solution thanks to the
panoply of techniques provided by SIME.
Calling upon an OPF program suitably adjusted allows providing near op-
timal solutions to the MAT problem while complementing the target with
other objectives:
– in short, the MAT-OPF

based approach consists of rescheduling power
on CMs according to SIME and on NMs according to OPF;
– computationally, the resulting software can be made fully compatible
with real-time requirements because the most time-consuming tasks
are straightly parallelizable. The complete iterative cycle “contingency
filtering-assessment-stabilization” according to a given objective can
thus reach this objective very easily within minutes.
Further, observe that
– all harmful contingencies identified by FILTRA are stabilized simulta-
neously in few iterations;
– the size of the problem affects rather marginally computational perfor-
mances.
Finally, we mention that
– MAT is an actual problem in many real-world power systems;
– the proposed solution is likely to be easily accepted by operators, since
its strategy and objectives meet everyday concerns;
– use of an OPF algorithm goes along emerging needs and trends.
3. TSA&C IN CONTROL CENTERS
N.B. This Section is transcribed from [Avila-Rosales et al., 2000].
3.1 Introduction
In recent years utility companies have being required to functionally separate
their power transmission, generation and energy marketing departments. Today,
utilities are searching for tools in the new restructuring environment that operate
at the same efficiency level as the full Energy Management System (EMS)
software that has evolved over time. New static and dynamic security challenges
are thus emerging.
Independent power producers, competitive economic transactions, open ac-
cess requirements and free energy routing through the transmission system are
putting a greater emphasis on On-line TSA&C, integrated available transfer ca-
pability (ATC) static and dynamic calculations and preventive control to allow
room for future transactions and savings.
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Most companies with stability concerns are willing to consider on-line im-
plementation of TSA&C and the determination of preventive control actions
for the operation of their power system.
Below we describe functional aspects for on-line TSA&C integration with
the EMS, and the Dispatcher Training Simulator (DTS) environments for plan-
ning and current operation studies.
Voltage Security Assessment (VSA) is not of concern here; it is however
included in all figures to complete the EMS operation and control center picture.
The following TSA&C/EMS issues are discussed below:
TSA&C and the Transmission Services Provider (TSP)
TSA&C and the Independent System Operator (ISO)
TSA&C for the above considering the study and DTS environments
ATC calculation considering dynamic security constraints
preventive control using an optimization technique.
Regarding time horizon, TSA&C must be evaluated to provide ATC and
preventive countermeasures for the following:
planning horizon (hours, days, weeks, months)
operating horizon (half an hour to one hour).
3.2 TSA&C in the EMS
The TSA&C role in the EMS depends on the type of company. Two basic
alternatives are described here.


















Figure 5.12. Transmission Services Provider. Adapted from [Avila-Rosales et al., 2000]
Figure 5.12 is a functional overview of the TSP environment. The purpose
of the ATC calculator is to manage available transfer capability information for
the OASIS (Open Access Same time Information System) automation system.
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It calculates initial ATC values during periods of initialization or resynchro-
nization. It also calculates changes to ATC values that result from new requests
for transmission service. The ATC calculator in this context currently performs
either a flow based or a path based method.
Figure 5.12 shows that the ATC calculator supports data input from multiple
sources: the response factor calculator using state estimation information, the
resource scheduling, TSA&C and VSA if available.
The ATC calculator evaluates ATC data for each constrained facility based
on the operating horizon (solid lines), the planning horizon (dotted lines) and
in some cases a study horizon.
When a request for transmission capacity is received, the ATC calculator
calculates new ATC data and sends the values for evaluation. Once evaluated,
the new ATC values may be posted. ATC values are calculated in advance and
for future transmission reservations considering two horizons:
the operating horizon which starts in the next hour and covers the immediate
short term;
the planning horizon which starts after the operating horizon and extends
into the future.
Transfer paths are used to evaluate stability limits and the information is sent
to the ATC. A fast technique is required to update the limits when a specific
request for transmission capacity reservation is received.
Response Factor (RF) runs in real-time using fresh information from state
estimation; it currently calculates flow at each gate and the sensitivity of each
flow gate to a new reservation on a given path. TSA sensitivity values will
be considered in the RF evaluation for the constrained facilities (related to the
transfer path) to obtain ATC estimated values for future transactions.
Resource scheduling uses resource commitment network data, forecasted
conditions, transaction information and device schedules to optimize and ob-
tain transfer limits. TSA&C will include stability constraints as part of the
calculation.
VSA and TSA may reside in independent boxes and use distributed process-
ing to minimize execution time.
3.2.2 On-line TSA&C for the ISO
Figure 5.13 describes an ISO environment using a resource dispatch that
provides solutions for the market based operation.
TSA&C will include stability constraints in the market solvers for the re-
quired time horizon and interfaces with the resource commitment, the resource
scheduling and the resource dispatch applications.















Figure 5.13. Independent System Operator. Adapted from [Avila-Rosales et al., 2000]
Resource scheduling is a function with a time horizon of 24 hours in hourly
intervals. The results are fed into the EMS market database and TSA&C and
resource dispatch will iterate to ensure dynamic security in this time frame.
Resource dispatch executes typically every five minutes and its purpose is
the real-time dispatch of the resources; it uses generator response and limits to
calculate base points for AGC as well as unit participation factors.
Note the planning horizon (dashed line) and the current operating loop (solid
line) are connected with TSA&C to include stability constraints.
TSA&C can provide limits every five minutes, with a fast and reliable
sensitivity approach.
Several harmful dynamic contingencies and transactions are evaluated for
real-time and planning scenarios.
For the planning horizon, TSA&C will analyze contingencies and transac-
tions for daily operation and up to two weeks in advance.
TSA&C and VSA may reside in independent boxes and use distributed
processing to minimize execution time.
3.3 Congestion management
In general the EMS should be provided with a set of optimization tools that
will allow Congestion Management (CM) and generation redispatch. Preven-
tive control is an example where TSA&C and these optimization tools can be
used. The integration of the planning and the current operating horizons will
force the extensive use for next hour, day and month. TSA&C shall inter-
face with these tools to analyze dynamic contingencies, then stabilize unstable
cases, possibly via OPF.
The CM process will participate in activities like ATC calculation and re-
sponse against security violations. These tools may be used to plan and schedule
controls for dangerous situations. The controls will have of course associated
cost of operation; but in some cases they could be cost free.
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CM tools shall be flexible and easy to use by different applications like
TSA&C and VSA to consider transient and voltage problems. Resource
scheduling and resource dispatch are part of the applications including op-
timization tools in new restructuring EMS.
3.4 TSA&C for the DTS and Study Environments
The DTS provides a realistic environment for operators to practice normal,
everyday operating tasks and procedures, as well as emergency conditions.
It can be used in an experimental and investigatory manner to recreate past
scenarios, or simulate future behavior of the system and the EMS. The DTS
and Study environments should include resource scheduling, resource dispatch,
VSA and TSA&C to emulate the new energy system. Remedial actions can
be integrated as part of the simulation process, thereby providing a powerful
dynamic tool. The following features are required:
The DTS fast real-time initialization
The Data Preparation (DP) using the DTS databases
Network information, transactions, contingencies, monitored elements and
parameters are sent to the TSA&C box
TSA&C output is summarized and sent to the DTS to continue with the near
future base case condition.
The DTS can be thought of as being parallel to, and a close emulation of the
EMS environment. Hence, results in the DTS environment are highly reliable
















Figure 5.14. Study and DTS dynamic tools. Adapted from [Avila-Rosales et al., 2000]
The study tools are shown with dashed lines in Fig. 5.14; the loop is similar
to the DTS one, except that is primarily used for power flow case analysis
including optimal power flow and contingency analysis. Study is initialized
from real-time or saved cases to recreate actual conditions and analyze the
impact of “what if” conditions to prevent dangerous situations.
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4. SUMMARY
This chapter has set up a unified TSA&C software, based on material devel-
oped in the previous chapters.
Section 1 has first described the resulting basic software then has interfaced
it with an OPF algorithm.
Section 2 has used this augmented “TSA&C + OPF” software to assess
transient stability-constrained maximum power transfer between areas of the
Brazilian South-Southeast-Centerwest power system. This assessment relies
on generation shifting, where the SIME-based TSA&C software takes care of
generation rescheduling of critical machines, whereas the OPF software takes
care of generation rescheduling of non-critical machines. It was shown that
this integrated software provides “near optimal” solutions able to comply with
real-time operation requirements.
Besides, the OPF algorithm broadens the possibilities of TSA&C by deter-
mining static limits as well. Even more importantly, it bridges the gap with
other EMS functions. Its role as the ISO’s tool for safeguard and justification in
his interaction with the market is certainly not the least interest of its interface
with TSA&C.
ISO’s concerns have been addressed in Section 3, and various solutions
were envisaged for the combined coverage of dynamic (transient and voltage
stability) constraints together with static ones, in particular during congestion
management and ATC calculations.
Chapter 6
CLOSED-LOOP EMERGENCY CONTROL
The previous chapters have addressed preventive TSA&C issues and de-
veloped appropriate techniques. In particular, Chapters 4 and 5 focused on
preventive control aiming to design pre-contingency remedial actions able to
stabilize harmful contingencies, should they occur. The actions concerned
generation shifting.
This chapter addresses emergency control issues. It aims at designing, in real
time, corrective post-contingency actions, triggered during the transient period
following a contingency inception, so as to avoid loss of synchronism which
otherwise would occur. The corrective actions concern generation tripping,
although many other types of control may also be thought of.
More precisely, the objectives of this chapter are:
to predict in real-time, after a disturbance inception, whether the system is
driven to instability
if yes, to assess the size of the instability and devise “in extremis” corrective
actions able to safeguard system’s integrity
to continue monitoring the system in order to assess whether the action has
been sufficient or should be further complemented.
In short, the ultimate objective is to design techniques for real-time closed-
loop transient stability emergency control. The information necessary to
achieve such a challenging task should be provided by real-time measurements
rather than T-D simulations.
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1. OUTLINE OF THE METHOD
1.1 Definitions
Transient stability emergency control may be viewed as complementary to
preventive control in many respects. For example, preventive control deals with
pre-contingency actions, emergency control with post-contingency ones. Also,
preventive control attempts to broaden the system domain of attraction so as
to contain the dynamic trajectory initiated by a contingency inception. On the
other hand, emergency control attempts to bend the dynamic trajectory so as
to force it to remain or return to the domain of attraction (which will generally
be changed, too). Differences between preventive and emergency control are
further discussed in Chapter 7.
The preventive countermeasure considered in Chapters 4 and 5 for real-time
preventive control was generation shifting, possibly in conjunction with load
shedding1 . The decision about whether to take such countermeasure(s) or not
relies on the tradeoff between economy and security.
Emergency control, on the other hand, aims at designing and triggering
actions in real time, after a harmful contingency has actually occurred. Here,
such control actions become vital for both security and economy.
Emergency actions may be either designed in real time using real-time
measurements, or assessed in anticipation, for example by means of off-line
stability simulations. The latter case belongs to open-loop emergency control,
as opposed to closed-loop emergency control; in this latter case, the action
is designed and triggered in real time, during the transient period following a
contingency inception, and the system continues being monitored and further
controlled.
1.2 Scope
The Emergency SIME proposed in this chapter is a general approach to real-
time closed-loop transient stability emergency control [Zhang et al., 1997b,
Ernst et al., 1998b, Ernst and Pavella, 2000, Ernst et al., 2000a].
Unlike Preventive SIME which goes along the conventional thinking and
strategies2 , Emergency SIME departs definitely from the traditional T-D simulation-
based approaches by processing real-time measurements.
Admittedly, given that transient stability phenomena develop very fast, the
above objective seems to be quite ambitious with respect to both software and
hardware requirements. This may explain to a large extent why, to the best of
our knowledge, such a challenging strategy has not been envisaged so far.3
1although in the simulated real-world examples load shedding has not been required.
2even if its possibilities are far beyond those of conventional transient stability methods
3Note, however, that open-loop emergency control schemes exist, in some dedicated places.
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We however trust that the proposed method is now within reach, thanks to the
software possibilities of SIME and to recent important technological advances.
In what follows we address methodological issues essentially.
Let us observe at once that, whatever the type of control, the closed-loop
emergency control techniques developed hereafter are intended to safeguard
important, dedicated sites as, for example, large hydro-electric power plants.
They are supposed to be worked out at dedicated locations, different from the
control room.
1.3 Principle
As aforementioned, the Emergency SIME uses measurements acquired from
the system power plants in real-time, in order to control the system just after a
contingency occurrence and its clearance.
More precisely, following a disturbance inception and its clearance, Emer-
gency SIME aims at predicting the system transient stability behavior and, if
necessary, at deciding and triggering control actions early enough to prevent
loss of synchronism. Further, it aims at continuing monitoring the system,
in order to assess whether the control action has been sufficient or should be
reinforced. More precisely, the procedure consists of the following tasks.
(i) Predicting the OMIB structure: say, 100 ms ahead.
(ii) Predicting the OMIB
    curve, using a weighted least-squares (WLS)
estimation.
(iii) Predicting instability, by searching whether the above curve reaches
SIME’s instability conditions.
If not, repeat the above steps using new measurement sets. If yes, compute the
corresponding margin, as well as the (predicted) time to instability.
(iv) Determine the size of control and trigger the corresponding action.
(v) Continue monitoring by repeating above steps after the actions have
properly been triggered.
N.B. Prediction’s validity test. The reliability of the prediction takes advan-
tage of the observation that, since the operating and contingency conditions are
fixed, the value of the (negative) margin should be constant, whatever the time
step (see below,

2.2). Hence, the above computations should be repeated at
successive    ’s until getting an (almost) constant margin value.
1.4 General organization
Figure 6.1 describes schematically the general framework for real-time
transient-stability closed-loop emergency control.
Let us briefly comment on the functions contained in the various boxes.

















To Prevent loss of Synchronism
Figure 6.1. General organization of real-time transient stability closed-loop emergency control.
Adapted from [Ernst and Pavella, 2000]
(1) Real-time measurements. These measurements are supposed to be col-
lected at main power plants and centralized in a location (control room)
possibly close to the dedicated site under control. The measured (directly
or indirectly) quantities are machines rotor angles, speeds and accelerations.
(2) Predict TSA: see Section 2.
(3) Design and trigger corrective actions: see Section 3.
1.5 Computational issues
The sine qua non of method’s practical interest is its ability to prevent
loss of synchronism in real-time. Given the rapidity of transient (in)stability
phenomena evolution, the duration of a complete emergency control cycle
should not exceed a few hundreds of milliseconds.
Let us appraise this duration, and more specifically, the time elapsed between
a contingency clearance and the moment the corrective action starts acting. To
this end, we will first consider the various tasks of the emergency control
(EC) scheme displayed in Fig. 6.1, then we will appraise their corresponding
durations, taking into account performances that one can reasonably expect
from modern telecommunication and measurement devices.
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1.5.1 Involved tasks
According to Fig. 6.1, an EC cycle comprises the following tasks:
(i) data acquisition at power plants and their transmission to the control room
(ii) data processing at the control room (blocks (2) and (3) of the figure)
(iii) order transmission from the control room to the power plant(s) to be
controlled
(iv) order actual application.
1.5.2 Corresponding durations
1. For the data acquisition-transmission corresponding to above item (i): 50 ms
2. For above item (iii): 50 ms
3. For above item (iv): 50 ms
4. To appraise the duration of task (ii), note that the data processing for pre-
dicting (in)stability and computing the corresponding margin requires a
minimum of 3 successive measurement sets and up to, say, 10 sets. As-
suming that the rate of data acquisition-transmission is about 1 cycle (to
simplify, say, 20 ms) this corresponds to a total duration of 60 to 200 ms.
5. The time to run the corresponding software is virtually negligible with
respect to the above durations.
Summing up the above approximate figures yields a total duration varying
in between 210 ms and 350 ms after the contingency clearance, i.e., in between
310 and 450 ms after the contingency inception. For the EC scheme to be




1.6 Notation specific to Emergency SIME
In addition to the general acronyms and notation used so far, in this chapter
we will further introduce the following specific ones.
      : beginning of the during-fault period  
: beginning of the post-fault period
   
: sample time , i.e. time between two successive measurement sets acquisition
(here:
        ms )  
: beginning of the predictive TSA  
: current processing time  
  : control time, i.e., time elapsed between a contingency inception and the control
action. (Subscript  
 
is used in order to avoid any confusion with
  
,
the critical clearing time.) 
: sum of durations of steps (i), (iii) and (iv) of  1.5.1         : OMIB angle at   
    
      : OMIB speed at    .
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2. PREDICTIVE SIME
2.1 Description
Unlike preventive TSA, the predictive TSA has not been used so far, because
this task is not achievable by conventional approaches; besides, its interest is
linked to the feasibility of closed-loop emergency control - and, again, this
cannot be handled by conventional approaches.
Predictive TSA deals, in real-time, with an event (or a succession of events)
which has been detected but not necessarily identified, and generally automat-
ically cleared by the protective devices. Thus, in order to be effective, it must
predict the system behaviour early enough so as to leave sufficient time for de-
termining and triggering appropriate control actions, whenever necessary. To
get a stability diagnostic ahead of time, the predictive TSA relies on real-time
measurements.
More precisely, the method predicts the stability of the system entering its
post-fault configuration, using the multimachine data available at successive
sample times    ’s (e.g., 1 sample every 20 ms). Thus, at each sample time,
an OMIB analysis is performed to decide whether the system keeps stable or
is driven to instability. The crux for this analysis is the prediction of the OMIB    curve, and hence the prediction of the unstable angle,   , and the
corresponding stability margin. Its achievement addresses the following two
questions:
1. which are the most disturbed machines ?
2. is the system driven to (in)stability and to what extent ?
2.2 Procedure
To answer the above questions the method relies on the following steps,
illustrated in Figs 6.2.4
(i) At a time
   short after the disturbance clearance, (               )
consider the incoming measurements at times
         ,        ,    , and use
Taylor series to predict the individual machine angles at some time ahead (e.g.
100 ms). Sort the machines in decreasing order of these angles and consider
as candidate critical machines those advanced machines which are above the
largest (angular) distance between two successive machines.
(ii) Construct the corresponding OMIB, determine its parameters           from the corresponding parameters of the individual power plants at times
4Figure 6.2a sketches the principle, while Fig. 6.2b illustrates its application to the real case simulated in
Section 4. Notice that the curves in Fig. 6.2b are drawn after the disturbance clearance. (Actually, they start
being drawn 10 time samples after the first acquisition of measurement set.)
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(b) Application to the
stability case of Section 4
Figure 6.2. Principle of the predictive SIME
         ,        ,    , and approximate the      curve by solving:
                  (6.1)
for       at these times.5 .
(iii) Solve eq. (6.1) to find the OMIB angle          which verifies
conditions (2.15).




           (6.2)
(v) If  is found to be negative or close to zero, declare the system to be
unstable and determine control actions (see Section 3).
(vi) Compute the time to instability,
 
 , i.e. the time for the OMIB to reach
its unstable angle,   , i.e. to go unstable. This may be computed, for example,
by [Ernst and Pavella, 2000]:
 





           
 (6.3)
(vii) Acquire a new set of measurements and continue monitoring the system.
5Subsequently, this estimated value,   , is refined by using newly acquired sets of measurements and
processing a least squares technique which shows to be particularly robust. A further improvement consists
of using a weighted least-squares (WLS) technique, by giving more important weights to the last sets of
measurements. To simplify notation, however, we will simply write
 
, even if all values are actually
estimated.
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2.3 Remark
Two main ideas are behind the above predictive stability assessment: OMIB
structure and prediction’s validity test.
OMIB structure. The OMIB used at the very first instants of the proce-
dure relies on measurement-based prediction rather accurate assessment.
Therefore, it might not necessarily be fully correct. However, it is likely
to contain (part of) the most disturbed machines, whose control will (hope-
fully) stabilize the system.
Validity test. The resulting
    curve might be not accurate enough.
But its accuracy may be assessed by observing that, by definition, for a
fixed clearing time
  
the margin (6.2) should be constant whatever
   ;
hence, the margin values obtained at successive
   ’s should converge to
a (nearly) constant value. This observation provides an interesting, handy
validity test.
Figure 6.2b shows that the
     prediction converges towards the exact     following about 14 time samples after the first prediction; this corrob-
orates what Table 6.1 of Section 4 shows: the value of  stabilizes at about
435 ms.
2.4 Specifics
1.- Computationally, the above strategy is very inexpensive and fast; indeed,
at each time sample, it merely requires:
(a) solving Taylor series for the individual machines to identify the candidate
OMIB;
(b) computing this OMIB parameters and its
  
curve (6.1);
(c) solve (6.1) to get   ;
(d) compute the margin (6.2).
Obviously, all these computations require only fractions of ms.
2.- The time to instability,
 
 , expressed by (6.3) is a good indicator of
contingency severity; moreover, it provides valuable advice about whether to
act immediately, though imperfectly, or to wait for a more accurate assessment.
3.- It may happen that the transient stability phenomena take some time
to get organized, and do not appear clearly enough at the beginning of the
post-fault transients, thus yielding a confused diagnostic. However, in such
cases instability is likely to develop rather slowly; this leaves time to continue
monitoring until the phenomena become clearer. (See Table 6.1 of Section 4.)
4.- Along the same lines, a case which at the first time prediction yields
a stable margin may actually be unstable. The closed-loop control handles
properly such cases.
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5.- The above developments assume that the individual power plant variables
may be obtained by synchronized phasor measurement devices placed at each
power plant together with some local processing power to determine generator
angles, speeds and accelerations.
2.5 Salient features
The prediction phase starts after detecting an anomaly (contingency occur-
rence), generally followed by its clearance via protective relays. Note that
this prediction does not imply identification of the contingency (location,
type, etc.).
The prediction is possible thanks to the use of the OMIB transformation;
predicting the behavior (accelerating power) of all of the system machines
would have led to totally unreliable results.
There may be a tradeoff between the above mentioned validation test and
the time to instability: the shorter this time, the faster the corrective action
should be taken. On the other hand, the severer the contingency, the earlier
the instability phenomena appear.
3. EMERGENCY CONTROL
3.1 General principle
As already stated, stabilizing an unstable case consists of canceling out the
negative margin, i.e. of increasing the decelerating area and/or decreasing the
accelerating area in the OMIB
    plane (see Fig. 6.2a).
Broadly, this may be achieved:
either by reducing the mechanical power of the OMIB6 and hence of the
CMs. E.g., by using:
– fast-valving, or
– generator tripping;
or by increasing the electrical power. E.g., by using:
– dynamic braking
– HVDC links
– thyristor controlled series, and other FACTS devices.
Further, notice that a negative margin means that the integral term in eq. (6.2)
is not large enough: in order to stabilize the system one should increase this
area by increasing the decelerating power.
6unless backswing phenomena are of concern, in which case the CMs’ power should be increased.
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Finally, recall that, in addition to the time needed to predict the unstable
margin, there is always a time delay,
   , before the corrective action is triggered;
it corresponds to the three terms (i), (iii) and (iv) of

1.5.1. Observe that the
longer the time delay, the larger the size of the corrective action needed. These
issues are addressed below.
3.2 Generation shedding
3.2.1 Computing stability margins
The aim of this paragraph is to assess the influence of generation shedding
on the system stability margin. We will start by considering the shedding of
one critical machine, denoted    . It is supposed to be shed  seconds after
the current time
   .7 Note that the resulting procedure can easily be extended
to any number of machines, shed at different times.
We assume that at time
   ,   sets of measurements corresponding to
the post-fault period have already been acquired, where   is at least equal
to 3. These sets correspond to times
                            . The
critical OMIB identification described in previous sections relies on the values
of parameters             computed from the   sets of measurements
according to the procedure described in

2.2.
Shedding machine    ,  seconds after the last set of measurement
acquisition, results in modifying OMIB’s structure, since the number of CMs
decreases by one.
Hence, the first task is to predict the angle and the speed of this OMIB just
after the actual shedding of machine    . Let OMIB  	 	 denote this new OMIB.
To this end we first compute OMIB  	 	 from the   sets of measurements, using
eqs (2.3) to (2.12) of Chapter 2 where
 
is replaced by
      to indicate that
machine    does not anymore belong to the group of CMs. Superscript  	 	
distinguishes the parameters of this new OMIB  	 	 , from the original parameters.
Accordingly, we use the   sets of parameters to approximate the
   	 	    	 	
curve by solving    	 	     	 	       	 	      	 	 
The angle that OMIB  	 	 reaches at the control time, i.e.,  seconds after






   	 	 
         





to emphasize that whatever the time horizon of the shedding, we can estimate
the influence of this control action on the system stability.
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Note that solving this equation for   	 	  can be done only numerically.
Once   	 	  is computed, the value of the OMIB  	 	 speed at the control time
can be determined by solving the following equation for   	 	  :





   	 	    	 	       	 	   	 	   (6.5)
Note that the only approximation used to compute   	 	  and   	 	  is the
extrapolation of the
   	 	 curve.
To compute the stability margin of the corrected system we still need the
shape of the accelerating power of OMIB  	 	 . Note that the    	 	    	 	 curve
previously computed is not appropriate for this purpose. Indeed, equality
   	 	     	 	     	 	 is valid under the assumption that machine    is still in
activity. But, obviously, while the shedding of machine    does not influence
   	 	 (at least at the very first moments after this shedding) , it does influence
   	 	 .
To simplify, we will approximate this influence by considering that the
electrical power produced by the critical machines is a function of the angle of
the OMIB of concern, independent of the number of machines still in activity.
The same assumption will be used for the non-critical machines. 8 So we will
suppose that the electrical output produced by the machines of group
     
just after
    equals the electrical output produced by the machines of group 
just before
    . We may express this in a different way, by writing:
         just before     equals        just after     .
Now, to compute the shape of the accelerating power of OMIB  	 	 after
the corrective time9, formulas (2.3) to (2.12) suggest to compute   sets of
parameters    




	    	 	 and    
	     	 	     	 	       	 	 











	     
	       
	      
	 
8Note that more sophisticated and reliable models can also be implemented; but they require additional
computations.
9The parameter of the modified OMIB after the time to control will be identified by superscript
   
.
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thus computed, we solve the





The stability margin of the controlled system is readily given by :
  
    
	
    
   
	    
	      	 	   	 	    (6.6)
In Fig. 6.3a, the
 
curve corresponds to the original OMIB accelerating
power. In Fig. 6.3b the dotted curve corresponds to the
 
curves of OMIB  	 	 ,
while the solid curve corresponds to the same OMIB  	 	 but after the corrective
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(a) Uncontrolled OMIB
    curve (b) Controlled OMIB     curve
Figure 6.3. EPRI 88-machine test system
3.2.2 Identification of the machine(s) to shed
The next step consists of determining which machine(s) to shed when the
system is found to be unstable. The proposed method is simple: from the
predicted swing curves of the individual machines, take the most advanced
one, and compute the margin of the corrected system using the procedure
described in the previous paragraph where  equals    ; if the margin is still
negative, shed another machine; continue until the margin becomes positive.
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Once the shedding order is sent, continue monitoring the system. To compute
the margin of the controlled system using the next set of measurements, proceed
like in to the previous paragraph, after replacing  by        .
3.2.3 Straightforward improvements
A good number of improvements can be made to what has been described
in the two previous paragraphs.
For example, other functions than second order functions can be used to
approximate the
  
curves. A function of higher order or of a different type
(e.g.    
            ) could offer better results.
The method described to choose when and which machines to shed is also
perfectible. Indeed, margins close to zero could lead to erroneous corrective
actions because of the approximations done.
But all these considerations are beyond the scope of this chapter which
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(a) Swing curves (b) OMIB
    curve
Figure 6.4. Uncontrolled EPRI 88-machine test system
The simulations are performed on the EPRI test system C, having 88 ma-
chines (of which 14 are modeled in detail, see Section 3 of Appendix B). The
considered base case has a total generation of 350,749 MW.
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The considered contingency is a 3-
 
short-circuit applied at bus
 
15 (500 kV);
it is cleared 100 ms after its inception, (
    ) by opening the line 1-15.
The ETMSP program is used here to create artificially real-time measure-
ments, since such measurements are not available. The swing curves of the un-
controlled system corresponding to this contingency are displayed in Fig. 6.4a.
The corresponding
    curve is portrayed in Fig. 6.4b.
4.2 Simulation results of Predictive SIME
Table 6.1. Closed-loop emergency control
1 2 3 4 5
    	   	       after
(ms) (rad.) (ms) (rad/sec)
 
shedding
375 1.094 788 -0.60
395 0.922 676 -0.81
Corrective decision is taken (3 units shed)
415 0.850 631 -0.88 0.271
435 0.822 614 -0.91 0.115
455 0.813 610 -0.91 0.092
475 0.820 617 -0.91 0.113
495 0.826 622 -0.90 0.151
515 0.836 631 -0.90 0.234
535 0.850 642 -0.89 0.347
555 0.858 649 -0.89 0.376
Corrective action is applied
575 0.861 652 -0.89 0.352
595 0.860 652 -0.89 0.361
615 0.859 651 -0.89 0.373
635 0.861 652 -0.89 0.384
The simulations of the predictive TSA are displayed in Fig. 6.2b. On the
other hand, Table 6.1 summarizes the results of both predictive TSA and closed-
loop emergency control.
Simulation conditions : 
    (contingency inception);
     ms ;
first set of data: acquired at
      ms; (arbitrarily taken larger than 100 ms);
rate of data acquisition:        ms .
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Simulation results of the predictive TSA. The predictive TSA computations
start at
                   ms (remember, three measurement sets are
necessary for running the predictive TSA (

2.3)).
At the beginning (155 ms up to 375 ms), the simulations do not provide a
clear prediction (identification of CMs and corresponding margin): it seems as
though the system is not going to lose synchronism (see also Fig. 6.2b). But at    	 ms (i.e.,           ) the first unstable margin appears; it corresponds
to 33 CMs.10
Table 6.1 summarizes the sequence of events from 375 ms onwards. Observe
that the time to instability predicted at
       ms is quite short; it equals
around 670 ms, i.e., less than 300 ms later. This is why a corrective action is
decided before waiting for the margin to converge to a constant value, which is
(nearly) reached at
     ms .
Figure 6.2b illustrates the above descriptions; it also suggests that:
there is no negative margin before
    	 ms (            )
the prediction starts being reliable around 435 ms (            ) ; indeed,
the
     curve drawn at 435 ms is found to coincide with the “exact”
curve, obtained by the preventive SIME.
It is interesting to compare results of the preventive and predictive SIME:
the time to instability,
 
 , is found to be 635 ms by the preventive SIME,
whereas the predictive SIME yields values varying between 788 ms (at
    	 ms ) and 614 ms (at      ms );
the normalized margin is found to be -1.044 (rad/s)

by the preven-
tive SIME, whereas the predictive TSA underestimates it slightly (around    ).
4.3 Simulation results of Emergency Control
Because of the proximity to instability, it is decided to take control action
quite early (at
       ms ). The type of action is shedding CMs; the size of
this action, assessed according to

3.2, is found to be 3 units among the 7 more
advanced ones, corresponding to 2,463 MW.11
Table 6.1 summarizes the sequence of the events.
Let us first focus on columns 2 to 4 which refer to the monitoring of the
system, relying on the incoming measurements at the rate of 20 ms: rows
  
    to 555 ms correspond to the measurements of the uncontrolled
10Note that for
       
ms (i.e.,
  	     ) the margin is positive and thus the unstable angle represented
in figure Fig. 6.2b is never reached
11The machines shed are 1875 (835 MW), 1771 (793 MW) and 1877 (835 MW).
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system; they suggest that the predicted loss of synchronism reaches good
accuracy (the margin value stabilizes around
     (rad/s)  ) and that it is
imminent: the
 
 value stabilizes around 640 ms. At
    	 ms , i.e.
160 ms after the control decision has been taken, the control (generators’
shedding) is actually triggered.
Consider now column 5 of the table which refers to the controlled system,
i.e. to the system evolution after the shedding of 3 units. They are all
predicted results: rows corresponding to
       up to 555 ms predict
the system evolution as will be after the control triggering, whereas rows
corresponding to
    	 up to 635 ms assess the system evolution after
the control triggering.
Observe that the negative margin of column 4 stabilizes to a more constant
value than the positive margin of column 5; this is due to the fact that the
negative margin relies on the closed-form analytical expression (6.2), whereas
the positive margin results from an approximate expression.
Figure 6.3 describes the sequence of the closed-loop control events: the
control decision is taken at
       ms (corresponding to an angle of about
0.57 rad), relying on stability conditions corrresponding to 33 CMs. The control
starts acting at
     ms . It is found to be sufficient to stabilize the system:
the
    curve experiences a return angle of about 0.93 rad, corresponding
to
     	 ms .
5. DISCUSSION
5.1 Summary of method’s features
The Emergency SIME uses generator data of the main power plants of a
utility, supposed to be derived from synchronized phasor measurement devices
placed at each plant, then sent to a central location. The method predicts the
transient stability behaviour of the power system, and determines whether and
which control actions should be taken in order to stabilize it. These actions are
then sent back to the control devices. The total time required for the whole cycle
“prediction-assessment-design and triggering of the action” is expected not to
exceed 500-600 ms; and the severer the instability, the shorter the duration of
this cycle.
An essential asset of this real-time approach is its adaptability to any kind
of operating and fault conditions. Moreover, being free from any off-line (or
preventive mode) tuning, it is intrinsically robust with respect to modeling
errors, and able to cope with unforeseen events.
Another method’s asset is its high computational efficiency. This makes it
able to work in a closed-loop fashion, using a fast enough ground communi-
cation system. Such a closed-loop operation makes it even more robust, in
particular with respect to its own prediction errors. The method is therefore
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expected to be applied to a large variety of control means, in addition to the
particular generation shedding considered in this chapter.
Finally, let us mention that the generation shedding scheme has shown to
effectively apply to the two real-world power systems simulated so far, in
addition to that considered in this chapter, namely: the Hydro-Québec system
(in the Churchill Falls corridor) [Zhang et al., 1997b] and the Brazilian power
system (Itaipu’s site) [Ernst et al., 1998b].
5.2 Topics for further research work
Admittedly, the approach needs further developments and refinements. For
example, the prediction scheme should be further validated on various types of
power systems and, if necessary, modified accordingly.
The developments of this chapter have assumed that the contingency oc-
curence and its clearance were properly identified. A systematic method should
be set up to this end.
Another question is the real-time modeling of external equivalents. In the
general case, we believe that current practices may readily suggest adequate
solutions.
An important concern is how to appraise various types of control actions.
The generation shedding considered in this paper was just a first attempt, and
probably one of the less problematic to tackle.
Yet, another question worth developing concerns “local” control, where
real-time emergency control would rely on local measurements relative to par-
ticular power plants, as opposed to the “global”, centralized approach proposed
here. This local approach would be less general and accurate than the global
one, but at the same time less demanding in terms of information needed and
corrresponding communication requirements.
The above list of open questions is certainly not exhaustive. But the main
objective of this chapter has been to show that the general methodology is able
to cope with the difficult problem of transient stability closed-loop emergency
control and to pave the way towards pragmatic solutions.
6. SUMMARY
This chapter has described the fundamentals of a closed-loop emergency
control scheme. It was developed in the particular case of generation shedding,
and illustrated on a realistic situation.
The essential ingredients of such a scheme are: predictive TSA, predictive
control, and real-time measurements: the first two tasks rely on SIME, the third
on modern hardware and telecommunications facilities.
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Unlike Preventive SIME which reached maturity and is now ready for use,
Emergency SIME is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, it has promising skills,
complementary to those of preventive control and also of open-loop emergency
control.




This monograph has been devoted to a hybrid temporal-direct methodology,
tailor-made for power systems transient stability assessment and control.
The objective of this final chapter is to give a general, quick overview by:
glancing over the monograph to summarize salient features of this general
methodology as well as of its preventive and emergency versions
giving an example to illustrate method’s capabilities of extensions
pointing out main differences and complementarities of this particular
deterministic approach with the general statistical approach of automatic
learning, as well as their ability to jointly cover a considerably broad field
of applications.
1. SIME: HINDSIGHT AND FORESIGHT
1.1 SIME: a unified comprehensive approach
SIME is a deterministic, tailor-made approach to power system transient
stability.
It uses temporal information about the multimachine system continuously
updated during the transients and transformed into that of an OMIB equivalent.
The information is processed until meeting method’s own instability/stability
criteria.
The OMIB transformation reduces dramatically the dimensionality of the
transient stability problem and provides three different representations of the
phenomena, namely:
OMIB swing curves: to identify the type of (in)stability modes and appraise
impact of various system parameters
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OMIB
    curves: to appraise margins and identify CMs
OMIB phase plane: to get a synthetic view of transient stability phenom-
ena.
These representations, together with the multimachine swing curves contain
the necessary and sufficient information for deriving TSA&C techniques able
to encounter needs of both preventive and emergency operation modes.
1.2 Preventive SIME
The preventive SIME gets information from contingency simulations per-
formed step-by-step by a T-D transient stability program in order to set up a





The tight coupling of the T-D program with the OMIB allows SIME to
preserve the assets of these programs, namely
accuracy
flexibility with respect to power system modeling, contingency scenarios,
modes of (in)stability
compliance with existing operational strategies
and at the same time to speed up the assessment of T-D methods, while broad-
ening enormously their possibilities. In particular, by
complying with real-time requirements
uncovering CMs and designing preventive control actions by quantifying
judiciously generation shifting patterns
providing transient stability-constrained ATC calculations and congestion
management
in short, by opening avenues to issues which have long been considered to
be problematic, if at all feasible (e.g., see [Ilic et al., 1998]).
Further, interfacing SIME with an OPF program allows meeting in a near
optimal way both static and transient stability constraints; it thus makes an
old dream come true [Ribbens-Pavella et al., 1982a, Ribbens-Pavella et al.,
1982b, Sterling et al., 1991]. Besides, this interface with OPF contributes to
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cope with emerging market needs by helping the operator to make pertinent
and transparent decisions.1
Finally, observe that the Preventive SIME is not a stand alone software;
rather, it is coupled with the T-D program of concern.2
This coupling is a rather easy task.3 We therefore believe that it is an
important advantage of the method. Indeed, it offers the possibility of choosing
the appropriate T-D programs, and hence the possibility for SIME to easily
adjust itself to the modeling and specifics of the particular power system of
concern. Over the years, SIME has thus been tested on a large variety of power
systems, differing in their structure (radial vs meshed; e.g. the Hydro-Québec
system vs the EDF power system [Zhang et al., 1997a]), by their size (e.g., the
3-machine system used for illustrations in this monograph vs the EPRI 627-
machine test system) by the type of prevailing generation (hydro vs nuclear;
others).
Throughout thousands of simulations performed on over 10 real-world power
systems, SIME has behaved consistently well. The right choice of the T-D
programs has contributed to its easy adaptation to the various power system.
An additional advantage of this coupling is that it makes SIME’s interfacing
with existing EMSs quite straightforward.
Note on instability phenomena and their characterization
Instability phenomena are certainly independent of the method used to analyze
them.4 However, SIME provides many interesting ways of characterizing and
assessing them. For example, easy ways of appraising CCTs and PLs; or, for
a given unstable contingency scenario, stability margins, number of involved
CMs, time to instability, number of swings and their (negative) damping.
For illustration, let us consider again the stability case of the Hydro-Québec
system described in

4.2 of Chapter 2 and displayed on Figs 2.9. On this ex-
1Observe that other, more recent attempts to embed transient stability constraints in OPF algorithms, have
also been proposed. For example in [De Tuglie et al., 1999] the idea is to combine transient stability and
the conventional OPF problem into a single non-linear programming problem.
This type of approaches, however, lack transparency. Besides, they face the curse of dimensionality and
cannot be directly solved by existing non-linear techniques within reasonable times. As an example, the
model for a one-machine infinite bus test system represented by the conventional simplified model has 2002
variables and 3005 algebraic constraints for only 10 s simulation having a 10 ms step size length. A similar
approach was also proposed by [Gan et al., 1998].
2For instance, the examples described throughout the monograph have used couplings with MATLAB
(Section 1 of Appendix B), ST-600 (Sections 2 and 4 of Appendix B), ETMSP (Section 3 of Appendix B).
Coupling with home-made T-D programs as well as with EUROSTAG and SIMPOW have also been
mentioned in various publications (e.g., see [Zhang et al., 1997a, Ghandhari et al., 2000]).
3To fix ideas, a close collaboration of SIME’s and T-D program’s designers helps completing the job within
less than one month. Subsequently, this job becomes rather trivial and takes about one week.
4Recall that one may distinguish many types of instabilities, such as first-swing vs multiswing, upswing vs
backswings, plant vs inter-area modes ones and their combinations.
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ample, one can observe the well-known fact that, in the presence of multiswing
instability phenomena
the first-swing CCT is larger than the multiswing one (here: 220 vs 175 ms)
the time to instability is much smaller for first-swing than for multiswing
(here: 0.418 vs 5.6 s).
To state this latter consideration otherwise, if the contingency is cleared at
220 ms      
	 ms the system will lose synchronism after some seconds
(about 5 s), after a number of oscillations, while if
        ms it will lose
synchronism after some hundred ms (418 or less).
Notice also how clearly the number of swings and their damping are identi-
fied by SIME.
To illustrate inter-area instability modes, consider the case described in

4.3.4 of Chapter 4, displayed on Figs 4.10, where 38 CMs swing against
the remaining 50 machines. The example suggests that the CCT and time
to instability of such phenomena may be quite small and close to each other.
Along the same lines, for the stability case displayed on Figs 5.11, CCT =
156 ms ; if the contingency is cleared at




  ms , i.e., less than 400 ms later.
1.3 Emergency SIME
The emergency SIME uses real-time measurements which warn about (i.e.,
detect) a contingency’s actual inception (without necessarily identifying it).
Processing these data allows SIME to set up a closed-loop emergency control
which
(i) predicts the system instability ahead of time and assesses its characteris-
tics (size, i.e. margin of the instability, CMs, time to instability)
(ii) devises an appropriate control action and sends the order of its triggering
(iii) continues monitoring the controlled system.
The three main ingredients of this closed-loop emergency control (CLEC)
scheme are
1. predictive stability assessment
2. control
3. hardware for transferring information from power plants to control room
and from this room to the controlled device (e.g., controlled plant(s)).
The speed (and hence duration) of a complete CLEC cycle is directly related
to the possibilities of the telecommunications systems (hardware). Typically,
the total duration is lowerbounded by about 350 ms but could be larger (450
or 500 ms). Recall, however, that the severer the instability and the shorter














A : original pre-fault stable equilibrium point
B : fault clearance of the uncontrolled trajectory
C : controlled pre-fault stable equilibrium point (preventive control)
D : fault clearance of the (preventively controlled) trajectory
E : application of the emergency control (shedding of 3 machines)
Figure 7.1. Difference between preventive and emergency control. Illustration on the
OMIB phase plane computed for the 88-machine EPRI test system.
the duration required. Nevertheless, the CLEC scheme could be helpless for
some extremely fragilized situations. In such cases, one should call upon either
open-loop emergency control (OLEC) discussed in

1.5, or on a combination
of preventive and corrective controls, discussed below.
1.4 Preventive vs emergency control
Let us compare preventive control with emergency (or corrective) control,
no matter whether it is of the open-loop or the closed-loop type.
1.4.1 Description of physical phenomena
While both approaches pursue the same objective, they use sort of comple-
mentary ways to reach it. Indeed, their common objective is to avoid loss of
synchronism; in other words, to maintain the dynamic trajectory caused by
a contingency inception within the domain of attraction of the system in its
post-fault configuration. But to this end, preventive control acts also on the
pre-fault operating conditions, while emergency control acts on the trajectory,
in order to bend it.
Figure 7.1 describes the two procedures. It was obtained by simulations
performed on the example of Chapter 6, using the OMIB phase plane, with the
following notation:
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solid line: uncontrolled, unstable trajectory
dotted line: controlled trajectory in the preventive mode, by means of a
pre-contingency generation shifting of 589 MW
dashed line: controlled trajectory in the emergency mode, by means of a
post-contingency generation shedding of 2,240 MW, at
       ms after
the fault inception.
Observe how clearly this phase plane representation describes the physical
phenomena. These descriptions are complemented by the corresponding OMIB
swing curves of Figs 7.2, which shed more light into the shapes of these phase
portraits.
1.4.2 Controlled generation vs control time
Another interesting information is provided by the curve of Fig. 7.3. It was
obtained via simulations carried out on the EPRI test system C. It displays the
quantity of controlled generation     necessary to preserve system’s integrity
vs the “control time”,
    , (duration elapsed between the contingency inception
and the actual application of the control action). Incidentally, observe that the
first part of this curve is (almost) piece-wise linear. The preventive action is
supposed to correspond to
      . Besides, recall that this preventive action
implies generation shifting, mainly from CMs to NMs. On the other hand,
corrective action (be it closed-loop or open-loop) implies generation shedding.
1.4.3 Discussion
In terms of MW (amount of generation power), it is obvious that preventive
control is much less demanding than emergency control. Indeed, it requires
shifting rather than shedding generation; besides, the amount of shifted gener-
ation is smaller than the amount of generation shed. (In the previous example,
589 vs 2,240 MW.)
However, in terms of cost the comparison is less easy. Indeed, preventive
control is based on hypothetical (though plausible) assumptions about antic-
ipated operating conditions and contingency scenarios; but such conditions
might never occur: the corresponding countermeasures become useless and
the related cost unacceptably high. In contrast, emergency control actions are
fully justified; the question is whether they could be triggered early enough to
safeguard system’s integrity.
The above discussion suggests that there could be a tradeoff between the size
of countermeasures taken preventively and those taken correctively. For exam-
ple, shifting preventively part of the required generation power (i.e., stabilizing
only partly a contingency) might provide a better security vs cost solution: at
a reasonable “cost”, it would render the contingency less severe, resulting in a
quite important saving of generation shedding in the emergency mode, when-











(a) Uncontrolled OMIB swing curve. Pre-fault:
      












(b) Controlled OMIB swing curve in the preventive mode
Pre-fault:
      
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(c) Controlled OMIB swing curve in the corrective (emergency) mode
Pre-fault:
     	
 $  MW ; Post-fault:       $   MW
Figure 7.2. OMIB swing curves corresponding to the OMIB phase plane trajectories of Fig. 7.1
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Figure 7.3. Quantity of controlled generation,
    
, vs control time,
  
  . Adapted from
[Ernst et al., 2000a]
ever this latter is needed, inasmuch as the resulting time to instability would
increase quite a lot.
Incidentally, observe that the tools provided by SIME make the study of this
kind of tradeoffs easy, systematic, and able to furnish near optimal solutions.
This is further illustrated below.
1.5 General comparisons
1.5.1 Description
The real-time closed-loop emergency control (CLEC) proposed in Chapter 6,
aims at replacing or complementing existing open-loop emergency control
(OLEC) schemes. On the other hand, OLEC can be viewed as being half-way
between CLEC and preventive control.
Let us first summarize the basics of these three types of control before
comparing them further.
Preventive control aims at reinforcing the robustness of the (forecasted)
system vis-à-vis (anticipated) plausible contingencies. The procedure relies
on contingency simulations, performed off-line, in a horizon of, say, 30 min
ahead.
Open-loop emergency control relies on off-line plausible (anticipated) con-
tingency simulations to assess appropriate control actions, and on real-time
measurements to detect anomalies and decide to trigger these actions.
Closed-loop emergency control relies on real-time measurements to predict
in real-time (the size of) system’s instability, and corresponding control actions,
and to decide to trigger these actions.
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Roughly, CLEC is composed of the steps (i) to (iii) mentioned in

1.3, while
OLEC uses part of step (ii).
Given today’s hardware possibilities, OLEC is thus able to “save” 200-
300 ms.
1.5.2 Preventive vs emergency control
In terms of amount of generation power, it is obvious that under identical sta-
bility conditions (contingency scenario and operating state), preventive control
will be significantly less demanding than OLEC which will be less demanding
than CLEC. Indeed, the earlier the control action is triggered, the earlier the
predicted instability is contained and the smaller the size of this control. The
curve of Fig. 7.3 illustrates this consideration on a concrete practical case.
However, the above assumption concerning application of various controls
under identical stability conditions is quite unrealistic.
Indeed, as concerning preventive control, it is very unlikely that the fore-
casted stability conditions will actually occur, especially because of the com-
binatorial nature of the events. Hence, preventive control generally faces
the tradeoff between security and economy in a sub-optimal way. Besides,
today where new legislations open electricity markets, the trend is to avoid
anti-economic stability countermeasures to be taken preventively; rather, they
tend to operate the power systems increasingly closer to their stability limits:
emergency control becomes the last resort for safeguarding system’s integrity.
A midway solution suggested in

1.4.3 would consist in applying preven-
tively part of the countermeasure required, so as to mitigate the severity of the
situation that the emergency task would have to control.
Open-loop vs closed-loop emergency control aspects are discussed below.
1.5.3 Open-loop vs closed-loop EC
Comparing OLEC with CLEC, we point out the following main differences.
Open-loop emergency control:
is generally faster, and therefore cheaper; it can even be the only control
action able to prevent loss of synchronism in some fragilized situations
generally requires local measurements; it is therefore less expensive and
less demanding in terms of communications hardware
is spoilt by uncertainties: power system modeling uncertainties introduced
during the off-line simulations (like preventive control); additional uncer-
tainties concern the stability conditions for which the control actions are
designed off-line
is thus contingency dependent, i.e. pre-designed to cope with only contin-
gencies very likely to arise
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once triggered, it has no means to re-adjust control actions, (open-loop
technique).
Closed-loop emergency control:
is slower and therefore more expensive
requires more measurements than OLEC and is more demanding in terms
of communications hardware
is free from the above-considered uncertainties, and hence can assess (near)
optimal control (and hence cheaper from this viewpoint) provided that the
measurements are good enough (otherwise they replace one by another
source of uncertainties)
is thus able to cope with the actual contingency without necessarily knowing
it, since the measurements take it into account
being by essence a closed-loop technique, it continues monitoring and
possibly controlling further the system, as long as needed.
All in all, OLEC and CLEC have complementary possibilities and can be
used in combination, if deemed necessary.
2. AN ILLUSTRATION
This section illustrates on an example SIME’s possibilities for further ex-
plorations of transient stability issues.
2.1 Description
In this paragraph, SIME is used to appraize the impact of the length of
important transmission lines on transient stability. The study will be conducted
using unusual events; but the obtained results are physically fully sound.
Contingencies considered so far were supposed to have a finite during-fault
period (
  
) followed by a post-fault one. Generally, the post-fault configuration
differs from the pre-fault one by the loss of transmission elements. We will
suppose here that the duration of the fault is so small that it can be neglected        : the system stability is then determined by the transition from the
initial to the final configuration.
Three situations may be distinguished, depending upon the system operating
state in its final configuration.
1. No operating state exists anymore: this corresponds to the absence of
solutions of the dynamic eq. (2.2), i.e., of equilibrium points in the system
post-fault configuration.
2. A new operating state exists but the initial operating state does not belong
to its domain of attraction.
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3. A new equilibrium state exists and the initial operating state belongs to its
domain of attraction.
2.2 Application
Below we focus on cases 2 and 3, that we illustrate on an example carried out
on the EPRI test system C (see Section 3 of Appendix B). The final configuration
differs from the initial one by the loss of two  kV identical parallel lines.
They are located at a meshed part of the system and have an approximate length
























(a) Multimachine swing curves (b)OMIB P-

plane
Figure 7.4. Two lines tripped on the EPRI test system C
Figure 7.4a represents the swing curves of the multimachine system, corre-
sponding to the case where both lines are opened at
    :     later the
system loses synchronism.
This is corroborated by the OMIB transformation. The critical group is
composed of   machines. Figure 7.4b displays the corresponding OMIB    curves. At     , its angle equals      rad . At         s
(      		 rad) , the OMIB accelerating power vanishes. The decelerating
area that follows is not sufficient to bring the system back to synchronism and
the unstable angle (       	  rad) is reached at        s .
Thus, although a post-fault equilibrium point exists, the system is unstable.5
2.3 Simulations results
Let us now assess the way the lines’ length affects stability. To this end, let




, and express their parameters in
5Note that if only one line is tripped, the T-D simulation as well as SIME show that the system is stable.
Note also that a steady-state simulator, which would consider the temporal evolution of the system as a
succession of steady state equilibrium points, would not have discovered any instability.




Figure 7.5.   modeling of the transmission elements
the three terms
       and    of their  equivalent as (see Fig. 7.5):
                                        and                    
where superscript      denotes the participation of the two lines to the admit-
tance matrix and  
   	 the participation of the other elements.
In the post-fault configuration these three terms can be respectively written
as:
   
                                                      
where
   means that the post-fault configuration is identical to the prefault one
(two lines in service);
     or 0 means that in the post-fault configuration there are, respectively,
one or zero lines in service.
More generally,  represents the fraction of the two lines in service.
Let us compute stability margins for values of         . Table 7.1 gathers
the obtained results. The first column indicates the value of  , the second the
unstable angle   (the return angle  if the system is stable), the third the
stability margin and the last one the time to instability,
 
 , (or the return time   if the system is stable). Observe that the stability margin increases with  ;
it becomes positive for  greater than     : the system becomes stable.
Table 7.1. OMIB parameters for different values of 

 	    




    )
  	   
(  )
0.000 0.976 -61.170 1.655
0.007 0.835 -30.435 1.660
0.015 0.718 -14.156 1.685
0.023 0.642 -7.988 1.710
0.031 0.574 -4.297 1.770
0.039 (0.550)
     (2.255)
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Figure 7.6 illustrates in the
    plane the OMIB    and   curves for
the different values of  used in Table 7.1 (between brackets). Note that for
   , the    curve is reduced to a single point: the point where the other   



















for different values of 
The above SIME-based computations appraise the sensitivity of the system
stability to the length of these heavily loaded transmission lines. The con-
clusions are sound from a physical point of view and interesting for practical
applications.
3. COMPARING CLASSES OF METHODS
In Chapter 1 we have distinguished three classes of approaches to transient
stability: the conventional T-D methods, the direct (pure or hybridized) meth-
ods and the automatic learning (AL) ones. The first two are deterministic
approaches, the third is a statistical one.
This monograph has been devoted to SIME, a particular hybrid temporal-
direct method, dedicated to transient stability. On the other hand, T-D, and
to a larger extent AL methods can cover a much broader field of applications.
However, in this section the comparisons will concentrate on transient stability.
They are summarized in Table 7.2.
Note that while SIME – and as a corollary T-D methods – have received
extensive consideration, AL methods have been described only very shortly in
Section 6 of Chapter 1. Below we give a brief complement to this “digest”
before proceeding with general comparisons.
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Table 7.2. Transient stability assessement: techniques vs criteria.
Adapted from [CIGRE, 1997]
Criteria: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Information Off- Real- Information
required line time provided
Model. Off- Real- prep. comput. Anal. Screen. Inter- Sensit. Con- Managt
Method poss. line time tasks reqts pret. trol uncert.
T-D + + + FD CS mV B D    
AL
- Off-line
prepar. + + + FD DB,V D,S + + +
- Real-time
use + + + SV EL D,S + + P,C +
SIME
- Preventive + + + FD CS mV FB D,S + + + + P 
- Emergency + + +  SV mV EL S  + C +
3.1 Practical aspects of AL approaches
3.1.1 Real-world applicability concerns
The short description in Section 6 of Chapter 1 suggests that AL methods
can meet stringent needs of power-system security. The practical application
reported [Cholley et al, 1998] is just an example of the wide range of the
possibilities they offer.
A prerequisite to the implementation and use of AL methods is the systematic
data base generation. In addition, in order for AL methods to be accepted by the
power system community, new strategies should be devised, generally different
from those developed in the context of deterministic approaches. Thus, AL
methods are likely to be used at first in areas where they are able to supplement
deterministic approaches. Such an important contribution could be made by
an approach able to handle simultaneously many security aspects [Wehenkel et
al., 1997].
Maintaining expertise in off-line study environments is still another way of
taking due advantage of statistical approaches.
3.1.2 SIME as compared with AL approaches
While SIME is a technique dedicated to TSA&C, the scope of AL methods
is significantly broader, with extraordinarily rich and diversified practical out-
comes. In particular, AL methods can cover the entire field of security. Along
these lines, one major contribution of AL methods could precisely be a unified
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approach to power system security [Wehenkel, 1999]. This, of course, implies
a heavy panoply of data mining techniques and a close collaboration between
designers of such techniques with power engineers.
In the field of TSA&C, SIME and AL approaches have complementary
features. Incidentally, SIME may preanalyze stability scenarios (for example
in terms of stability limits, stability margins, critical machines, sensitivity
analysis techniques) for use in the data base, from which synthetic information
is extracted in terms of decision trees, ANNs and the like.
3.2 Synthetic comparison
In this paragraph a synthetic comparison is given of the three classes of
transient stability methods: T-D vs SIME vs probabilistic automatic learning
approaches. Table 7.2 displays the comparisons. They are carried out in terms
of the various criteria described below.
Obviously, such a synthetic comparison is inevitably superficial; it only
intends to point out general trends.
3.3 The criteria
Column 1. Modeling possibilities: ability of the method to embed more or
less detailed models
+++ : Fully detailed power system modeling.
Column 2. Type of information required (with respect to the most detailed
possible modeling):
Off-line:
FD : Fully Detailed information, including controllers
PD : Partly Detailed information, concerning essential parameters relevant
to the considered security problem
LF : Load Flow type of information
Real-time:
CS : Complete System picture, e.g. as provided by state estimation
SV : Selected Variable (a very few number of electrical and topological
variables), directly measured or easily computed, e.g. as provided by
SCADA.
Column 3. Off-line preparation tasks, mainly for the purpose of:
Validating and building a data base
Validation, including evaluation of the applicability domain, tuning of pa-
rameters, etc., is usually carried out every time a method is applied to a
new power system or when significant changes appear in the system. One
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distinguishes tasks requiring:
V : Validation and,
mV : minor Validation,
DB : Data Bases, on the other had, are built for the purpose of intelligent
systems, using human expertise and/or other methods, of the system theory
type; a data base has to be refreshed every time the system configuration
and operating conditions change “significantly”. Generally, this is required
much more often than validation, and hence implies more massive compu-
tations.
Column 4. real-time computational requirements
B : Bulky computations, e.g. required for time-domain simulations with full
model,
FB : Fairly Bulky computations, e.g. reguired for time-domain simulations
with simplified model,
L : Light computations, e.g. required for fast direct methods,
EL : Extremely Light computations, e.g. required when using a decision tree
to assess the stability of a state.
To fix ideas, B may correspond to hours of CPU time, FB to minutes, L to
seconds and EL to fraction of millisecond CPU time.
Column 5. Type of information provided for analysis:
D : Detailed (e.g. bus voltages, swing curves, etc.); the type of provided
detailed information may change from one method to the other.
S : synthetic (e.g. margins).
Column 6. Contingency screening tool.
A fast method may be not accurate enough (e.g. when complying with
simplified system modeling only), yet reliable enough to identify and filter out
“uninteresting contingencies”, i.e. generally contingencies which are too mild
to be dangerous. In general, the more simplified the system model, the simpler
and faster the method.
++ : Ultra-fast screening tool.
+ : Very fast screening tool.
Column 7. Interpretability of phenomena: method’s ability to uncover and
describe the main mechanism driving the phenomena of concern:
 
: very transparent information ,
: “black-box” type of information (e.g., yes or no answer about stability;
except for time-domain response).
Column 8. Sensitivity analysis: in terms of computational overhead.
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 
: easy (e.g. via extrapolation-interpolation of margins vs parameters),
: difficult (cut-an-try, e.g. dichotomic search).
Column 9. Means to control:
P : Preventive, i.e. means to reinforce system robustness, C : Corrective, i.e.
means to bring the system back from emergency to normal.
Column 10. Management of uncertainties: ability to account for uncer-





1. Methods belonging to the same class have not necessarily equivalent per-
formances; the table takes into account the best of the existing performances.
Indeed, the table attempts to highlight strengths of a class of methods, even if
some of its members do not meet them. E.g., only some automatic learning
methods have the ability of interpretability. On the other hand, interpretability
may have various meanings; e.g. a decision tree describes the physical phe-
nomena at hand in a synthetic way (the parameters and their threshold values
driving the phenomena), whereas a
 
-NN uncovers similarities of a given state
with its neighbour states.
2. The table highlights complementary rather than competitive aspects of
the various techniques.
3. In terms of computational performances, the effect of power system
size is not considered here. This depends very strongly on various factors, in
particular method implementation, software and hardware environments, etc.
Similarly, the possibility of exploiting parallel computations is not taken into
account.
4. An empty box means that the considered criterion is not of concern for
the corresponding technique.
4. POSTFACE
Over the four past decades, the necessity of implementing in the control
center dynamic security assessment functions has been repeatedly claimed;
without success: adequate techniques were missing and the necessity of their
use was not felt strongly enough.
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After this 40-year (seeming) lethargy, we start now moving fairly fast: from
lack of techniques to a panoply of techniques with overlapping possibilities.
And demanding practicing engineers replace reluctant ones.
A key issue for good choices and adequate solutions is the synergy of prac-





The equal-area criterion (EAC) is an old graphical method that allows as-
sessing the transient stability of electric power systems in a simple and com-
prehensive way. This method was developed and popularized at the end of the
30’s and its origin is not very well known. Most of the first references to EAC
are often made in books like [Dahl, 1938, Skilling and Yamakawa, 1940, Kim-
bark, 1948], which are among the first to describe and use it, mainly for the
assessment of transient stability of one-machine connected to an "infinite" bus1
(or of a two-machine system).
One of the main appealing characteristics of EAC is that its use eliminates
the need of computing the swing curves of the system, thus saving a con-
siderable amount of work, even if, in its “pure” statement, very simplified
assumptions were made regarding power system modeling. Indeed, the system
was represented by the classical model having the following features2:
synchronous machines are represented by a constant voltage source behind
the transient reactance
synchronous machines have constant mechanical power and negligible
damping
loads are represented by constant impedance characteristics.
1The infinite bus being referred is regarded as a synchronous machine having zero impedance and infinite
inertia, not affected by the amount of current drawn from it. It is a source of constant voltage (both in phase
and magnitude) and frequency.
2Classical model, that is considered still valid for assessing first swing stability, is referred in this monograph
as "Simplified Modeling" (SM) and used mainly in FILTRA for contingency filtering purposes. (See
Chapter 5.)
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Later, it was shown in the different applications and extensions of the method
(ending with SIME method), that these simplifying assumptions in system
modeling were not necessary for the method to work, and that it is also useful for
assessing stability phenomena more complicated than first swing instabilities
like multiswing and backswing ones, in large multimachine systems.
As described below, EAC relies in the concept of energy and is a powerful
tool for assessing stability margins and limits, and for appraising the influence
on stability of various system parameters. It is also very useful for explaining
preventive and emergency control actions taken in industry for improving sta-
bility and, in general, for providing insight into the very physical phenomena.
1.2 Principle
Consider a machine connected to an infinite bus system.
 
                (A.1)
where

= inertia coefficient of the machine
= angle between the machine’s rotor and the infinite bus  
= mechanical power input to the machine  
= electrical power output of the machine 
= accelerating power.
From eq. (A.1)           (A.2)
 
                (A.3)
where

 = rotor speed of the machine
  = rated angular frequency of a synchronously rotating frame.
Multiplying both sides of eq. (A.1) by
    results in
 




                   (A.5)
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Multiplying both sides of eq. (A.5) by
  




              (A.6)
Integrating the equation between the pre-fault stable equilibrium angle   
to any (during- or post-fault) angle  yields
 
 
       
      (A.7)
or, by virtue of eq. (A.2),
 
           
 
    (A.8)
Hence
     	    
      (A.9)
In the above equation,        is the relative speed of the machine with
respect to the infinite bus. If the system is first swing stable then this speed
must return to zero when the accelerating power is either zero or of opposite
sign to the rotor speed. For example, a monotonously increasing rotor angle 
implies        ; the angle  stops increasing at a maximum value  
when        ; this only happens when a negative accelerating power  
damps the speed from        to 0 . This process can be expressed as
follows:
      
 
               ; (A.10)




             . (A.11)
If the accelerating power is plotted as a function of  as shown in Fig. A.1,
eqs (A.10) and (A.11) can be interpreted as composed of two areas, one ac-
celerating (positive) area    and one decelerating (negative) area     ;
these two areas become equal for     with         . The stability
limit occurs when       and         ; the system is then said to
be critically stable. This is the definition of the EAC, stated in the following
equation:








            . (A.12)









Figure A.1. Equal-area criterion
For this condition,   coincides with the unstable equilibrium point      
with   as the post-fault steady-state stable equilibrium angle for the OMIB
system shown in Fig. A.2. If the pre-fault and post-fault configurations are the
same, then   coincides with the unstable equilibrium point        shown
in Fig. A.2.
Let us now assume that the machine is connected to an infinite bus by a
double circuit transmission line. Further, let us assume that the fault occurs on
one of the lines, and search for the critical clearing angle,   . Figure A.2 shows
the power-angle curves for the three different cases, namely pre-, during- and
post-fault: the power-angle curves are generally displaced sinusoids. To obtain
the critical clearing angle we equate the two areas    and     which,
according to Fig. A.2, are expressed as
    
  
 
             (A.13)
   
       	
 
              (A.14)
Integration of
      and        does not pose any problems. Thus for




               
       	  
               (A.15)
This involves the solution of a simple trigonometric equation.
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π−δ( 0 )
δm( )










Figure A.2. Equal-area criterion for obtaining the critical clearing angle.
1.3 Two-machine system
For applying the equal-area criterion to a two-machine system it is necessary
to reduce this system to a one-machine infinite bus one. In this way, all the
concepts developed above are applicable. The derivation of the swing equations
of the equivalent system follows the pattern used in

2.2 of Chapter 2.
2. APPLICATION EXAMPLE
The main objective of this section is to show the curves obtained when using
this "pure" EAC together with a T-D pogram. To this end, we consider the
one-machine infinite bus system displayed in Fig. A.3 and plot the EAC curves
using a MATLAB. The system has one synchronous machine connected to an
infinite bus through two identical parallel lines. The contingency consists of
a three-phase short-circuit applied at the middle of one of the transmission
lines (as shown in the figure), that is tripped when clearing the fault. The
synchronous machine is represented using the classical model; its dynamic
data and initial operating condition are displayed in the figure.
The resulting power-angle curves are displayed in Fig. A.4 for two different
clearing times: one slightly larger, the other slightly smaller than CCT.
An interesting aspect of this application example is to stress that, when using
the EAC together with a T-D program, it is not necessary to compute the areas
under the electrical power curve because the system response naturally makes
the electrical curve either to cross the mechanical power curve at point  
(unstable case) or to go back after reaching the angle   at which    and
   become equal (stable case).















































= 362 ms (b)
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= 361 ms
Figure A.4. Power-Angle curves for the considered contingency under different clearing times.
This observation is readily generalized to the EAC application to a multima-
chine system after its reduction to the relevant OMIB. Expressions (2.19) and
















Figure A.5. Power-Angle curve of a “too unstable” case.
Finally, let us consider a “too unstable” case, where the curves
  
and  
do not cross anymore. This case is displayed in Fig. A.5. This case
complements the discussion of

3.3 of Chapter 2. We see that for making the
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system recover a post-fault equilibrium point, it is necessary to change either
the mechanical power (if the clearing time is fixed) or the electrical power (if
the mechanical power is fixed). The
      expressed by eq. (2.30) is clearly
indicated.
Appendix B
DATA OF SIMULATED SYSTEMS
This appendix provides data on a sample of power systems with various
characteristics, in terms of: size (number of machines, buses, lines); pre-
vailing type of generation; structure (radial vs meshed)
models (of machines, loads and transmission network elements)
types of transient (in)stability: first- or multi-swing; plant- or inter-area
mode
operational practices (T-D program; (in)stability criteria; maximum inte-
gration period)
types of studies: preventive, for analysis, sensitivity analysis and preventive
control; emergency, for predictive assessment and corrective control.
The systems have been used throughout the monograph to illustrate SIME’s
specifics and performances. Detailed system data like machine and transmis-
sion network parameters are given below only for the small three-machine test
power system described in Section 1.
1. THREE-MACHINE TEST SYSTEM
Due to its simplicity, this test power system is used for illustrating the basic
principles of SIME and derived techniques for preventive TSA&C. It was
adapted from [EPRI, 1977] and also used in [Sauer and Pai, 1998, Anderson
and Fouad, 1993].
Figure B.1 displays its one-line diagram and Table B.1 its main charac-
teristics. Table B.2 describes the dynamic data of the machines and their
corresponding excitation control system. This latter is an IEEE Type 1 AVR,
presented in Fig. B.2.
Simulation data of the contingencies used in the examples are shown in
Table B.3.
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Figure B.2. Automatic Voltage Regulator Type I model. Adapted from [IEEE, 1968]
Table B.1. Three-machine test system main characteristics. Adapted from [EPRI, 1977]
Nr of buses 9
Nr of lines 9
Nr of detailed generators 3
Load model Constant impedance characteristic
The simulations use SIME coupled with MATLAB [MATLAB, 1999].
On a stable T-D simulation, the maximum integration period is 3 s.
Table B.4 describes the contingencies considered for the simulations on
the three-machine system. They all consist of applying a three-phase short-
circuit to one bus and tripping one line when clearing the fault. Thus, two
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Table B.2. Machine and exciter data for the three-machine test system
Machine Data Exciter Data

Parameters
        Parameters All machines 
(s) 23.64 6.4 3.01  20
(s
 
/rad) 12.54 3.39 1.59 
(pu) 0.146 0.8958 1.3125   (s) 0.2   (pu) 0.0608 0.1198 0.1813  1.0
(pu) 0.0969 0.8645 1.2578   (s) 0.314  
(pu) 0.0969 0.1969 0.25 	 0.063
    (s) 8.96 6.0 5.89  	 (s) 0.35
    (s) 0.31 0.535 0.6

See Fig. B.2.
Table B.3. Three-machine power system simulation data
Nr of pre-contingency operating states 1
Nr of contingencies 12
Type of contingencies Three-phase short circuit applied at one bus
and cleared by tripping one line
Event times 0-10 cycles
Simulation time 3 seconds
Table B.4. Contingencies of the three-machine system
Cont. Nr (faulted bus) Cont. Nr (faulted bus) Line tripped
1 (5) 2 (7) 5 - 7
3 (7) 4 (8) 7 - 8
5 (8) 6 (9) 8 - 9
7 (9) 8 (6) 9 - 6
9 (6) 10 (4) 6 - 4
11 (4) 12 (5) 4 - 5
contingencies were defined for each of the lines shown in the third column.
The values in the two first columns give the identification number and, between
brackets, the faulted node for each contingency.
2. HYDRO-QUEBEC POWER SYSTEM
Hydro-Québec power system main characteristics and simulation data are
displayed in Tables B.5 and B.6 respectively. A very general one-line diagram
showing the structure of the system is given in Fig. B.3.
The simulations are performed by SIME coupled with the Hydro-Québec
transient stability program ST-600 [Valette et al., 1987].
On a stable simulation, the maximum T-D integration period is 10 s.
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Figure B.3. One-line diagram of the Hydro-Québec power system. Adapted from [Zhang et
al., 1996]
Table B.5. Hydro-Québec power system main characteristics
Nr of buses 661
Nr of lines 858
Nr of detailed generators 86
Nr of synchronous condensers 8
Load model Nonlinear load characteristic
Total power 36,682 MW
Table B.6. Hydro-Québec power system simulation data
Nr of pre-contingency operating states 1
Nr of contingencies 377
Type of contingencies Three-phase short-circuit applied at one bus
and cleared by tripping one line
Event times 95 ms
Simulation time 10 seconds
3. EPRI AMERICAN TEST SYSTEMS
N.B. The data presented in this section are adapted from [EPRI, 1995]. These
data are used by some utilities in North America and represent real electrical
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power systems. For confidentiality reasons, the original data provided by the
utilities have been modified and the resulting data are used here only as a
realistic test bed for the TSA&C techniques developed in this monograph.
The T-D program coupled with SIME for simulating these systems is ETMSP
[EPRI, 1994].
3.1 Test power system C
Test power system C is the smallest test system given in [EPRI, 1995]. Its
main features and simulation data are displayed in Tables B.7 and B.8.
On a stable simulation, the maximum T-D integration period is 5 s.
Table B.7. EPRI test system C main characteristics. Adapted from [EPRI, 1995]
Nr of buses 434
Nr of lines 2357
Nr of classical generators 74
Nr of detailed generators 14
Load model Constant impedance characteristic
Total power 350,749 MW
Table B.8. EPRI test system C simulation data. Adapted from [EPRI, 1995]
Nr of pre-contingency operating states 7
Nr of contingencies 36
Pre-contingency/contingency
combinations 252
Type of contingencies Three-phase short circuit applied at one bus
and cleared by tripping one or several lines
Event times 81.5 ms, 92 ms, 95 ms
Simulation time 5 seconds
3.2 Test power system A
Test power system A is the largest test system provided in [EPRI, 1995]. Its
main features and simulation data are displayed in Tables B.9 and B.10. If two
state variables are assigned to each classical synchronous machine model (301
machines) and a minimum of seven state variables to each detailed model (376
machines), the system is thus represented by over 3200 state variables.
Table B.10 shows that this system considers “remedial measures” for con-
trolling some instabilities, making it very useful for comparing the effects of
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Table B.9. EPRI test system A main characteristics. Adapted from [EPRI, 1995]
Nr of buses 4112
Nr of lines 6091
Nr of generators 627 (346 with detailed and 281 with classical model)
Synchronous condensers 36 (25 with detailed and 11 with classical model)
Load model 2240 Nonlinear static load characteristics
14 large dynamic loads (synchronous motors,
5 with detailed and 9 with classical model)
Nr of SVC’s 2
Total generation 76,1709 MW and 24,315 MVar
Table B.10. EPRI test system A simulation data. Adapted from [EPRI, 1995]
Nr of pre-contingency
operating states 1
Nr of contingencies 22
Type of contingency applying a three phase fault to one bus and tripping one or several
lines when clearing the fault
Remedial Schemes Scheme 1:
at 0.25 s after the fault application, shed loads at buses 1219, 1351,
793, 1267, 1806, 842, 1826, 1757, 999 and 965 for a total amount
of 2400 MW
Scheme 2:
Dropping pumps in the following steps
(all times are measured after the fault inception):
 at 0.2333 s, 370 MW in buses 2230 and 2411
 at 0.25 s, 350 MW in buses 2617 and 2069
 at 0.3 s, 96 MW of pumps (bus 2090) and 1432 MW of generation
on the sending end (buses 421, 422, 3357 and 3237)
Ramp up DC line (between buses 485 and 947) in 10  steps at times:
0.4 s, 0.5 s, 0.6 s, 0.7 s, 0.8 s for a total of 1000 MW increase in DC flow
Scheme 3:
Dropping pumps in the following steps
(all times are measured after the fualt inception):
 at 0.2333 s, 300 MW in bus 2230
 at 0.25 s, 177 MW in bus 2069
 at 0.30 s, 96 MW in bus 2090
Event times 0-4 cycles (approx. 66 ms)
Maximum
simulation time 10 seconds
Stable cases 21 (with respect to the event times)
Unstable cases 1 (with respect to the event times)
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remedial (or emergency) control actions with the ones of preventive control
actions.
Original simulation data from [EPRI, 1995] was modified by creating addi-
tional contingencies from each one of the four contingencies which simulate
remedial schemes (described in Table B.10). Thus, each one of contingencies
1, 4, 5 and 7 give rise to two contingencies:
one which does not simulate the remedial scheme (Contingencies Nr 1, 4,
5 and 7)
another contingency modeling the scheme (Contingencies Nr 23, 24, 25 and
26).
4. BRAZILIAN POWER SYSTEM
A model of the Brazilian South-Southeast-Centerwest power system de-
scribed in [Bettiol, 1999] is considered in the present monograph. This model,
which represents a major part of the Brazilian power system (approximately
80  of the electric energy market), is shown schematically in Fig. B.4. Main
characteristics and simulation data of this test power system are displayed in
Tables B.11 and B.12.
Figure B.4. Schematic diagram of the Brazilian South-Southeast-Centerwest power system.
Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
The T-D program coupled here with SIME is ST-600 [Valette et al., 1987].
On a stable simulation, the T-D simulation period is 4 s when using the
detailed model (DM).
The classical simplified model (SM) is available and valid for this power
system. This advantage is used when implementing the Filtering Ranking
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Table B.11. Brazilian South-Southeast-Centerwest system main characteristics.
Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
Nr of buses 1185
Nr of lines 1990
Nr of detailed generators 56
Load model Constant impedance characteristic
Total power 33,299 MW
Table B.12. Brazilian South-Southeast-Centerwest system simulation data.
Adapted from [Bettiol, 1999]
Nr of pre-contingency operating states 2
Nr of contingencies 850
Pre-contingency/contingency
combinations 1700
Type of contingencies Three-phase short circuit applied at one bus
and cleared by tripping one or several lines
Event times 0-10 cycles (approx 167 ms)
Simulation time 4 s for DM and 1 s for SM
and Assessment (FILTRA) scheme (see Section 2 of Chapter 5). The two
pre-contingency operating states correspond to the plant- and inter-area mode
examples given in Chapter 5.
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